

Turkey- Weak Link of Imperialism

R. Yürükoğlu

Introduction by William Pomeroy

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Comrade Bilen!

**We take an oath that
we will sacrifice
our whole life entirely to the liberation of
the working class and our people,
That we will deepen
our loyalty to Leninist principles and
the cause of revolution
and that we will not compromise this consciousness
or honour,
That we will, like you, stubbornly and fervently
believe in the power of
the working class and the victory of revolution,
That we will neither be overawed by success
or pessimistic in retreat,
That we will wage a persistent and
Leninist struggle
against every manifestation of opportunism,
That we will always remain loyal to
Leninism and
to proletarian internationalism,
to the Soviet Union,
the land of Lenin and the fortress of revolutions,
That we will follow your road of
self-sacrificing, unyielding and
honourable struggle!**

Introduction

by William Pomeroy

To understand a political situation clearly and in depth, and to know precisely what to do about it — these are two fundamental requirements of revolutionary leadership. They are qualities that spring from a Marxist-Leninist theory of society and of social forces, qualities that distinguish the responsible revolutionary strategist and tactician from the irresponsible sloganiser.

This book by R. Yurukoglu, fully illustrates the truth of this assertion. It is a profound analysis of present-day Turkish society, seen both in its broad international setting and in its inner, national circumstances. It sets forth in precise terms steps to be taken to meet the revolutionary crisis that has been developing in Turkey.

Although it is addressed mainly to the Turkish working people and to those who have stepped forward to help mobilise and to lead them in the struggle for social emancipation and for socialism, this is also a book to be studied with profit by all who have similar aims in other countries. To an increasing extent, more so than in past epochs, the revolutionary struggles of peoples in all parts of the world are indivisible, not merely impinging on the lives of peoples everywhere but calling forth active support and sympathy on an international scale. The experiences of struggle in each country, and how a movement goes about its tasks in connection with it, are a valued reservoir of theoretical and practical knowledge for all peoples.

This international significance of a revolutionary situation that

occurs within the borders of one country has become greatly accentuated by two major factors in the contemporary world.

One of these is the broad division of the world, since the Russian October Revolution, into two main social systems: socialism and capitalism. Some time ago this process reached a point where each national revolution or social transformation, in whatever corner of the world, became part of a decisive shift of forces in favour of the rising system of socialism, simultaneously subtracting from the capitalist system. This great historical trend causes the attention of people everywhere to focus with increasing interest on a coup in Afghanistan, a national liberation movement in Namibia, a massive demonstration in Teheran, a general strike in Istanbul. Each can lead to an important further tipping in the balance of forces between the two world systems.

The other major factor is more intensified organisation of the imperialist features within the capitalist system, tending to accelerate as the capitalist part of the world has shrunk. In all respects — in the activities of multinational corporations, the operations of banks and other financial agencies, the creation of military and political blocs — the major imperialist powers have sought to knit together under their control the remaining non-socialist countries. This has occurred in a more thorough fashion in the contemporary era of neo-colonialism than it ever did occur in the era of outright colonialism, and has been intended not only to enable a more intensive exploitation to take place but to serve as a barrier to revolutionary change.

In recent decades imperialism — in particular United States and British imperialism — has had a near-fanatical obsession with the weaving of chains or cordons to keep revolution from its preserves. This reached a peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the linking together of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Such military blocs, directed at socialist countries and national liberation movements alike, have been great strategic failures in the military sense. As blocs for exploitation they have had even more disastrous consequences, leading literally to an intensified development of weak links in the imperialist system. SEATO disintegrated and finally fell apart with the victory of the Vietnamese-Laotian-Cambodian revolution that it was set up in part to prevent. NATO has been riven by internal dissension and is felt increasingly as a burden by the people of its member countries. CENTO began to come apart when it was

breached by the revolution in Iraq.

Perhaps the most resounding snapping of a link in the imperialist chain, both in the military bloc and economic exploitation senses, has been the anti-Shah, anti-imperialist revolution in Iran. This has simultaneously removed an imperialist "policeman" from the Middle East, and has caused enormous losses in trade, investment and loan capital to the imperialist powers. Iran, rich in oil revenues, with a powerful imperialist-supplied army, had seemed a strong imperialist ally, but a revolutionary situation grew and matured with remarkable rapidity, featured by tremendous mass action. The reason for this lay in the heavy exploitation and oppression of the Iranian people that were embodied in Iran's alliance with imperialism.

This book was written prior to the revolutionary victory of the Iranian people over the Shah and his imperialist alliance, a victory in which the underground Communist Tudeh Party and the workers it influences played a major part. Certain aspects of that revolution reinforce the arguments put forward by Comrade Yurukoglu, a central theme of which is that countries of medium development such as Turkey and Iran, have become "weak links" in the imperialist chain.

The case of Iran revealed some significant weaknesses in that chain constructed by imperialism in the region known as the Middle East. As a military bloc, CENTO embodied such strategic considerations as the proximity of the Iran and Turkey to the Soviet Union, which it was presumed would give an offensive advantage to imperialism in an anti-Soviet war, and the understanding that the imperialist powers could make use of the military alliance to intervene to put down national revolutionary movements within bloc members. The Iranian experience demolished the validity of these tenets. Because of its proximity the Soviet Union turned out to be in a position to defend the Iranian revolution, effectively warning imperialist powers against intervening. Despite its military installations and its 40,000 military advisers in Iran, US imperialism was unable to make more than feeble gestures at intervention, restrained not only by Soviet proximity but by fear of generating a massive anti-imperialist reaction throughout the Middle East. In addition, the interventionist desires of imperialism were checked by the remembrance of the great anti-war, anti-imperialist movement that arose in the US itself during the aggressive war in Vietnam.

These considerations add weight to the theory of the "weak link" that is advanced by the author. They are a further encouragement to the

Turkish people to break the link with imperialism and to shatter the neo-colonial capitalist system that exploits them.

That this should occur has, however, nothing to do with the false imperialist theory of the "falling dominoes" that contends that a revolution in one country will lead to revolutions one after another in neighbouring countries. Imperialism invented this theory as an excuse for intervening in countries where revolutions take place, arguing that entire regions can be "lost" if a single revolution is not put down as it arises.

Countries are not dominoes and revolutions do not spread in such a fashion. What is true is that in virtually all subordinate countries in the capitalist system the conditions of neo-colonial exploitation and oppression provide the setting for the growth of revolutionary situations.

It must be noted that Comrade Yurukoglu's book points to the rise of a revolutionary situation in Turkey from as long ago as 1968 onwards. If this development is hastened from now on it will not be because the Iranian people refused to endure their conditions any longer and have overthrown their rulers; it will be because imperialism will now seek to intensify its control and its presence in Turkey and because the collaborating Turkish bourgeoisie will try to use more repressive means to keep the working class in subjugation. As proven in Iran, similar methods by the Shah's ruthless SAVAK only led to a magnifying of revolutionary sentiment.

A potentiality for revolt exists, indeed, all over the Middle East. In none of the countries of the region will it come from outside, from Iran or the Soviet Union or anywhere else. It will come from the maturing of conditions within each country. If one revolution does succeed another in the region, it will be due to the common reaching of the point of revolt.

Turkey was recruited into both NATO and CENTO, to serve, as the imperialists put it, as the bridge or link between those two military blocs. By its membership in these alliances, Turkey was drawn ever more surely into the same trap of heavy military burdens, loan capital indebtedness, unequal trade relations, and retarded industrial development that have featured all imperialist "partnerships" with underdeveloped and medium developed countries.

It was in consequence of this that, as Comrade Yurukoglu points out, Turkey has become a "weak link" in the imperialist system, driven into crisis through the combined exploitation by foreign capital and by a

rapacious native bourgeoisie allied with foreign capital. Turkey shares this situation with numerous countries of under development and medium development – in Asia, Latin America and Africa – making of them no dominoes but an inevitable series of weak links where revolutionary situations are likely to mature. The revolutionary movements in each of these countries will find it useful to study the analysis made by Comrade Yurukoglu.

What is undertaken here is not a generalised theory of revolution, but a careful analysis in depth of the conditions and factors that have produced an organised working class in Turkey, prepared to struggle with a rising level of mass action for anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly objectives. Equally carefully, the analysis includes a study of the Turkish bourgeoisie, its character, its behaviour, its limitations, its tendencies with imperialist approval to turn to fascism as the means of imposing super-exploitation on the workers.

This study of the conditions within Turkey, particularly the relatively rapid growth of industry from 1950, of the industrial working class, and of class organisation, comprises the meat of the present book. It has more than mere analysis: Comrade Yurukoglu has taken the pains to clarify his method as well, to define the terms and to explain the formulations that he applies to the Turkish situation. He has produced both a theoretical and a practical, programmatic work, a Marxist approach in the polemical style of Lenin.

Finally, Comrade Yurukoglu discusses and defines the tasks confronting the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP): the strengthening of the TKP as the indispensable subjective factor without which no revolutionary situation can be carried to its victorious conclusion, the improvement of the quality of party cadres, the building of a mass party (i.e., a party close to the masses and able to lead them in growing mass action), the need to conduct an ideological struggle against opportunism and left extremism, and the necessity to find the forms of organisation suitable to the developing situation. All of these are discussed in relation to circumstances peculiar to Turkey and to the Turkish working class.

It is noteworthy that precise forms of organisation or forms of struggle are not projected. The Turkish working class is not specifically told to rely on armed struggle, or on legal struggle, or on definite combinations of these. What is stressed is the need for a party capability to meet a developing situation flexibly. However, it is urged that the

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workers form suitable organisations not just for defence against fascism but for attack against the fascist system of suppression in order to destroy it.

Weak links of imperialism do not rust away or collapse by themselves. They are shattered by the revolutionary struggles of the people, led by revolutionary organisations with a principled, scientific ideology.

Comrade Yurukoglu's book is a powerful weapon for advancing that struggle in Turkey.

William Pomeroy

Preface

In an article entitled "The Race to Save Turkey", the American periodical *Institutional Investor* asks, "Will Turkey turn back from the threshold?" The West German *Wirtschaftskurier* talks of "Turkey breaking with the West". In Britain, the *Financial Times* devotes one of its longest supplements to Turkey and remarks, "A very deep and real crisis is at hand in relations between Turkey and the West". From this it goes on to comment on the possibility of Turkey breaking with the West. "The Nine" are discussing Turkey. Turkey is one of the main questions of the day in NATO. The "Position on Turkey" is a subject for Labour-Tory disputes in the British Parliament. The largest banks and finance centres in the world "review" Turkey.

Save Turkey from "what"? From which "threshold" might it turn back? To what does the "West" refer? What is meant by "breaking with the West"? What is all this about "Turkey"? Has it been recently discovered? The obvious answer to all these questions is this: Turkey is a weak link in the chain of imperialism! The imperialists are aware of this, and are alarmed by it. To "save" Turkey means to prevent the weak link from breaking. What they call the "West" is imperialism. What they call the "threshold" is the revolutionary situation.

Turkey is a weak link. Moreover, it is a link which is day by day being weakened by the constantly maturing crisis and revolutionary situation. This reality seen by imperialism, is also seen by the bourgeoisie of Turkey. Not simply seen, but felt deep-down. The

bourgeoisie is frightened.

Mass movements, revolutionary struggle, whatever they are aimed against, frighten the bourgeoisie. In our country, mass movements, the revolutionary impetus within the masses, is aimed against imperialism, the collaborating monopoly bourgeoisie and the fascist escalation. It is against unemployment and inflation. But it also objectively threatens the whole of the capitalist "regime", built on keeping the masses apolitical and pacified.

It is for this reason that the question of "saving the regime" is on everybody's tongue in recent years. The bourgeoisie is trying every alternative in this respect. It lets loose the fascists. It calls in the army. Some say a Justice Party-Republican People's Party coalition. Right social democracy is another possibility offered as "hope" in some circles.

In a recent interview published in the newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, Ecevit openly said that his aim is to prevent an "explosion"(!) In all truth, he has done and continues to do everything in his power for the success of attempts, as the imperialists put it, to "save" to "turn it back" from the "threshold". In taking "precautions" against the fascist escalation, right social democracy is aiming at pacifying the anti-fascist struggle of the masses, rather than the fascists themselves. In praising American imperialism while showing "hostility" towards Europe, it is attempting to exhaust our people's anti-imperialist feelings.

In short, imperialism, the finance oligarchy, and those merging with them, see that Turkey is a weak link, see the revolutionary situation and the extraordinary impetus and momentum of the masses. They see, are frightened and are thrashing about.

Years ago, the sole party of our working class, its fighting vanguard the TKP, spoke of the realities of Turkey which are showing themselves so clearly today. In 1974, the General Secretary of the TKP, Comrade I. Bilen, commented, "These are the dimensions which the conflict and struggle between classes have taken in the country today. The country is divided into two enemy poles — two camps. This process will develop even further. The data, the events point in this direction". (Comrade I. Bilen's speech on "May days in Turkey", on 30 April 1974, see *Bilen Yoldas Cok Yasa, Iscinin Sesi Publications* No: 4, p.79)

What Comrade Bilen said has come to pass. Every year the class

struggles became harsher. The division into two camps, the polarisation, became even more crystallised. And in 1976, Comrade Bilen summarised the essence of these developments with the following sentence: "Turkey is a weak point of imperialism". Within this same process, the TKP, conscious of the growing responsibility imposed by the day, and under the leadership of Comrade Bilen, brought down opportunism and smashed liquidationism. It leapt forward into battle to fulfill its historical responsibilities and is struggling to do so.

Both the working class and the bourgeoisie give their clear answer and take a definite position on the question — *break or save* the weak link. It is only petty-bourgeois socialists and opportunists who are frightened of giving a clear answer or taking a definite position. It is these, who, for the purpose of side-stepping the responsibilities of the day, say, "Turkey is not a weak link". They deny the existence of a revolutionary situation and, worse still, accuse Leninists of "revolutionary romanticism". They call adherence to principles "sectarianism". They talk of "becoming isolated from the masses" (for "masses" understand RPP!). They do not see that it is not Leninist methods, but pacifism, that will isolate the revolutionaries from the masses.

The TKP persists in the struggle against imperialism, the fascist escalation, the collaborating monopolists and their fifth columns. Victory in the struggle on each of these two fronts is a single whole. The TKP, which symbolises the unity of the working class on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, will become strengthened only in such struggles. It is only through the further strengthening of the TKP that the worker-peasant alliance, the National Democratic Front of our people, and other organisations of struggle can be established and consolidated. On the path to victory, all things are centred on the strengthening of the TKP on a Leninist basis, in the Leninist struggle.

"*Turkey — Weak Link of Imperialism*" was first published as a pamphlet in February 1978. The pamphlet, which gave a profound analysis of the main aspects of a very important question, received wide-spread attention. On the other hand, opportunists and petty-bourgeois socialists attacked it. For this reason, and as demanded by the escalated, new level of struggle against opportunism, both breadth and depth were added to the second edition of the pamphlet to produce this book. In one sense, this book is a second edition of the

original pamphlet. In another, with the clarification brought to many important questions, much of it is new.

Comrade Yurukoglu uses a sound methodology in his treatment and explanation of Turkey as a weak link. He looks at it both within the broader context of the imperialist system, and from the point of view of the crisis of capitalism in Turkey. In this way, the book also serves as a Leninist, scientific analysis of Turkey's economic and social structure. The book shows, in a scientific and concrete manner, the working and living conditions of our working class and its extreme exploitation as an integral part of this structure. In studying both the country's social-economic structure and the working and living conditions of our working class, it at the same time deals with the revolutionary situation and the fascist escalation. The book shows the necessity of an advanced democratic people's revolution.

On his 75th birthday, Comrade Bilen gave the young this advice: Believe in the power of the working class. Believe in the victory of the revolution. Wage a persistent, Leninist struggle against any manifestation of opportunism... With this book, Comrade Yurukoglu is following Comrade Bilen's advice. The book reflects a passionate belief in the TKP, in the power of the working class and the people, in revolution. The breaking of the weak link reflects the longing to take our land into the bright future of socialism. It reflects unyielding loyalty to the resolution, revolutionary spirit, principled stand and Leninist science of Bolshevism, against the pacifism, tailism, hostility to theory, the indecisiveness and wavering of centrism, characteristic of Menshevism. And most important of all, it gives a Leninist, principled answer to the question: "How to break the weak link?"

In short, Comrade Yurukoglu is putting into practice the oath taken at the celebration of the 75th birthday of the TKP's Leninist leader, Comrade Bilen.

Emine Engin

Introduction to the Expanded Second Edition

In his speech at the Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties (29-30 June 1976), Comrade I. Bilen, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey, said, "Our party believes that the strengthening of the anti-imperialist and democratic movements in Turkey is rooted in objective conditions, that the polarisation is more and more acute (...) that *Turkey is a weak point of imperialism*". The General Secretary of the TKP repeated the same idea in the report of the Central Committee presented at the 1977 Party Conference. This idea, put forward by the leader of the general staff of the working class of Turkey, its vanguard party, is of extreme importance for the revolutionary movement in Turkey.

The rapidly maturing revolutionary situation. The rapidly increasing danger of fascism. The fact that this danger and the revolutionary situation cannot be separated from each other. Apart from transitional alternatives, either an authoritarian order (open or covert fascism), or an advanced democratic people's revolution that will grow into socialism. There is no middle road. The question of alliances. Ways of taking the country to revolution by ensuring the broadest front of the people against the partnership of domestic and foreign monopolies... We could add much more. All these questions are related to the Marxist-Leninist analysis made by Comrade Bilen.

It is this subject which we will examine — in as short a form as possible — in this book. Only let us from the start point out that it was

impossible to examine all aspects within this framework. For this reason, we will stress those aspects of the subject which have been little — or not at all — examined in our movement. We will put the emphasis on the struggle against the increasingly more apparent disease of opportunism.

R.Y.

1. The World and Turkey

Underlying the strategy and tactics of the world communist parties is the Leninist idea that the world revolutionary process is universal. Thus, when evaluating the objective and subjective conditions for revolution in a given country, we should consider that country within the context of the world as a whole.

Turkey must also be considered within the world context, as part of a whole. We cannot understand Turkey's place or role in the world, the situation our country is in, if, like a worm in an apple, we look only at events taking place within her boundaries. For this reason, it is necessary to look first at the kind of world in which Turkey is situated.

The Birth of the World Capitalist System

The "world capitalist economy" of which Turkey is today a part appeared with the growth of competitive capitalism into imperialism.

In the period of free competition, there was trade and war between countries and seizure of colonies by force. However, there was no world system. Already in that period, capitalism had created a world market, had spread its net over the world through trade. Nevertheless, this was a superficial unity based on the exchange of commodities. On the other hand, the "world capitalist economy", which appeared together with

imperialism, is an integral whole based on production, on relations much deeper than the trade relations of the previous period.

Together with the formation of the world capitalist economy, individual countries became parts of a system. This system is called the "system of international capitalist economic relations". It rests on an *international division of labour*. Division of labour means that everyone is inter-related, inter-dependent. Yet this does not in any way contradict relations of exploitation. For the process of reproduction of international monopoly capital stamps the international division of labour with the mark of exploitation. We will return to this later.

In the period preceding imperialism, there was exchange of commodities and plunder. Imperialism implies the export of capital. Capital leaves England for Africa. *The export of capital means the export of the capitalist mode of production*. In this way, together with imperialism, capitalism is developing rapidly in every part of the world. With the expansion of capital beyond national borders into the international arena, we can now speak of the "international exploitation of labour". Now labour is being exploited on a world scale. At the same time, the basic contradiction of capitalism, the contradiction between labour and capital, is being spread over the whole world. This is one of the most important results engendered by imperialism. And it is this result which led Lenin to make one of his most important contributions to Marxism: If capital exported from the metropolises at the same time brings with it capitalist relations of production, this means that the world *as a whole has become ripe for socialism*.

To say that the world capitalist economy as a whole has become ripe for socialism does not mean that there will be socialist revolutions in all countries at once. World history teaches that revolutions take place in countries known as "weak links".

Revolutionary Centre-Weak Link

What does "weak link" mean? The discussions that have continued around the concepts "weak link" and "revolutionary centre" in the Turkish revolutionary movement since 1968, show that persistent and deliberate attempts have been made to confuse the matter.

There are essentially three wrong views put forward on the

question of weak link – revolutionary centre. The *first* is the view, generally held by “leftists” “guided” by a lack of theory, that the “world revolutionary centre is in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”. The *second*, in general defended by opportunists, denies the first view, but gives no clear answer at all as to where the revolutionary centre is. However, if we read their writings with care, we understand that what they want to say is that, “the world revolutionary centre is in the developed capitalist countries, because that is where the proletariat exists”. The *third* is the view held by adherents of the new social democracy called “Euro-communism” – which has gone far beyond opportunism – that, “there is no longer any revolutionary centre in the world today. Every man for himself”.

All three views are totally wrong. They all – first and foremost, the third – conceal the role of the Soviet Union in the world revolutionary process. The second view fails to understand the phenomenon of imperialism and what it implies.

In order to better see why these three views are wrong, let us ask our first question: Where is the world revolutionary centre?

The world revolutionary centre is that place where the proletarian movement, the proletarian struggle, has reached its highest stage.

As determined by the sharpening of the contradictions of capitalism and the growing dimensions of the proletarian struggle, the world revolutionary centre was first located in *Britain*. Later, in the period of revolutions, and with the glorious struggles of the French proletariat, this centre shifted to *France*. With the retreat of the proletarian movement in France following the bloody suppression of the 1871 Paris Commune uprising, the revolutionary centre then shifted to *Germany*. Marx and Engels explained this in the Manifesto. In a later period, commenting on the same subject, Lenin wrote: “Britain was the model of a country in which, as Engels put it, the bourgeoisie had produced, alongside a bourgeois aristocracy, a very bourgeois upper stratum of the proletariat. For several decades this advanced capitalist country lagged behind in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. France seemed to have exhausted the strength of the proletariat in two heroic working class revolts of 1848 and 1871 against the bourgeoisie that made very considerable contributions to world-historical development. Leadership in the International of the working class movement then passed to Germany”,⁽¹⁾

The shift eastwards to Germany did not stop there. At the end of

the 19th century, Czarist Russia, known as the "prison of nations", began to boil over. As Marx and Engels pointed out in their preface to the 1882 Russian edition of the Manifesto, "Russia forms the vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe".⁽²⁾ The world revolutionary centre shifted to *Russia*. Lenin reiterated the same idea in *What is to be Done*.

Russia's position as the world revolutionary centre reached greater heights with the Great October Socialist Revolution. The communists of Turkey correctly evaluated the new character assumed by the world revolutionary process from the very beginning. The First Congress of the Communist Party of Turkey, held — not in Anatolia, as the Kemal government withheld permission — but in Baku, on the 10th of September 1920, included this in the congress documents.

Today, the world revolutionary centre is still the Soviet Union. Because, economically and socially, the most highly developed socialist country is, at the same time, the country where the working class movement has reached its highest level. And the world's first workers' state, the Soviet Union, is today the most advanced socialist country.

Now we can pass to the second question: Can the world revolutionary centre no longer change?

It can change. We have said that the revolutionary centre changes from one place to another depending on the stages reached by the proletarian movement. A higher stage of the proletarian struggle, the stage succeeding the socialist revolution and the construction of socialism, is that of the building of developed socialism; then the laying of the material-technical basis for communism, and lastly, the stage of communist society. The centre of the world revolutionary forces may move from one place to another depending on these stages or on greater progress achieved within one and the same stage. As Lenin said, this centre may shift to another socialist country — and only to that country — which surpasses the most advanced socialist country in the economic and social spheres, to that country which develops its productive forces beyond those of the most advanced socialist country.⁽³⁾

The third question: What does weak link in the imperialist chain mean?

We know that the "law of uneven economic and political development" operates under capitalism. The operation of this law results in the contradictions in the world capitalist economy concentrating, intensifying and sharpening in different countries at different times. It is precisely these countries which we call "*weak links of the imperialist chain*" or

“weak links of the capitalist system”

As the name implies, weak links are those where the chain is likely to break. In fact, looking at history, we see that those countries where revolutionary situations matured, where these gave rise to revolutions, i.e., those countries which broke away from the capitalist chain, were among those countries known as weak links. Without any doubt, it will be the same in the future.

Until the appearance of the world's first socialist country, the weakest link and the world revolutionary centre were one and the same. Where the proletarian movement reached its highest levels, that detachment of the world proletariat marched in the forefront. With the victory of the first socialist revolution, the revolutionary centre moved outside the imperialist system and *the weak link and the revolutionary centre became two separate entities*. While the revolutionary centre became one with the most advanced socialist country, the weak links continued to be those countries where the contradictions of the capitalist system have most intensified.

This Leninist understanding of revolutionary centre — weak link is closely connected with a correct understanding of the epoch in which we live, the main contradiction of the epoch — that between socialism and imperialism, and the world revolutionary process.

We call our epoch the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. This evaluation reflects the existence and growing strength of a separate revolutionary centre which has broken away from the capitalist system, the fortifying of this centre by new links breaking away from the imperialist chain. In other words, *the process of transition from capitalism to socialism* is the process whereby the revolutionary centre gains strength and dominance, both qualitatively and quantitatively. More concretely, it is the process whereby the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries advance in every sphere and — through revolutions carried out in the weak links of the capitalist system — new countries join the socialist community. In this process, with the socialist system surpassing imperialism in every sphere, the epoch will change. *The epoch of socialism* will begin. Without doubt, the shortest route would be the realisation of revolution in the great imperialist countries. However, for the moment, we cannot see this happening in the near future. And it is the Soviet Union which, despite all difficulties, honourably and with supreme success, shoulders the heavy responsibility of this epoch.

We say that the main contradiction of our epoch is that between living socialism and imperialism, i.e., that between the proletariat which has made its revolution and established its state, and the bourgeoisie which is trying to hold on to an obsolete system. This contradiction is, in other words, the contradiction between the developing and strengthening revolutionary centre and the imperialist seats of reaction and counter-revolution which are rapidly losing their universal hegemony.

The main contradiction of our epoch is deepening, becoming sharper and more readily apparent as a concrete fact with the strengthening of socialism. At the beginning of the epoch, only great leaders such as Lenin and great historical giants such as the Comintern were able to see this truth. It is no longer so. The main contradiction in the world is now showing itself in every local event, even in the flutter of a leaf. It follows that there can be no other reason for "failing to see" the main contradiction of the epoch today than open subservience to imperialism — as practiced by the Maoists.

The main contradiction of our epoch is inflaming all the contradictions of the capitalist system, is accelerating revolutionary processes. In other words, it is multiplying the number of weak links in the imperialist chain, accelerating their appearance, and increasing the possibility of their breaking away from the imperialist chain. With its general revolutionising influence, with its direct and indirect, material and moral support, the Soviet Union, the world revolutionary centre, is the backbone of the world revolutionary forces, the powerful fortress of the world revolution.

The world revolutionary process is an integral whole. Its culmination will be the eradication from the historical scene of the system of imperialism and the establishment of world communism. In the forefront of the struggle that will lead to this culmination is the Soviet Union, living socialism. Unity between the revolutionary centre and the other forces waging a struggle against imperialism (the national liberation movements and the working class movement in the capitalist countries) is an objective necessity for the victory of the anti-imperialist struggle. It is for this reason that trends which would break the unity of the world revolutionary forces cannot even be considered progressive. The evolution of Maoism, its gradual assumption of an openly reactionary character, is a very good illustration of this. "Euro-communism" is also passing through the same evolution — on a different path — before our

very eyes.

Some may consider what we have said about the main contradiction in the world, about the determining role played in the world by the Soviet Union, as a kind of "revolutionary debt" we feel we owe to the Soviet Union. It is not so. We speak neither out of flattery nor out of love for the land of Lenin (which we do indeed love very much). Our unswerving defence of the Soviet Union against all attacks is based on the objective realities of our epoch. It is not empty words but objective realities that make the prime gauge of proletarian internationalism one's attitude towards the Soviet Union.

An understanding of the Soviet Union as the world revolutionary centre, as the vanguard of the world revolution is the foundation stone of a correct conception of the world revolutionary process. For revolutionaries in Turkey, where all manner of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism thrive, this understanding is of vital importance.

In conclusion, we can say that if we fail to understand the revolutionary centre — weak link and, connected with it, our epoch, the main contradiction of our epoch, and the world revolutionary process, neither can we understand many developments in the world capitalist system today.

The Internal Structure of the World Capitalist System

There are two systems in the world today. The world socialist system and the world capitalist system. The socialist system is a homogeneous whole based on fraternal cooperation of peoples and states on the basis of proletarian internationalism, a whole which excludes relations of exploitation. The capitalist system is something else. It is a sum of relations based on force, on exploitation. Here the law of the jungle operates. *The world capitalist system is a hierarchy.* "It includes imperialist, colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries, a variety of countries. It includes capitalist countries at various stages of development — developed, under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries."⁽⁴⁾ Countries, or groups of countries, at different levels in this hierarchy have different roles in the imperialist system of exploitation.

We can divide the countries forming the world capitalist system into two large primary groups. Imperialist countries and exploited

countries. Relations between these two groups are based on oppression, force and exploitation. For this reason, the profound social problems which beset the exploited countries cannot be solved in any way except by the breaking of the chain of exploitation.

Although the essence of the relations between the imperialist countries and the exploited countries remains the same, over a period of time they have changed and are changing. In the epoch of proletarian revolutions opened by the Great October Socialist Revolution in 1917, the world colonial system became progressively weaker at an accelerating rate and collapsed in the period from the Second World War to the beginning of the 1960's. The collapse of the colonial system was a great blow to imperialism. The vast areas which had been under its unrestricted rule vanished. A new situation arose.

We must draw attention to some of the important characteristics of this new situation.

The collapse of the world colonial system necessitated a change of method in imperialist exploitation. In order to protect its profits, the imperialist system was forced to adapt itself to the new situation. In short, "*neo-colonialism*" appeared.

With the appearance of neo-colonialism, the nature of the anti-imperialist struggle changed. Today the anti-imperialist struggle is the struggle to win *economic independence* from Imperialism, in this way to make political independence full and genuine political independence.

The destruction of the colonial system and the fact that imperialism was compelled to shift to new methods of exploiting the under-developed countries, further accelerated capitalist development in those countries. Domestic capitalism began to develop at full speed.

Things are no longer as they were; no one sports "colonial" hats any longer. Essentially, imperialists operate through the ruling class in the countries they have entered. The two are partners, have become integrated. The imperialists are developing such ruling classes, exploiting together with them, and using them as a base for themselves. It is no longer possible to separate anti-imperialism from the struggle against the ruling bourgeoisie in a given country. The enemy is now the local ruling class within capitalism. For this reason, the anti-imperialist struggle is becoming further *interwoven* with the class struggle every day. This is one of the important new features of today's world.

In the colonial period, a handful of great countries directly ruled in a large part of the world. These lands were theirs. For this reason, many

countries which had, from the economic point of view, reached the stage of advanced capitalism, could not easily participate in the division. The disappearance of the colonial system enabled small countries of advanced capitalism to join in the imperialist exploitation and claim a greater part of the spoils. For example, Switzerland, New Zealand, Denmark. In this way, the *struggle to exploit* the under-developed countries, and the competition between the monopolies intensified. This too must be underlined.

Thus, we have seen that the collapse of the colonial system under the direct influence of living socialism brought certain changes in the relations between imperialism and the exploited countries. **However**, the influence of the socialist system on the relations between imperialism and the exploited countries is not restricted to the collapse of the colonial system. Today, under pressure from the socialist system from all directions, imperialism is forced to submit to many things that it would normally reject. The fact that even the most backward country in the world can make progress in social development by relying on the support of the socialist system, confronts imperialism with the question, not only of maintaining its exploitation of these countries, but of keeping them within the world capitalist system itself. Today there is a socialist system which can provide all manner of support to the still under-developed countries. This fact compels imperialism to give some concessions to the under-developed countries. And this brings about an ever-increasing rate of development of capitalism in the world as a whole.

Weak Links of the World Capitalist System

After this brief look at the world revolutionary centre, the weak link and the internal structure of the world capitalist system, we can now pass to present-day weak links of imperialism.

In our day, the *under and medium-developed countries* are the weak links of the world capitalist system.⁽⁵⁾ We can further distinguish the medium-level developed capitalist countries as the "primary weak links". Because in these countries, capitalism has developed to a level requisite for the creation of the objective conditions of socialism. From the point of view of objective conditions, the medium-level developed capitalist countries are ready for socialism. For the other, under-

developed countries, however, socialism is a long-term aim dependent on processes that in their turn will rely on the strength of the world socialist system.

Why are the under-developed, the medium-developed capitalist countries in particular, the weak links of the imperialist chain? And why are not the advanced capitalist countries the weak links of today? The answer to these questions depends on remembering, or rather, correctly understanding, imperialism and the scientific and technological revolution.

While making life a hell in the exploited countries, imperialist exploitation at the same time provides important weapons for the softening of class contradictions in the advanced capitalist, i.e., imperialist countries. For example, today the British monopolies derive the vast majority of their profits, not from the exploitation of their own workers, but from foreign investments, from exploitation of the under-developed countries. On this basis, the imperialist bourgeoisie is able to raise the standard of living to a certain extent, to create a wide labour aristocracy, to bourgeoisify the consciousness of large sections of the working class, and thereby — however transitory it may be — to soften the contradictions. In recent years in particular, the imperialist countries have begun to experience serious economic crises due to fatal competition from the world socialist system, due to the rising national liberation movements and the first signs of negative results of the scientific and technological revolution. The contradictions have begun to sharpen — but not to an extent to change what we have said above. Imperialist exploitation is continuing, becoming even more brutal. One cannot fail to see that the “advanced” capitalist countries are imperialist countries and that this provides them certain advantages. One cannot avoid seeing that today, contradictions are much much sharper in the under and medium-developed capitalist countries.

The advanced capitalist countries have all the possibilities provided by the scientific and technological revolution. It is true that this revolution has given birth to new contradictions, that it has deepened the old contradictions, and that, in the long run, it will propel the crisis of capitalism to a higher stage. However, it is also true that by developing the productive forces, by making the imperialist powers more self-sufficient, by contributing to raising the standard of living, by further intensifying the exploitation of the under-developed countries, it created a relative relaxation in the advanced capitalist countries.

The under and medium-developed capitalist countries, which do not have all these possibilities, are the weak links of the imperialist chain today.

In addition to what we have said above, there is in our day, a new phenomenon which is worsening the situation of the under and medium-developed countries which cannot break out of the imperialist economic system. In particular, we can observe some *new tendencies* in the world capitalist economic system under the impact of the growing strength of the world socialist system, the national liberation movements, and the new stage of the scientific and technological revolution. We can observe new developments in the structure of production, particularly in industry, in the structure of international trade and its geographical distribution, in the norms of international trade, and in the regional movement of capital and labour-power.

If we take a closer look at some aspects of these new developments which are most directly related to our subject, we see, for example, that natural raw materials are now being replaced by synthetic or other artificial materials. This development is connected with the scientific and technological revolution. However, we cannot answer the question, "Why are these innovations appearing today?" in isolation from economic and social conditions. Every period in world history has had its discoveries which it was not found possible to apply at the time, which were forgotten and then "rediscovered" much later. Genuine discoveries and advances are those imposed by the economic and social requirements of the day. Such is the case with the appearance of synthetic materials today. The under-developed countries to which the imperialist countries look for their natural raw materials to a large extent, are now powderkegs. Under these conditions, the problem of attaining raw materials and energy is an increasingly more serious one for imperialism. Hence come scientific research, laboratories, etc., followed by synthetic materials, artificial meats and foods, and new sources of energy.

In close connection with these developments, an important new tendency is gaining strength in the economy of the advanced capitalist countries. That is the increasing scale on which investments are being made among the advanced capitalist countries themselves. The increased importance of specialisation, and changes taking place in manufacturing industry in particular, as a result of the scientific and technological revolution, have made possible the realisation of "extended reproduction", imperative for the functioning of capitalism, among

the advanced capitalist countries themselves. The advanced capitalist countries can ensure extended reproduction to a certain extent by investing in each other.

These two new developments which we have touched upon briefly (decreasing dependence on natural raw materials and the advanced capitalist countries' realisation of extended reproduction among themselves to a certain extent) entail *changes in the international division of labour* within the world capitalist economic system. The positions held by various countries in this division of labour are changing. There are two main, important results of this development.

The *first* is a paradoxical result. With the increasing shift of the reproduction of monopoly capital to relations between the advanced capitalist countries themselves, the exploitation of the under-developed countries is increasing rather than decreasing. Investments by imperialist countries in the under-developed countries, although continuously declining as a percentage of total investments, are increasing rather than decreasing in absolute terms. For this reason, there is no question of a reduction in exploitation in relation to foreign investments. However, there is one other important point alongside this. As the imperialist countries turn inward on themselves, the place held by under-developed countries in the international process of reproduction of capital, *diminishes*. This situation undermines their "bargaining power", enabling the international monopolies to impose harsher conditions on and extract many more concessions from the under-developed countries.

The *second* result is the other side of the same coin. The imperialist countries are further strengthening themselves against the under-developed countries. Their economic "dependence" on the exploited countries is, to a certain extent, weakening.

In previous pages, we noted that the world capitalist economic system is an international division of labour, comprising all capitalist countries in a network of mutual interdependence. Because this network is governed by the exploitative relations of imperialism, these mutual interdependencies are not on equal levels. In all that is vital, the imperialists have tied the under-developed countries to themselves and exploit them. However, alongside this subjection and exploitation, the process of reproduction of international monopoly capital is also dependent on the exploited countries to a certain extent. Under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries provide imperialist countries with markets, cheap labour and raw materials. The

characteristics of the world capitalist economy which are emerging today, are reducing the role played by under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries, and strengthening the hand of imperialism.

As a result of the increasing shift in the foreign economic relations of advanced capitalist countries to the developed regions of the world, the condition of the under-developed and medium-developed countries is deteriorating even further. The relative decline in the place held by these countries in the international capitalist division of labour, is *rapidly* aggravating the existing economic and social problems.

The under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries are suffering both from their dependence on imperialism, imperialist exploitation, and from the diminution of their role within this framework due to the intensification of relations between the imperialist countries (known as imperialist integration). Moreover, all this mounts on top of backwardness. As a result, as long as under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries remain within the world capitalist system, they increasingly become the "*centre of gravity*" and *focal point* of all contradictions. And it is in such countries that the *weak links* of the imperialist system appear.

Countries at the Transition Stage (Medium-Level Developed Capitalist Countries)

Those countries of the world which are exploited by imperialism are also not a whole. They too include a variety. As Lenin says, in the capitalist world, "strength varies with the degree of economic and political development".⁽⁶⁾ In this sense, one cannot conceive of the exploited capitalist countries without variations in strength, without differentiation. However, it is neither necessary from the point of view of our subject, nor is it possible within the scope of this book, to deal with this differentiation in detail. For this reason, we shall be content to deal with that group of countries within the rough classification of under-developed and medium-developed countries made above that concerns us, namely, the medium-developed countries.

These countries, which we may call countries at a "transition

stage", are situated at a point between the developed countries and the under-developed ones. In comparison with the other under-developed countries, these countries have a fairly high tempo of development. The majority of these, e.g., Turkey and many Latin American countries, were able to make some attempts to industrialise in the first period of the general crisis of capitalism. India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Greece, the Phillipines, Egypt, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Mexico, Portugal, South Korea, Malaysia, etc., in general, are in this stage.

In the countries at a transition stage, the bourgeoisie has generally succeeded in using state capitalism to develop capitalism. The capitalist mode of production has developed both in depth and in breadth, has become the dominant mode of production. This development is proceeding with speed, and division into classes and strata is advancing rapidly. The working class, historically well established, is gaining further strength and the contradiction between labour and capital is penetrating the entire fabric of society. Because these countries do not have those possibilities by which the imperialist countries are able to alleviate the sharpness of class contradictions, the class struggle is rising to high levels. On the other hand, there is an ever more profound differentiation within the bourgeoisie, there are even sharper contradictions and conflicts.

This intense capitalist development in the transition stage countries, took place in the epoch of imperialism, when capitalism had universally entered the monopoly stage. Using every form of state authority, economic, political and military, the bourgeoisie extraordinarily accelerated the accumulation of capital. So much so, that through methods of primitive accumulation, big capital was created and, as is the case in general in these countries, the transition to monopoly capitalism was effected *without ever having experienced* a period of free competition. Due to both the natural logic of monopoly, and the role the banks played from the beginning in the generation of big capital in these countries, finance-capital emerged. On the other hand, the monopoly capitalism and finance-capital that emerged from such forcibly accelerated processes, does not rest on a developed economic basis. The general economic backwardness persists. It is precisely this level of development of the economic basis which we are defining when we speak of a "medium level of development". This medium-level development of the economic basis, including industry, agriculture, transportation, etc., naturally brings forth economic dependence on developed capitalist countries.

In these countries, finance-capital is using every method (methods of primitive accumulation and methods of capitalist accumulation) in the most barbaric fashion, in its efforts to grow and expand. What methods it finds to grab whatever pennies are in whatever pockets! Think, for a moment, of Turkey. "People's capitalism", mutual aid institutions, bonds, shares, etc. Plus the "people's sector" the social-democrats are trying to impose. As long as capitalism exists in Turkey, the "people's sector" will mean taking from the people and giving to finance-capital. A crafty game indeed!... And in truth, the process of accumulation and concentration of capital in these countries is much more rapid than in the under-developed countries. Nevertheless, this pace is much less than is needed to bring them on a par with the giant multi-national imperialist monopolies. Furthermore, it is not merely a question of "money". There are also the questions of technology, technical know-how and, related to these, foreign exchange. For these reasons, the finance-capital of these countries generally has no or very restricted possibility to compete with giant imperialist monopolies. Since it is a law of capitalism to fall under if one is unable to climb above, or at least reach an equal level, this situation determines the dependence of domestic finance-capital groups on international finance-capital. Thus, the concept which was long known under such names as comprador or collaborationism, depending on the structure of the given capitalist country, now, in the stage of monopoly capitalism, confronts us as "collaborating-monopoly" or "collaborating-holding".

Take Turkey. Domestic finance-capital is dependent on imperialism. It operates as an appendage, a part, a *"rank and file organisation"*, or "local branch" of imperialism. It participates as a partner in the exploitation of our country by imperialism.⁽⁷⁾ It is not for nothing that the TKP emphasizes the term, "collaborating-monopoly".

What we see in the transition stage countries today, is the subjection of domestic monopolies to imperialism, their merging with imperialism into a single mechanism of exploitation, in order to be able to exploit their own country. One cannot consider imperialism in isolation from these monopolies, nor these monopolies in isolation from imperialism. For this reason, the struggle waged in the transition stage countries against imperialist monopolies, imperialism, their pacts and associations which bring economic and political slavery is, at the same time, interwoven with the struggle against the big bourgeoisie, monopoly bourgeoisie and finance-capital of each country. *The anti-imperialist*

struggle and the anti-monopoly struggle are inseparably bound. In raising your fist against one, you are obliged to hit the other as well.

On the other hand, due to the historical period in which they occur, the ascension to the monopoly stage and the appearance of finance-capital in these countries, does not give rise to the same results as in the West. The finance-capital in these countries is under the heavy pressure of imperialism and underdevelopment. This is not the case in the West. The countries of the West exploited and plundered, and are still exploiting and plundering, the entire world. Their wealth is largely derived from the exploitation of the peoples of the world. On the basis of this exploitation, the imperialist monopolies have been able to maintain an advanced level of development and a definite standard of living, and to extend these across their countries. But for the transition stage countries in general, this door is closed.

The phenomenon of finance-capital, *whatever* the general economic level of a given country, brings with it a striving to expand outwards. And this striving has appeared in the medium-level developed capitalist countries. But finance-capital in the countries at a transition stage is in all respects, in both capital and technology, very weak against the giant imperialist monopolies. So much so, that even the exploitation of their own countries, they must conduct under the wing of imperialism. For this reason, the countries at a transition stage are, *in general*, unable to realise the pressing need to expand outwards. We say in general, because it is possible that new imperialist forces may emerge from among these countries. Given the operation of the law of unequal development, some of these countries are bound to join the imperialists, relying on their vast lands, rich resources, or petrol, etc. Certain countries are making rapid progress in this direction. According to the Communist Party of Brazil, Brazil is one of them. But this does not change the general situation. In general, this door is closed for the countries at a transition stage.

Unable to solve either this pressing "problem", or their general economic and social backwardness, the finance-capital of these countries lacks the wherewithal to mute the high class struggle. Moreover, these countries are also exploited by imperialism. The working class and working people of these countries are forced to provide both the monopoly super-profits of domestic finance-capital, as well as the share of imperialist exploitation. A "double yoke". For this reason, capitalism in these countries cannot even alleviate, let alone solve, such

profound social problems as hunger, poverty, sickness and cultural backwardness. This dilemma places the transition stage countries among the weak links of the imperialist chain. And if we consider that the objective conditions for socialism exist in these countries, this makes them the "primary weak links".

2. The New Stage in the Development of Capitalism in Turkey: The General Economic Basis of the Revolutionary Situation and the Danger of Fascism

Turkey is a country which has pursued the capitalist road for many years. It has a long history of capitalist development. When the "seeds of capitalism", which had begun to sprout as early as the 17th century, were crushed under the pressure of Western Europe, newly entered into the process of industrial revolution, Turkey's own independent road of capitalist development was blocked and its process of colonization began. To use the fashionable expression of our day, Turkey entered the road of "distorted development", the road of capitalist development dependent on imperialism, was opened. In this process the Ottoman Empire became a semi-colony. In other words, a capitalism dependent on the outside developed right from the beginning.

As Lenin points out in his *Imperialism*, the Liberation War waged by our people against the imperialists, who wished to turn Turkey into a full colony, cut short this process of colonization *before it could be completed*. The moral support derived from the Great October Socialist Revolution which was carried out in the same years, and the boundlessly self-sacrificing military, economic and political aid of the young Soviet State played a great role in this victory. Nevertheless, because the bourgeoisie seized the leadership of the Liberation War, things in a sense started all over again, after the establishment of the Republic. By the 1940's, Turkey was once again under Imperialist domination. Comrade I. Bilen, General Secretary of the TKP, explains this process brilliantly:

“The bourgeoisie sidled up to imperialist capitals. at first warily. but much later and particularly after the Second World War, in leaps and bounds. The bourgeoisie welcomed them with open arms. opened to them the gates of the country. The American imperialists strolled in with their Truman ‘doctrine’ and Marshall ‘plan’. Later they squatted on our land with their bases. They drew Turkey into their economic, political, cultural and military web. It was during this period in particular that the collaborating bourgeoisie grew fat. This bourgeoisie, together with its partner, the big landlords, became the *supports of imperialism in our country* (1) (Our italics)

It was in such a process, and also by making use of the opportunities offered by state capitalism, that capitalism developed rapidly in Turkey.

Today, Turkey is a medium-level developed capitalist country. *Industry is the leading sector.* As first disclosed by Ozlem Ozgur in 1972. in his work. “The Development of Capitalism in Turkey”, 60% of production realised in the country was being produced in the industrial sector.* In terms of 1977 current prices, 34.24% of total production was produced in agriculture, 65.76% in industry. This is a very significant percentage... Furthermore, the rate of concentration and centralisation of capital has also become very high. New Zealand is an imperialist country. but the rate of concentration and centralisation of capital is greater in Turkey. The monopolies have a firm hold on the economy. 3.5% of all workplaces control 80-85% of the total capital of joint-stock companies, and each year appropriate at least 80% of the total profit of all workplaces.(2)

The history of banking in Turkey is also a long one. The banks,

* Sometimes a figure of 26% is given for the percentage of industrial production within the total. This percentage is obtained from calculations of the “national income” which also takes into account the service sector as a separate production sector, while in reality, it is non-productive. Thus, the percentage for industry appears much smaller than it actually is. The percentages we have given, however, are obtained from calculations of production totals in current prices in the various sectors and are realistic.

together with the state and foreign capital, played the most important role in the emergence and development of monopolies. For this reason, the process of monopolisation itself has been, as in Germany and Japan, the process of the emergence of *domestic finance-capital* through the merging of bank and industrial capital. "There are today 43 banks in Turkey. (...) There are today nearly 100 holdings* in Turkey. But the largest number about 10. (...) There are today 13 families which hold sway over millions in Turkey. The number of multi-millionaires, according to published data, is 86."⁽³⁾

This domestic finance-capital is organically bound to imperialist capitals. "Foreign companies, firms and banks have merged with domestic banks, holdings and companies"⁽⁴⁾ Turkey has become a common feeding-post for domestic and foreign monopolies"⁽⁵⁾

What about agriculture? Because the bourgeoisie was "unable" to carry out a real democratic revolution, an agrarian revolution, after the Liberation War, capitalist development in agriculture has followed, not a revolutionary, but an *evolutionary* course. This is a slow and painful process, under which the villager suffers greatly. It is a process which has transformed the landlord into a capitalist landowner. In 1978, the number of tractors used in agriculture exceeded 400,000. Remnants survive in places in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, but *in agriculture too*, capitalist production relations are absolutely dominant. This is true to such an extent, that today finance-capital is also penetrating into agriculture. It is striving to make the cooperative movement of the small and middle peasantry, a product of the evolutionary development of capitalism in agriculture, into a base for the monopolies.

Turkey is not a semi-feudal country. It is necessary all the time to put great stress on the fact that capitalism is predominant in agriculture.

* Some people show a great aversion to the expression, "holding-bourgeoisie". They claim it is not "scientific", that one should say instead "monopoly". If one tries to learn life and struggle from a "handbook", one must unavoidably stumble into such positions. In the first place, use of the expression "holding-bourgeoisie" is not only correct, it is also highly useful. It is a good example of introducing into political consciousness, concepts that the working man comes across in day-to-day life. Furthermore, holding means finance-capitalist not monopoly. Holdings are a form of organisation of finance-capital. Holdings unite in a whole, companies operating in various areas of economic life (banking, industry, trade, transportation, agriculture), by virtue of the controlling share of their capitals.

The opposite attitude, that of exaggerating the pre-capitalist remnants, would lead the revolutionary movement into a quagmire. This is due to fact that this question is directly related to the character of our revolution.

Together with this capitalist development we have briefly examined in Turkish society the *role of the state* has also been "forced" to change, and *has changed!* In the first years of the Republic, the bourgeoisie was very weak. The bourgeois state originally pursued a fairly liberal policy with the 1923 Izmir Economic Congress. It sought to secure favourable conditions for the bourgeoisie's strengthening by "indirect" means. Nevertheless, the lack of sufficient capital accumulation in the country and the effects of the 1929 crisis compelled the bourgeois state to participate directly in the economy to pursue a policy of "etatism". As a result of this etatism, planning, etc., the accumulation of capital accelerated and big capital emerged. Once etatism had fulfilled its function of activating the mechanism of capital accumulation, it was abandoned. But the economic activity of the state did not cease. Now the state began to play an active role in the process whereby big capital — having from its inception merged with bank capital and, since the 1940's, completely leaned on imperialism, becoming a support for it — became finance capital.

The period 1960-1970, is characterized by the efforts of finance capital to establish its hegemony. In this period, we witness restored planning and growing state intervention in general. A large number of mixed enterprises appeared. A mixture of what? A mixture of state, bank, industry, foreign and "military" capital. The Army Mutual Aid Corporation (OYAK) in Turkey, is a direct partner in this complex. The clique occupying the upper echelons of the army has merged, coalesced with finance-capital.

When we come to the 1970's, the role of the state is qualitatively different. A turning point has been reached. *This new stage* is characterized by the greater daily integration, coalescence, of the monopolies with the state, by the two becoming a single whole, by the seizure of the state by the monopolies. The power of the monopolies and the power of the state are merging into a *single mechanism*. This merger renders the state the "*managerial committee*" of finance-capital, of the collaborating-holding-bourgeoisie. The state fulfills a concrete task in the *process of reproduction of monopoly capital*; it becomes a very important *part* of this process. The economic activity of the state is ever more resolutely being carried out in the interests of the finance-oligarchy. Finance-

capital is making maximum use of the state apparatus to protect and increase its high profits and to strengthen its position.

Today, state activity aimed at regulating the economy in the *general interests of the monopolies* has greatly expanded. The state employs various means for this: direct investment and credits to the monopolies from the budget, subsidies, contracts, purchase and sale, tax rebates and privileges.

"Personal unions" between the monopolies and the state leadership play a fundamental role in rendering the state apparatus subservient to the interests of the finance oligarchy. These personal unions between the state and the monopolies (whereby the same persons hold positions of authority in both the state and the monopolies, or move from the leadership of one to that of the other, etc.) are at a very high level in Turkey. Almost all the top bureaucrats (civilian and military) sit on the executive board of this or that bank or monopoly, either during their state employment or after retiring. The men of the monopolies, on the other hand, hold high offices in the state.

Parallel with the merger of the monopolies and the state into a single mechanism, the role and importance of *planning* is constantly increasing. The five-year plans, which are binding on state-enterprises and "guiding" for the private sector, play a vital role in making the state subservient to the interests and strategy of the finance oligarchy. These plans put into practice the general strategy of finance-capital in regulating solutions to pressing economic problems and in programming areas of production and long-term economic and social questions. The plans are aimed at finding solutions to the most difficult problems of finance-capital *as a whole*, rather than towards the interests of this or that monopoly group. Through these plans, finance-capital moulds the base it rests on — in Lenin's words, "old capitalism" — that is, widespread small and middle production, in such a way as to best serve its own interests.

Today, surplus-value extracted from the workers in state economic enterprises flows, to an ever-increasing extent, into the coffers of the monopolies. Monopoly partnership in state enterprises, participation in their management, is the *direct* form of plunder. Then there are the *indirect* methods. One such method consists in state enterprises selling their products to the monopolies at prices below the market value, and sometimes even below production costs. Another method is that whereby the state purchases machinery or raw-materials at high prices

from the monopolies. The newspapers are full of stories showing how widespread these methods are. Even the building of state enterprises is nothing other than a method of transferring surplus-value from the state to the monopolies. Mixed enterprises are a way of diverting costs to the state and profits to the monopolies.

This situation also has a "by-product". On the one hand, the monopolies are exhausting all the resources of the state. On the other hand, they are conducting an intense campaign to discredit the state enterprises (and hence "socialism"! — running at a loss due to the above-mentioned mechanisms — in the eyes of the people. They are constantly playing the old tune that private enterprise is rational and productive, while state enterprises are useless. Yet, state enterprises run at a loss because they operate in the interests of finance-capital. This is generally the case in all capitalist countries.

Today, state activity to *redistribute national income to the benefit of the monopolies* has also become very important. Various payments, the credit system, measures of encouragement, state consumption expenditures, subsidies, etc., are all ways of shifting income obtained from the people to the monopolies.

The integration of finance-capital and the state, their merger into a single mechanism, is precisely so concrete. In any case, it cannot be divorced from the existence of monopolies. Monopolies begin to take hold of the state from the moment they are born. The tendency to coalesce with the state appears with the first monopoly. In Turkey, monopolies exist and they dominate the economy. He who so wishes may call the Vehbi Koc's and Sabanci's the "commercial bourgeoisie", but these are in fact monopoly groups, the finance oligarchy. And, if they are monopolies, then no one can deny the domination of the monopolies over the state. Because everywhere, including Turkey, the coalescence of monopolies and the state is inherent in the existence of monopolies.

On the other hand, this coalescence is also necessary in order to solve problems which finance-capital cannot solve by itself. For example, expansion of the domestic market, acceleration of capital accumulation by the monopolies, guaranteeing intense exploitation of the workers and working people, these and other problems all require active state intervention for their "solution". If we look back in history, we see that in difficult conditions — whether those of wartime or those that appear when the monopoly bourgeoisie is not sufficiently strong in the face of

competitors — the state has come on to the scene in full strength, right from the beginning. Germany is an example of this.

To summarise what we have stated thus far, Turkey is a medium-level developed capitalist country under imperialist exploitation, a country which has not completed its industrialisation and in which agriculture in particular is technically backward. Alongside this, it is a country in which the growth and strengthening of the monopolies provides the basis for the formation of finance-capital and the merger of the state and the monopolies.

Can There Be Finance-Capital in a Medium-Level Developed Capitalist Country Exploited by Imperialism ?

Do exploitation of Turkey by imperialism and a medium-level of capitalist development contradict the emergence of finance-capital? Some say they do. We must look into the past of those who say so. At one time, these opportunists said, "There cannot be capitalism in an under-developed country under imperialist domination such as Turkey; it cannot develop". When capitalism developed to such an extent as to forge a way into the thickest of heads, they began to say, "Capitalism there is, but monopolies there cannot be; imperialism would not permit it". They did not see that capitalism developed in Turkey as monopoly capitalism *from the beginning*, that it never lived through a period of free competition. When the monopolies grasped the economy like an octopus, opportunists made one last attempt. "There are monopolies", they say, "but there cannot be finance-capital". Why these efforts? Their aim is to hide from view the real enemy, the ruling bourgeoisie, and to tack onto the bourgeoisie's tail. The opportunists think that by minimizing the level of development of capitalism as much as possible, they will have thereby watered down the character of the revolution, and will have pulled back the revolution and the role of the working class in the revolution to the same degree.

Neither Turkey's medium level of development, nor its being a country under imperialist exploitation, contradict the emergence of

domestic finance-capital.

A medium-level developed capitalist country is a country in which capitalism is the dominant mode of production, in which the productive forces — including industry, transportation, the energy network and the qualitative level of labour power — lag behind those of the advanced capitalist countries, and surpass those of the under-developed countries. Proceeding from this, some say that if the productive forces have reached a medium level of development, then the relations of production cannot be very advanced in such a country, since the relations of production accord with the forces of production. This logic is wrong.

There is harmony between the forces of production and relations of production, and the forces of production play the decisive role in this harmony. For example, historically, there is a direct connection between the advent of the stage of large-scale machine production, the introduction of machines into production, the concentration of production, and the promotion of capitalist relations of production to the level of monopoly. But this is a general truth which defines the original development of capitalism in the world. It would be wrong to apply this general truth to individual countries without taking into account the conditions of the era in which they are living. From such an error would follow the ridiculous conclusion that there cannot be monopoly in a country which cannot today produce its own machinery. Monopoly is a form, a relation. Its content, i.e., machinery, can be filled in either by producing it oneself or by purchasing it. Neither has the backward technological level of countries such as Turkey, nor the relative backwardness of machinery they use, anything to do with our question. Finance-capital existed in Europe 80 years ago and clearly, the forces of production that existed in Europe at that time were far more backward than they are today.

In conclusion, there is harmony between the forces of production and relations of production. In the long term, the relations of production are dependent on the forces of production. However, the relations of production also have a relative independence. The relations of production may trail behind or run ahead of a necessary minimum level of development of the forces of production. For example, socialist relations of production may first be established in a revolutionary way on a minimum basis of capitalist development, a basis sufficient for the establishment of socialism. The forces of production may then subsequently be promoted to a level requisite for socialism, a level at

which the relations of production may be further matured and developed. The Soviet Union is the most vivid example of this, i.e., of the possibility of form overtaking content and pulling the latter forward.

A further example: Monopoly capitalism will operate on electricity, atomic energy or solar energy. The problem is to achieve machine production. Where the machines come from and on what they operate is irrelevant. Or are we to assume that, because, in America, monopoly capitalism and then only *now* operates on atomic energy, whereas in Turkey it does so on electricity that is frequently cut, there cannot be monopoly in Turkey? However, if we were to say that the majority of production in Turkey is based, not on machinery, but on hand-labour, then it would be impossible to speak of monopoly capitalism. There could still be the individual monopoly or two based on machine production, but there could be no monopoly capitalism.

The petty-bourgeois socialists in TIP (the Workers' Party of Turkey) who, although they are unable to fully comprehend this logic, nevertheless sense it, thus always strive to emphasize small production. Moreover, they seek and find backward-looking terms such as "craftsman" and "artisan" to apply to the mass of small capitalists!

One cannot dispute the existence in present-day Turkey, where 66% of production is produced in industry and where a powerful bank system is evident, of a minimum basis of productive forces requisite for the formation of finance-capital. Nor can one dispute the existence alongside this basis, of very widespread small capitalist production and, even more widespread, of simple commodity production.

This is natural and is in any case an indication of Turkey's medium level of development. But this situation in no way precludes the existence of finance-capital. It was Lenin who said that in Russia, finance-capital was "enmeshed in a particularly close network of pre-capitalist relations".⁽⁶⁾ It is Lenin who teaches us that monopolies emerge as a kind of "superstructure" on the "old" capitalism.⁽⁷⁾

In order to properly understand Turkey's present situation, we must properly understand this idea that monopolies emerge as a kind of "super-structure" on the "old" capitalism. Given a certain minimum foundation, finance-capital can emerge. And when it does appear, it sweeps up the remnants, small production, whatever, into its cogs and makes them into supports for itself. This is the case in Turkey as well. Everything works for finance-capital. (Even the five-year plan introduced by the social-democrats!)

Up to now we have spoken of a medium level of development. Inseparably connected with this is the question of "being under imperialist exploitation".

Nor does the emergence of domestic finance-capital contradict Turkey's being a country under imperialist exploitation. As Lenin said, it is precisely imperialism which brings monopoly principles to these countries.⁽⁸⁾ This is very important idea from the point of view of our subject. In the opening pages, referring to the emergence of the world capitalist economy, we said that the export of capital is the export of the capitalist mode of production. However, *the export of the capitalist mode of production means the export of the capitalist forms prevalent in the metropole countries*. If monopolies exist in the metropolises, then monopolies will also emerge in the countries to which capital is exported. If, in the metropole countries, finance-capital has emerged through the merging of bank and industrial capital, this process will also operate in the other countries. The opportunists fail to understand this absolute logic of capitalist development. Speaking of capitalist development in "young countries", Lenin explains this by a reference to "the example of old countries".⁽⁹⁾

Let us draw attention to one more point. Export of monopoly forms by imperialism must also not be understood merely as their direct transfer through imperialist investments. Because the network of relations of the world capitalist economy which emerged together with imperialism bears the stamp of monopoly, it determines the situation and the forms of relations in all the countries within this system accordingly. It imposes its methods, sizes and measures.

Let us consider the following example: A bourgeois state which has won its political independence in the epoch of imperialism and is as yet "hostile" to foreign capital, wishes to progress, to develop its forces of production. What will it do? Naturally it will attempt to industrialise. It is obvious that the epoch determines what is to be done. Next, what sort of industrialisation will be aimed for? Will industry take the form of gathering four or five people in a room and giving them hammers and wrenches, i.e., building an *atelier*, or of building a factory? Naturally it will be the latter. Next, will the machines and measures utilised be those which were used in the course of Britain's industrial revolution, because "we are still at the beginning"? Or will they, however backward in relation to today's advanced technology, be things measured by the imperialist period? Naturally, the latter. Even if one were to search for

the tools of the industrial revolution, they could only be found in a museum. As can be seen, even a country at the beginning of industrialisation must use the sizes and measures of the day. Firstly, because it can find nothing else, and secondly, because it could not survive in the world market any other way. This means that it is compelled to aim for large-scale enterprises. And that is nothing else than beginning to create monopoly. Because, as Lenin said, "the hindrance to competition, the tendency towards monopoly, arises from the huge size of the enterprises".⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, even without direct foreign investment of any sort, imperialism has imposed its principles. A section of that state's bourgeoisie will gradually fatten to become a monopoly bourgeoisie.

If we consider Turkey with the logic of the above example, the irrelevance of arguments about "whether monopoly forms were transported by such and such foreign capital in 101 joint stock companies" will become apparent. Of course, they transported them *as well*.

To put forward "dependence" as a means of refuting the existence of finance-capital in Turkey, is even more meaningless than to put forward "medium level of development". Because dependence is among the causes, not of the lack of finance-capital in Turkey, but of its *existence*. When Lenin says, "monopolies introduce everywhere monopolist principles",⁽¹¹⁾ it is just such a situation that he is explaining.

Thus, we see that the formation of finance-capital does not contradict dependence or a medium level of development.

The General Economic Basis of the Revolutionary Situation and the Danger of Fascism

In Turkey, as in the West, monopolies and finance-capital have formed and have merged with the state, have seized hold of it. However, due to general economic differences, this development does not, and cannot, give rise to the same results as in the West.

In advanced capitalist — imperialist countries, state-monopoly

capitalism developed because the revolutionary forces, under the influence of opportunism, could not resolve the contradiction between labour and capital by means of revolution. In this way, by expanding the basis of property, capitalism alleviated the contradiction between the social nature of production and the private character of ownership, a contradiction which the revolutionary forces were unable to resolve by socialising property. In a sense, to quote Marx in *Capital*, it resolved the contradiction "in the negative". And this state-monopoly capitalism, together with the merciless plunder of exploited under-developed countries, and the possibilities of the scientific and technological revolution, allowed a softening of social contradictions from the Second World War to our day. In the West, the contradictions are only now becoming sharp again.

The situation is different in Turkey however. The phenomenon of finance-capital, which, in the 1970's, embraced the economy like an octopus and intertwined with the state, is not softening the social contradictions. On the contrary, it is aggravating them. And truly, our country, particularly since 1968, is witness to continuous economic, social and political crises. "In Turkey, the capitalist system of exploitation is writhing in the grip of economic, social, political, cultural, moral and spiritual crises of all kinds".⁽¹²⁾ Since 1968, Turkey has been experiencing a *revolutionary situation*, which is from time to time advancing or retreating, but constantly rising and maturing.

What underlies this revolutionary situation?

Although stated in connection with other historic circumstances and for other countries, the following words are an important aid in understanding Turkey's condition: Stalin, referring to the eastern countries, says, "...the existence of a double oppression, internal oppression (by the native bourgeoisie) and external oppression (by the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie) is intensifying and deepening the revolutionary crisis in these countries".⁽¹³⁾ A similar situation exists in Turkey. Moreover, finance-capital has formed as well. A mechanism which is no longer satisfied with normal profit, which craves monopoly *super profit*, has been established. For this reason, the General Secretary of the TKP, Comrade I. Bilen, says, "...The rise of the collaborating bourgeoisie to monopoly...aggravated the crisis manyfold, has made it permanent".⁽¹⁴⁾

Monopoly super-profit accelerates the accumulation of capital. On the other hand, it causes the rapid impoverishment of the broad masses. For this reason, and because it seeks monopoly profit rather than normal

profit, it is unable to find "profitable" spheres in the country. Thus, whatever the country's level of development, a surplus capital will appear. For this reason, together with the appearance of monopolies and finance-capital, the export of capital comes onto the agenda.

In recent years, there have been attempts to export capital from Turkey. Some monopolists made investments even in Britain (e.g., Kadir Has), some in Switzerland (e.g., Vehbi Koc's joint investment with Fiat), Germany, Cyprus and Libya. In Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other countries of the Middle East, 24 construction companies from Turkey have contracts to build infrastructural installations. There is a tendency towards integration on the state level between Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. However, these efforts are negligible.

In his work *Imperialism*, Lenin relates the following words of Cecil Rhodes, the English "finance king", in 1895: "*If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists*". (Our Italics) He adds, "Even then these leading British bourgeois politicians saw the connection between what might be called the purely economic and the socio-political roots of modern imperialism"⁽¹⁵⁾ Can we suppose that the foremost bourgeois politicians in Turkey do not see this relation? They see. The programmes of all the governments which have come and gone in the past 10-15 years prove that they see. However, the existence of imperialist giants equipped with inexhaustible capital and extremely high technology bars the way. The restricted "exports of capital" which do take place are carried out under the wing of this or that imperialist monopoly. In other words, in foreign investments too, Turkey can go no further than being "a springboard for imperialism" (*Atilim*). For example, ENKA, one of the largest construction firms in Turkey, a firm which does a lot of business in the Middle East, is a "partner" with the West German firm "Polensky and Bilfinger".

As Lenin said, when capitalism feels the need to expand and cannot, it will expand inwards, in depth.⁽¹⁶⁾ This is precisely what is happening in Turkey. As was once the case in the West, unable to find doors that open easily, the Turkish monopolies are taking the state in tow, merging, coalescing with it, and, by binding the state to its interests, using it to *intensify exploitation within the country*. For they have no other source of exploitation than the people of Turkey.

When we add imperialist exploitation to this, we see that the workers and working people of Turkey are under multiple exploitation. The collaboration between imperialism and the domestic finance-

oligarchy is wearing our people to the bone. Life is becoming increasingly intolerable for the masses. Because of this "double exploitation" (see the TKP Conference Report), *the rate of exploitation* of the working class of Turkey is *much higher* than that in the advanced capitalist countries. The working class of Turkey and similar countries is under more severe exploitation.

Thus, bearing in mind the above quotation borrowed from Lenin, "if you want to prevent civil war, you must become imperialist", we can arrive at a conclusion: In Turkey, because finance-capital, formed on a medium-level developed foundation, cannot open outwards, because it is itself under imperialist exploitation, all contradictions are becoming extraordinarily sharp. This is the socio-economic reason that lies at the base of the continuous crises since 1968. Capitalism in Turkey is at an impasse.

Under such conditions, a "Western-style bourgeois democracy" cannot survive. The basis for the lukewarm democracy in the West is imperialist super-profit. There, the greater portion of the monopolies' profits come, not from the exploitation of their own working-class, but from the exploitation of the peoples of the world, among them the people of Turkey. For Turkish finance-capital, however, the principal source of exploitation is the workers and the working people of Turkey. *Atilim* explains this situation in the following words:

"The bourgeoisie of Turkey was unable even to bring its own bourgeois democracy in an evolutionary way. It cannot. Turkey lacks the economic conditions that can support bourgeois democracy over a long period. Monopolies, the most reactionary face of capitalism, have appeared. These monopolies, as Comrade Bilen states in the Konya Conference Report, act as imperialism's "tool", and, in collaboration with it, exploit the life-blood of our people. However, they do not have the super-profits extracted from wide areas of the world, accumulated through neo-colonialism. Their sphere of exploitation is our country, our people. This circumstance pushes them to the most barbaric, most extreme exploitation. Within this structure, even a Western-style bourgeois democracy is a nightmare for the collaborating-holding bourgeoisie".⁽¹⁷⁾

For the working masses, this circumstance means "discipline", oppression and brutality. This is one of the objective reasons underlying the fact that the Communist Party of Turkey has been forced to struggle in illegality for 57 years. The bourgeoisie of Turkey does not have the wherewithal to give "freedoms". This economic and social structure is also the source of the fascist danger in Turkey today. The striving towards fascism is structural.

Turkey is not the only country in this position. We can speak of a similar situation in all of those countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Portugal, whose conditions are more or less similar. In such countries, as long as the present economic and social conditions prevail, the prospects for a Western-style bourgeois democracy are non-existent. This is so, even if some see salvation in "social democratic reformism". And for this reason, we readily understand the analysis put forward by the Portuguese Communist Party immediately following the revolution: "either fascism, or socialism".⁽¹⁸⁾

What should a Communist Party in a medium-level developed capitalist country, which had overthrown fascism with a revolutionary movement, and embarked on democratic transformations, have said? The militant, Leninist Portuguese Communist Party knows well that in a country dominated by finance capital, if one stops at the democratic stage, if one fails to march towards socialism, fails to move towards establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, those gains will be transitory. The revolution has been made, fascism overthrown; the struggle of the working class must move to a new stage. Otherwise, the gains brought by the revolution will be taken back one by one. That is what the PCP slogan was saying. And later developments confirmed just how true this analysis was. In the democratic stage, which was unable to grow into a socialist revolution, the gains of the revolution are today being taken back one by one.

Returning to Turkey, the impasse of capitalism in our country, with which we have dealt above, brings and necessitates a very high level of exploitation of our working class and all working people. For this reason, despite the fact that social-democratic reformism came to power with slogans such as "We will abolish exploitation", "people's sector", etc., this rule could not have resulted, and is not resulting, in anything other than fully exposing before the masses "the impasse of social-democracy". For in Turkey, the middle road is transitory. The two roads facing the society of Turkey do not change: Either fascism, guaranteeing

the extreme exploitation of the people, or the realisation of an advanced democratic people's revolution, the path which will solve the problems by mobilising the revolutionary energy of the people. And the turning of this revolution, which will not stop half-way under the influence of various opportunist theories of "stages", into a socialist revolution, part of the Leninist process of uninterrupted revolution. The establishing of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

3. Working and Living Conditions of the Working Class of Turkey and the Revolutionary Process

In the first edition of this book, we said that the exploitation of the working class of Turkey is much greater than that of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries, and left it at that. Many of our comrades subsequently requested that we expand on this point. They were correct, for this question is closely related to the dilemma in which capitalism in Turkey has found itself, to the mounting class struggle and the fact that Turkey is a "weak link", to the revolutionary situation.

There are many misunderstandings on the question of the working and living conditions of the working class of Turkey, their relation to the class struggle, and their comparison with the West. For our conscious workers, the relation between the struggle they wage and the struggles of the other detachments of the world working class, is concrete. But "learned" petty-bourgeois socialists also carry into the revolutionary movement adoration for the West. Instilled by the Kemalist bourgeois education system, without so much as passing it through a filter. The "lefts" either try to pass off Baader-Meinhof as the "high working class movement in the West", or lose "hope" in the working class of the West. Meanwhile, the opportunists display their adoration of the West by belittling the class struggle in our country, and feeling an "affinity" towards resurgent revisionism in the West. As a result, they attempt to deny even such a *mathematical* truth as the fact that the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey is higher than that of the working class in the advanced capitalist countries.

medium-developed capitalist countries, are in fact the product of

One such argument was truly comical. It went like this: "In his search for the weak link of imperialism, Yurukoglu also does not shy away from committing technical errors. To state that the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey, or of other developing countries, is much higher than that in the advanced capitalist countries, is to confuse the concepts, exploitation and rate of exploitation. But there are some justified fears that such 'technical' errors are not merely the result of a lack of knowledge or of carelessness".⁽¹⁾ Let us see! Leaving aside the fact that the writer declines to offer a clear answer to the question himself, the conclusion to be drawn from his words is that the exploitation of the working class of Turkey is higher and the rate of exploitation lower, while in the advanced capitalist countries, exploitation is lower, but the rate of exploitation is higher...Such a level of irresponsibility against Marxism-Leninism is hard to find.

The exploitation of the working class is a general concept. How can it be made concrete, perceptible, how can it be put into figures? By looking first of all at the rate of exploitation and, alongside it, the other indicators which show the working and living conditions of the working class. If all these are not taken into account, and if, in particular, a serious examination is made of working and living conditions, it becomes clear that the exploitation of the working class of Turkey is *much more horrific* than is indicated by the rate of exploitation.

Now let us proceed to consider each of these indicators in turn.

Rate of Exploitation

Before looking at the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey, let us touch on a theoretical question, in order to better clarify the matter. Must not the rate of exploitation in advanced capitalist countries in fact be higher? For, in these countries, although the value of labour-power is higher than that in the under-developed countries, it is produced in a much shorter period of time thanks to the high productivity of labour afforded by advanced technology.

If we were to freeze the line of thought at this point (as many do), we would conclude that the rate of exploitation is higher in the advanced capitalist countries. But this would be primitiveness. Let us

proceed with our thinking and ask the question: Why is the rate of exploitation higher in the under and medium-developed capitalist countries? We must look for the answer to this question in the *historical conditions*.

A striking phenomenon in the under and medium-developed capitalist countries is the *extremely low level of wages*. In these countries, the value of labour-power is lower than in the advanced capitalist countries. For this reason, at least theoretically, it is normal that wages, the value of labour-power in terms of price, are also lower. However, the extremely low wages mentioned above are something else again. In these countries, the *ratio of wages to the value of labour-power* is much lower than that in the advanced capitalist countries. For example, in Turkey, for many years and in many sectors, in some sectors continually, wages have stood at *the physical limits*, sometimes below. This endangers the ability of the working class in the under-developed and medium-developed capitalist countries to reproduce itself. Indications of this are the extremely high death rates, low life expectancy, very high number of work accidents and occupational illnesses. The under and medium-developed countries, Turkey among them, far and away head the list in all these indications.

The second striking phenomenon in these countries is the *inhuman working conditions*. Exploitation of women workers, exploitation of children under the name of "apprenticeship", exploitation of uninsured-illegal workers, have assumed incredible dimensions. And none of these phenomena are included in the rates of exploitation we are about to examine, because they are not included in any statistics.

Then comes *unemployment*. In under- and medium-developed countries, unemployment is a social "disaster". Clearly, the mass of unemployed workers greatly lowers the general indexes of the income and standard of life of the working class. This makes it necessary to take into consideration the unemployed masses as well when speaking of the condition of the working class. However, what really interests us here is not this, but the impact of the unemployed masses on those working in the factories, their effect on conditions imposed in the factory and wages. And Marx explains this effect beautifully: "Among 1000 equally skilled workers, wages are determined, not by the 950 who are employed, but by the 50 who are unemployed".⁽²⁾

These few important characteristics which we have touched upon in connection with the condition of the working class in the under- and

historical conditions. We can now pass on to what we mean by these "historical conditions".

By historical conditions, we mean to draw attention to the three factors which determine the general condition of the world working class.

These three factors are: 1) *the law of the steady deterioration of the condition of the workers*, a law which operates under capitalism continually, 2) *the class struggle of the proletariat*, and 3) *the phenomenon of imperialism*. These factors, particularly the first and the second, are contradictory. While one pulls in one direction, the other strives to pull in the opposite direction.

The *tendency towards deterioration of the condition of the working class* under capitalism, is an economic law valid for the entire capitalist period. What "deterioration" signifies in general falls outside our subject. There is one fact that we can determine clearly without touching upon this. Although at times levelling off, at times receding, the rate of exploitation is historically rising. For example, Marx calculated it to be 100-150% in his day, while Lenin found it to be 102-103% for Russia in 1902. Victor Perlo, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States and a leading communist scientist of our day, calculates the rate of exploitation in the American manufacturing industry in 1969 as between 114-226%, closer to the latter. These rates reflect a definite trend, but are nevertheless far from indicating the true rise. They concern single countries, whereas, with imperialism, when the world working class is a whole, it is necessary to take into consideration the world as whole, in order to observe an historical trend. In that case, the trend will become much more apparent, for in the under-developed countries, these rates are much higher.

As regards the class struggle, we know that the proletariat has always waged a struggle against the conditions imposed by capitalism, and that, historically, this struggle has won the working class many things. Not one of the rights we see in the imperialist countries today was given by the bourgeoisie voluntarily. This in the case, not only for those important rights which constitute milestones in the working class struggle, but also for the insignificant, or small gains. For example, the tea-break (ten minutes in the morning and ten in the afternoon), which everyone takes for granted in Britain today, was the product of years of struggle, which reached the point of conflict in places. It is this struggle which played the main role in raising the value of labour-power and

wages, and improving the general living conditions, which counteracted the "law of deterioration of the condition of the workers" in the imperialist countries. Marx and Engels observed this phenomenon long ago. For example, Engels, in rejecting the draft of the Erfurt Programme of the German social-democrats, also criticised their remark that, "the poverty of the proletarians ... constantly increases" and said, "This is incorrect when put in such a categorical way. The organisation of the workers and their constantly growing resistance will possibly check the *increase of misery* to a certain extent."⁽³⁾

In criticising Bernstein, who denied the tendency of the condition of the working class to steadily deteriorate, Lenin drew attention to the "*real social forces*" countering this tendency. Lenin said, "While speaking about the growth of poverty, Marx indicated at the same time the counteracting tendency, the real social forces that alone could give rise to this tendency. (...) We actually see that capitalism has a tendency to engender and increase poverty, which acquires tremendous proportions when the above-mentioned counteracting tendency is absent."⁽⁴⁾

In trying to understand the difference between the advanced capitalist countries on the one hand, and the under- and medium-developed capitalist countries on the other, these words of Engels and Lenin must be our key. The "real social forces" opposing poverty, i.e., the working class and its struggle, have a long history in the West. The oldest and most developed, the best organised working class in the world, is here. Whatever the working class of these countries won, it took in a century-long process of struggle, with its fists. Yet it has not even come close to obtaining all its rights. Exploitation continues, growing all the time. However, through its struggle, the working class of the advanced capitalist countries — unlike the working class of under- and medium-developed capitalist countries — halted the growth of impoverishment to a certain extent.

From what we have stated thus far, the relationship between the two factors determining the condition of the working class in history, also becomes clear. As long as it remains within the confines of capitalism, the class struggle can slow down the operation of the law of deterioration of the condition of the working class, it can obstruct, temporarily halt or reverse it, but it can never annul that law. This law, one of the fundamental economic laws of the capitalist mode of production, can be abolished only by the overthrow of capitalism. Nevertheless, it would be wrong, misleading, to make an evaluation without taking into account

the class struggle. For example, gravity is also a law, a law of physics, not an economic or social law. Its operation is absolute rather than tendential. Nevertheless, airplanes fly. Has the law of gravity disappeared? Or, has its operation been temporarily obstructed by the operation of other laws of physics?

We cannot fully understand the fact that the rate of exploitation is higher in the under- and medium-developed capitalist countries, lower in the advanced capitalist imperialist countries, by considering only the two factors discussed above. Let us assume that the working class has had it up to here and that the proletarian struggle has risen around various demands. What will happen? If the bourgeoisie has no possibility of meeting the demands of the working class without touching its own profits, the living conditions we see in the West will not come about. The workers will not be able to achieve their demands. Something else will happen. There will be uprisings, revolutionary outbursts. For this reason, in evaluating the working class movement in advanced capitalist countries, we must also take into consideration the third factor, namely, the phenomenon of imperialist exploitation.

Lenin said, "...the culture of the advanced countries has been, and still is, the result of their being able to live at the expense of a thousand million oppressed people. (...) The capitalists of these countries obtain a great deal more in this way than they could obtain as profits by plundering the workers in their own countries".⁽⁵⁾ That is to say, the following process has operated in the advanced capitalist — imperialist countries: By raising the struggle against the working and living conditions forced upon it, the working class has been able to achieve at least a part of its demands at the point that struggle beings to get dangerous. The bourgeoisie of these countries has been able to give what it has given, what it has been forced to give, by virtue of imperialist exploitation. For some reason, one can see the phrase "advanced capitalist country" in every sentence in the writings of the opportunists in the past few years. However, the fact that these countries are imperialist is forgotten!

Now we may pass to the figures.

The first serious work on the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey was done by Y.N. Rozaliev. According to his results, in 1962 a worker was producing a value of 50-60 lira each workday, receiving in return 16.5 lira in wages. The rest was appropriated by the capitalist. If we express this in units of time, in an 8-hour workday, a

worker laboured only 2 hours 15 minutes for himself, 5 hours 45 minutes for the capitalist. Rozaliev summarised his findings as follows: "The entire post-war history of Turkey is characterised by the constantly intensifying exploitation of the proletariat. Calculations of the degree of exploitation of the workers, based on information provided by an industrial census, bear witness to the fact that the norm of surplus-value in Turkey varies from 300-360%".⁽⁶⁾

Among studies made in recent years, the most noteworthy are the findings of Ozlem Ozgur. According to his results, the rate of surplus-value in the Turkish manufacturing industry, which was 178% in 1958, rose to 216% in 1959, 263% in 1963, and 377% in 1968. Thus, the rate of exploitation in the manufacturing industry in Turkey showed an increase of 21.3% in the ten years 1950-1959, an increase of 43.3% in the six years 1963-1968. Thus, in 1968, a worker laboured one hour 41 minutes for himself, 6 hours 19 minutes for the capitalist. In other words, out of every 100 lira of value created through industrial production in 1950, 37 went to the workers, 63 to the employers. By 1968, however, the workers' share had fallen to 21 lira, while that of the employers had risen to 79 lira.⁽⁷⁾

Using these two methods, we have extended the rates given above, the last of which was for 1968, up until 1973. In addition, we have arrived at two more figures, those for 1970 and 1973, using a third method similar to that used by Ozlem Ozgur. (For more detailed information about these methods, see *Appendix 1*) The table below (*Table: 1*) shows the rate of exploitation arrived at using the three methods, as well as an index reflecting the tendency of the rate to change.

As can be seen from the table, all three methods show that the rate of exploitation is very high. Nevertheless, even these high rates are far from fully reflecting the reality.

For example, exploitation is very heavy in mining. In agriculture, capitalism has turned millions of working people into workers, and subjected them to unlimited exploitation. On the other hand, all the rates shown in the table, are for workplaces in the manufacturing industry which employ more than 10 workers. However, there is a broad capitalist sector, a sector which has surpassed simple commodity production, in which individual enterprises employ less than 10 workers. Here too, exploitation is unlimited. Furthermore, the statistics relevant to the calculations reflect neither extremely widespread exploitation

Table: 1

Rates of Exploitation in the Manufacturing Industry of Turkey

YEAR	Rate of Surplus-Value			Index showing yearly changes in the rates of exploitation 1970=100		
	Method 1 *	Method 2 **	Method 3 ***	Based on Method 1	Based on Method 2	Based on Method 3
1950	360%	178%	—	109	69	—
1959	—	216%	—	—	84	—
1963	337%	263%	—	102	102	—
1968	443%	337%	—	134	147	—
1970	331%	257%	306%	100	100	100
1972	394%	—	—	119	—	—
1973	399%	315%	370%	121	123	121

* Based on Rosaliev's method,

** Based on Ozlem Ozgur's method

*** Based on a method close to that of Ozlem Ozgur

of child-labour under the name of "apprenticeship", nor the exploitation of women workers, nor even the exploitation of uninsured or illegal workers. Moreover, the workers in the manufacturing industry are the most well organised, the best fighting detachment of the working class of Turkey. Their wages are also higher than those of other sections of the working class. Thus, when one speaks of the exploitation of the working

class of Turkey *as a whole*, one must think of higher rates of exploitation.

From this point of view, a rate of surplus-value of approximately 400% in the large manufacturing industry in Turkey in 1973, is an *extremely low figure for the working class as a whole*.

The index provided in *Table 1*, taking 100 as the index for 1970, indicates the yearly changes in the rate of exploitation. What first strikes us, is that the rate of exploitation rose rapidly up until 1968, fell off between 1968-1970, and then climbed rapidly again thereafter. Without any doubt, alongside others, the most important factors influencing these fluctuations, are the struggle of the working class and the bourgeoisie's 12 March experiment with fascism. Without entering into this, to turn to the general tendency of the rate of surplus-value, we see that all three indexes exhibit the same tendency. It is this finding which enables us to speak with certainty about the changes in the rate of exploitation: *The rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey exhibits a tendency to rise constantly and rapidly. If we take into account the limited possibilities for the finance-capital of Turkey to exploit foreign markets, i.e., the fact that the collaborating-monopoly bourgeoisie has no basic source other than increasing the exploitation of the people, it becomes abundantly clear that this tendency will not let up.*

Let us continue. As regards the working day, the country with the *longest* official working week in Europe, is Turkey. For example, in 1971, the official working week was 43.8 hours in Federal Germany, 37.9 hours in Belgium, 44.8 hours in France, 44 hours in Luxembourg, and 44.2 hours in Holland. In Turkey, it was 48.2 hours.⁽⁸⁾ This situation further augments the *mass* of surplus-value appropriated by the capitalists in our country, where the rate of exploitation is already extremely high. The working class, meanwhile, is worn out that much more. Nevertheless, the matter does not end there. An additional burden is overtime. And when the workers work for free for the employers in shifts, this increase the total mass of surplus-value, if not the rate. The shift coefficient in the Turkish manufacturing industry was 1.41 in 1971.⁽⁹⁾ This means that the actual working week was 72 hours.

Since the rate of exploitation was *at least* 315% in 1973, this means that the employers were making the workers work *at least* 55 hours for free, paying them for only 17 hours labour. As a result, the mass of surplus-value appropriated by the capitalists grows at an extremely high rate. (For more detailed information, see *Appendix 1*)

Table: 2

Comparison of Rates of Exploitation in the Manufacturing Industries
of the United States and Turkey

YEAR	Rate of Surplus-Value in US Manufacturing Industry*		Rate of Surplus-Value in Manufacturing Industry of Turkey***
	1**	2**	
1947	87%	146%	—
1950	—	—	360%
1953	83%	148%	—
1957	94%	181%	—
1960	96%	195%	—
1963	104%	207%	337%
1967	111%	221%	—
1968	—	—	443%
1969	114%	226%	—
1970	—	—	331%
1972	—	—	394%
1973	—	—	399%

* Victor Perlo, *The Unstable Economy: Booms and Recessions in the USA Since 1945*. International Publ., New York 1974, p.27.

** Perlo arrives at these two separate series of surplus-value using two different methods. He says that the truth is somewhere between the two, but closer to the second.

*** These are the figures presented under "Method 1" in *Table 1*. They include only the large manufacturing industry.

For example, we see an increase of 187% in the four years 1970-1973. Furthermore, the increase since 1950 is the extreme figure of 8287%, a figure, we must stress, which derives purely from "domestic sweat-shops".

Now, let us return to the beginning of our topic. We stated that the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey is much higher than that of the working class of advanced capitalist imperialist countries. In order to show this, we have compared the rates of exploitation in the manufacturing industries of the United States and Turkey.

As can be seen in *Table 2*, the rate of exploitation in the manufacturing industry of Turkey is 2-3 times as great as that in the manufacturing industry of the United States. The difference is so great that it "cannot go unnoticed". Thus, the fact that the rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey is very much higher than the rate of exploitation of the working class of advanced capitalist imperialist countries, is a *mathematical* truth. Now, it becomes clearer whether it is we who have committed "technical errors", or petty-bourgeois socialists who are consciously engaging in falsification in order to muddle heads.

Wages

The exploitation of our working class and the life it is forced to lead as a result, cannot be explained solely by means of the rate of exploitation. For this reason, let us attempt to observe the life of our working class more closely.

Our second point of departure is wages*. Theoretically, wages are the equivalent of the value of labour-power. Therefore, let us ask: do workers' wages in Turkey accord with the value of labour-power? In order to understand this, we must first look into the application of minimum wages.

According to the Labour act, "minimum wages are those wages which are paid to the workers in return for a normal day's work, and which will suffice to meet, to a minimum degree and at current prices, such necessary requirements of the worker as food, housing, clothing, health, transport and culture". It is clear from this definition that the

* For the relevant statistics concerning wages, see *Appendix II*.

Table: 3
Minimum Wages 1963-1978
(Gross, Turkish lira/day)

Groups	1963	1965	1967	1969	1972	1974	1976	1978
I (Istanbul)				19.50	25.00			
II (Ankara, Izmir)	10.1	11.0	12.9	18.00	23.50	40	60	110
III				17.09	23.00			
IV				16.04	22.00			
For the under 16.								
I					21.00			
II					20.00	34	50	70
III					19.00			
IV					18.50			
Agriculture							33	

purpose of the minimum wage is to serve as a kind of standard for the value of unskilled labour-power.

Leaving aside its application, even the definition of the minimum wage proves the barbarity and monstrous exploitation engaged in by the bourgeoisie of Turkey. As is known, the value of labour-power consists of the value of the worker's physical, family and job-training requirements, as well as that of his social-cultural requirements, the latter being determined by historical conditions. Yet the above definition does not even include the family. In Turkey, we are still waging a struggle over the first two elements in the value of labour-power. The inclusion of "culture" in a definition which ignores the worker's family, is nothing but a cruel mockery.

Let us pass from the definition to the application of the minimum wage. According to the Labour Act, the minimum wage is fixed once

Table: 4

**Gap Between Minimum Wage and
Value of Unskilled Labour-Power**

YEAR	Current Minimum wage (Gross, TL/day)*	Value of Unskilled Labour-Power, or Required Minimum Wage (Gross, TL/day)**	Required Minimum Wage as Multiple of Current Minimum Wage
1972	23.50	72 TL ⁽¹⁾	3 times
1975	40 (1974)	180TL ⁽²⁾	4.5 times
1976	60	200TL ⁽³⁾	3-3.5 times
1977	60 (1976)	300TL ⁽⁴⁾	5 times
1978	110	650TL ⁽⁵⁾	6 times
1978 sonu	110 (1978)	800TL ⁽⁶⁾	7 times

* The years given in parantheses are those in which the minimum wage was fixed.

** These figures are those arrived at by (1) DISK, the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions, (2) and (3) TIB, the Association of Economists of Turkey, (4) and (5) Osman Nuri Kocturk (whose net figures we changed into gross). We arrived at (6) by adding new price increases to (5).

every two years. In a country like Turkey, where the cost of living rises incessantly, this is in itself an attempt to freeze wages. Moreover, the minimum wage is fixed in gross, as if the payment of taxes was an essential requirement of the worker. The minimum wages which have been fixed are shown above. (*Table: 3*)

What actually concerns us in looking at minimum wages, is the connection or, more correctly, gap, between the minimum wage and the value of unskilled labour-power. The table above (*Table: 4*) shows this, and compares the official minimum wage with the minimum wage

required. (For more detailed information on this point, see *Appendix II.*)

As can be seen in the table, there is a wide gap between the official minimum wage and the required minimum wage, and this gap is growing. In other words, the bourgeoisie is fixing the minimum wage at only one-third, one-fifth, one-sixth or even one-seventh of the value of unskilled labour-power. In addition, the fixing of the minimum wage once every two years further increases this gap. For example, the 110 Turkish Lira (TL) minimum wage fixed at the beginning of 1978, was a great deal lower than the minimum wage necessary at the time. However, in less than one year, the gap had widened even further. The value of unskilled labour-power in today's prices is 800 TL, 7 times greater than the 110TL minimum wage still in effect.

Moreover, there are sections of the working class to which the minimum wage has not even been extended yet. The rounded sentence contained in the Third Five-Year Plan to the effect that, "It is understood that the minimum wages are not being applied in small enterprises and in rural areas in general, due to economic reasons and difficulties of supervision", is an admission of this fact. This sentence speaks of "difficulties of supervision". However, it is not just here and there, but in the heart of Istanbul, that great and "prestigious" factories conduct an inhuman form of exploitation under the name of "apprenticeship": exploitation of children. Capitalism both employs school-age children, takes advantage of their inexhaustible energy, exploits them, at the same time refusing to pay them an equal wage for equal work, fixes a low minimum wage, and then fails even to apply it.

Here is an example of one such "prestigious" factory: Child workers are employed as apprentices in one of the most renowned workplaces of Turkish capitalism, the Pasabahce Bottle and Glass Works. Numbering some 200, these are generally the children of the workers at this factory. When children start to work, a contract is signed between their parents and the factory. It is stated therein, that after a child has worked next to a master for 20 days, he will be classed as a worker. However, until they are 18, these children work for years for a wage of 150 kurus an hour, 300 lira a month, including night shifts (which are illegal). Many of them are never classed as workers. What about the contract? The employer has found a way out of that as well. The child worker is made to work 18 days next to one master, then transferred to another, and then another. That is, it takes years to complete the "20 days".(10)

We see that the minimum wage, both in its application and in its non-application, stands before us as an important question. Where it does not suit it, the bourgeoisie does not apply the minimum wage. When it does apply the minimum wage, the bourgeoisie does not do so at any loss, for in this case, it uses it as a mechanism which pulls wages down. We will see later, that when skill and seniority differentials are added to the minimum wage, we come close to the average wage. Thus, the minimum wage operates as a base for all the wages which appear above it. In spite of this, there are those who hold that the minimum wage is not that significant, that it can be raised by collective bargaining. This is a right-wing view which tries to mislead our working class. We know that in our country, after every successful collective agreement, the employers resort to widescale sackings and requirement of new workers. In this way, those who are employed after the collective agreement has been reached, do not receive the first year's rise and work at the minimum wage. In addition, the minimum wage influences all the other wages in a chain-reaction effect. For example, if the minimum wage rises to 45 lira, the wages of a senior worker, who until then had been working for 45 lira, would also have to be raised. It is clear that the minimum wage influences all wages, and that it is a question which has rightly become a focal point of the struggle of our working class.

Summarising what we have said so far, *the official minimum wage in Turkey, is a great deal less than the value of unskilled labour-power.* Moreover, the gap between the two widens even further as the official minimum wage is set in gross. Since it is fixed every two years, it cannot keep up with price increases. And even in this form, there are many areas where it is not applied.

Now, let us consider average wages. The average wage is the daily average of the total wages earned by a worker. *Gross average wages between 1963-1977, and net average wages between 1971-1977 are shown in the table below. (Table: 5) For more detailed information on average wages, see Appendix II)*

In the first place, the average wages shown in the table include insured workers only. But we know that in 1976 for example, 71% of workplaces covered by Social Insurance did not submit declarations and were employing over two million illegal workers. (We will return to this question later). Many of the workplaces that do submit declarations deflate the actual number of workers. Thus, it is only natural that millions of workers will work for much lower wages. In addition, the

Table: 5
Average Wages of Insured Wage-Earners
Employed in Non-Agricultural Sectors

YEAR	Average Wage (Gross, TL/day)	Yearly Increase %	Average Wage (Net, TL/day)	Yearly increase %
1963	17.92	—	—	—
1964	19.55	13.7	—	—
1965	21.62	6.1	—	—
1966	23.53	8.9	—	—
1967	25.83	9.7	—	—
1968	28.22	9.3	—	—
1969	32.13	13.8	—	—
1970	35.32	9.9	—	—
1971	39.32	11.3	31.70	—
1972	43.88	11.6	34.66	9.4
1973	54.41	24.0	41.27	19.1
1974	68.26	25.5	50.27	21.8
1975	85.55	25.3	59.47	18.3
1976	115.30	34.8	76.10**	30.0
1977	153.—*	32.7	91.8**	20.63

Source: *Year Book of Labour Statistics*, ILO, 1974
 1977 *İçer Programi*, DPT (State Planning Organisation)
 1978 *Programi, Resmi Gazete (Official Gazette)*, no:16261.
 1976'da *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, TIB Yayinlari, no:17, Ankara
 1977, p.61

* October average

** Calculated by deducting 34% and 40% from 1976 and
 1977 gross wages respectively.

average wages also include many highly-paid "workers", who are not really workers at all. In short, these average wages do not reflect the true average wage in Turkey.

Secondly, as can be seen in *Table 5*, the gap between net and gross wages is constantly growing, while the rate of increase in net wages is

declining. In other words, without even considering price increases, taking into account only the inflation in taxes, we see that the rates of increase of gross wages are misleading. We shall understand this better when we come to real wages.

There are essentially two points which we wish to stress in connection with average wages: The *first*, is that the level of average wages shows that the minimum wage acts as a factor impeding the growth of wages. Between 1963-1977, the general average wages were approximately 105% above the minimum wages, i.e., twice as much. Between 1963-1977, average wages in the private sector were 87% above the minimum wages, i.e., 1.9 times as much. (For more detailed information on this subject, see *Appendix II*)

As we saw on previous pages, some people are saying that the minimum wages are insignificant, that we will raise them through strikes. Average wages, as well as minimum wages, can be raised through struggle, everything is possible. That is clear. But have they been raised in practice? In practice, average wages have not even caught up with what the minimum wages ought to be. The economic struggle of the working class has succeeded only in preventing the gap between them from growing. Why? One reason is that the minimum wage serves the bourgeoisie as a reference point in determining the entire wage-scale above it. It is enough to ask the following question: In 1976, for example if the minimum wage had been, not 60TL, but 200TL as it should have been, could the average wage have been 115.30TL? It could not. There is also another side to the question. Because the minimum wage struggle is not sectional, because it is directed towards a general class objective, because it will confront the state, the government and the employers in general, and because its gains will affect much wider sections, it will yield more revolutionary results. Could it be that it is this which frightens those who belittle the significance of the minimum wage?

Let us come to the *second* point we wish to stress in connection with average wages, and ask the following in regard to the annual nominal rates of increase we gave in the table of average wages (*Table: 5*) What has happened now that average wages have increased? We will see this in *Table 6*.

From *Table 5*, we recall that between 1975-1976 and 1976-1977, gross average wages increased by an "influential" 34.8% and 32.7% respectively. Yet, in *Table 6*, we see that the average wages, which increased so much, which were 115.30TL in 1976 and 153TL in 1977,

Table: 6

Average Wages as a Percentage of the Value of Unskilled Labour-Power

YEAR	(1) The Required Minimum Wage, or Value of Unskilled Labour-Power (Gross, TL/day)	(2) Average Wages (Gross, TL/day)	(3) (2) as Percentage of (1)
1972	72	43.88	60.9%
1976	200	115.30	57.7%
1977	300	153.0	51.0%

Compiled from tables 4 and 5

reached only 57.7% and 51% respectively of the value of unskilled labour-power. There remains the fact, as we said at the beginning, that the average wages appear higher than they actually are. They also include skills and overtime. Another trend reflected in Table 6, is that average wages, far from catching up with the value of labour-power, are moving further and further away from it.

In short, we must underline one fact: In our country, "average" wages are, as yet, nowhere near the value of unskilled labour-power, nowhere near the required minimum wage. Moreover, they are moving further and further away from it. The working class of Turkey is living below the "poverty line", to the extent that even its self-reproduction is threatened.

Until now, we have dealt only with nominal wages. Now, let us see the true face of wage "increases" in comparison with prices: Let us come to real wages. (For more detailed information, see Appendix II.)

Using the increases in gross average wages we gave in Table 5, let us now investigate the effect of price increases. Table 7 gives the gross real wages obtained after deducting the price increases shown in the Istanbul

Table: 7

Gross Real Wages (1963-1977)

YEAR	Average Wages (Gross, TL/day)		Gross Real Wages Based on Istanbul Cost of Living Index		Gross Real Wages Based on Ankara Cost of Living Index	
	TL	%	TL	%	TL	%
1963	17.92	—	17.92	—	17.92	—
1964	19.55	9.1	19.46	8.6	20.21	12.8
1965	21.62	10.6	20.64	6.1	20.09	-0.6
1966	23.53	8.9	20.73	0.4	20.73	3.2
1967	25.83	9.7	19.95	-3.8	21.41	3.3
1968	28.22	9.3	20.52	2.9	22.47	4.9
1969	32.13	13.8	22.28	8.6	24.21	7.7
1970	35.92	9.9	22.71	1.9	23.82	-1.6
1971	39.32	11.3	21.24	-6.5	21.76	-8.7
1972	43.88	11.6	20.54	-3.3	21.07	-3.1
1973	54.41	24.7	20.77	1.1	22.56	7.1
1974	68.26	25.5	22.53	8.5	24.52	8.7
1975	85.55	25.3	23.39	3.8	25.82	5.3
1976	115.30	34.8	26.84	14.8	29.91	15.8
1977	153.—	32.7	28.28	5.3	32.38	8.3

and Ankara Cost of Living Indices for the years 1963-1977.

As can be seen in the table, the "high" increases in average wages diminish when we look at real wages, sometimes turning into a decline. The fact that in both columns, this decline coincides with the years 1971-1972, calls to mind the 12 March experiment with fascism. Further, if we look at the whole period 1963-1977, we see that in 15 years, real

wages rose merely from 18TL to 28-32TL. In other words, the increase in real wages was nothing to get one's teeth into.

There remains the fact that this increase too fails to fully reflect the reality. The real wages shown in *Table 7* are gross real wages, before the deduction of taxes. This means that calculations of purchasing power include money which the worker cannot spend. For this reason, real wages arrived at using net average wages will show the changes more truthfully.

In the previous table (*Table: 7*), real wages were seen to decline only in 1971-1972. However, if we take net wages as the basis (*Table: 8*), we see that there was a decline in 1975-1977 as well. During these years too, the workers' standard of living deteriorated in absolute terms. Further, if we look at the change over the 7-year period 1971-1977, we see that one index shows a decline, while the other shows a real increase of only 3.5 lira.

Most significant is one fact which all the tables confirm. Wages increased much more in 1976 than in other years. We cannot pass over this simply by saying that 1976 was a year of collective bargaining. If we examine the figures with an eye towards the class struggle, we see that, underlying this relative "peak", is the fact that 1976 was a glorious year of struggle.

Nevertheless, neither the appearance of a relative "peak" in the percentage increase for 1976, nor the real wages arrived at using net wages, fully reflect the true situation. For example, since 1972, price indexes have taken rents in Turkey as constant. But in the past three or four years alone, rents increased by 100-200%.⁽¹¹⁾ For this reason, we cannot regard real wages arrived at by using Turkish price indexes as "real".

In addition, increases in real wages trail behind increases in national income and increases in industrial income. A comparison for the years 1963-1973 is given in the table below. (*Table: 9*)

Table 9 shows that the gap between our working class and the bourgeoisie has widened. The same fact emerges when we compare increases in real wages with increases in labour productivity. If the increase in real wages trails behind the growth of labour productivity, this means that the worker is working longer for the employer, that his exploitation is increasing, and that the gap between himself and the bourgeoisie is widening further. (For more detailed information on this question, see *Appendix II*.)

Table: 8

Net Real Wages* (1971-1977)

YEAR	Average Wages (Net)		Net Real Wages Based on Istanbul Cost of Living Index		Net Real Wages Based on Ankara Cost of Living Index	
	TL	%	TL	%	TL	%
1971	31.70	—	31.70	—	31.70	—
1972	34.66	9.4	30.02	-5.3	30.05	-5.2
1973	41.27	19.1	31.38	4.5	30.90	2.9
1974	50.27	21.8	30.84	-1.7	32.62	5.5
1975	59.47	18.3	30.12	-2.4	32.46	-0.5
1976	76.10 ^{**}	30.0	32.81	9.0	35.66	9.9
1977	91.80 ^{**}	20.6	31.42	-4.2	35.12	-1.5

* Although the real wages arrived at in this table are net, they appear to be higher in amount than the previous gross real wages. This is because the previous table began the comparison from 1963, while this table begins from 1971. In any case, the aim is to see the direction and rate of the change. The real wage amounts are specified in order to be able to visualise the change concretely.

** Our calculations, performed by deducting 34% and 40% tax from gross wages.

Table: 9

Comparison of Increases in National Income
(in 1969 Producers' Prices) and Increases in Real Wages

YEAR	Increase in National Income (%)	Increase in Industrial Income (%)	Increase in Real Wages (%)
1963	9.7	12.0	—
1964	4.1	11.2	8.6
1965	3.1	9.5	6.1
1966	12.0	15.2	0.4
1967	4.2	8.2	-3.8
1968	6.7	11.1	2.9
1969	5.4	12.0	8.6
1970	5.6	2.1	1.9
1971	10.7	10.4	-6.5
1972	7.1	11.8	-3.3
1973	6.4	9.1	1.1

Compiled from increases in real wages calculated from figures provided in *Türkiye'de İsci Ücretleri ve Enflasyon (Workers' Wages and Inflation in Turkey)*, TIB Yayınları, no:5, Ankara, 1975, p.62, and *İstanbul Gecinme Endeksi (the Istanbul Cost of Living Index)*.

As TIB (Association of Economists of Turkey) has disclosed, in the private sector, "While, in 1973, wages rose to 159.6 points relative to 1963, the increase in productivity was much higher, reaching 192. In the public sector, this situation was found to be even worse. While wages stayed at 142.1 points, productivity rose to 200.9. It is clear that there was nothing in later years that contradicted this development. In other words, the illusion of an increase in workers' wages was made possible by increased exploitation of the workers and increased profits for the employers."⁽¹²⁾

It is pertinent to note here that views highly "fashionable" in advanced capitalist countries, views which try to link wages to price

and productivity increases. are also spreading in Turkey. We even see some. who claim to be on the side of the workers and present themselves as socialists. either defending these views. or putting them into practice in an under-handed way. This is tantamount to saying. "For heaven's sake, let's not disturb this rate of surplus value! God forbid that capitalism should come to any harm!"

From the point of view of the working class. there is no limit to demands for wage increases under capitalism. The question of ensuring that wages do not trail behind price and productivity increases is worthy of attention. so that wages do not fall while appearing to rise. However. to halt the demand for wage increases here. to forsake the struggle for further increases. is to put a wall between the economic struggle of the working class and its political struggle. between the struggle to reduce exploitation and the struggle to abolish exploitation.

Opportunists who have wormed their way into the trade unions of our working class. pretend to accept this. but say. "Demands can't come from out of the blue. We must put forward practicable demands. Revolutionaries are realistic!" At first glance. a very "effective" attitude indeed! But here is how Lenin answers this point: "If we understand by the 'practicability' of a demand its general correspondence. not to the interests of social development. but to a specific state of economic and political conditions. it will be a totally fallacious criterion".(13)

What we are concerned with are the general interests of social development. That is. to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism. In that case. why not demand wages that capitalism is "unable" to give? Why shouldn't we demand wage increases of 200% or 300%. especially in our country. where wages have not yet reached even the value of unskilled labour-power. where the working class lives below the poverty line. where the worker dies at 50 and cannot give his children an education? Capitalism cannot give. they say. Let it not give! Let us convince the masses of the justice of our demand. And when capitalism fails to meet it. let us smash its system. It is for this reason that. no matter how "revolutionary". no matter how "realistic". views which try to limit demands for wage increases by this. that or the other may appear to be. they are in fact. neither revolutionary. nor in accordance with the realities of the epoch or the country. The realities are revolutionary. So too in the question of wages.

Working Conditions

In order to understand the living conditions of the working class of Turkey, we must also look at conditions in the workplace.

Becoming rich on the money extracted from the workers and working people, the bourgeoisie does not take even the most basic measures to safeguard the health and lives of those who create this wealth. According to the third Five-Year Plan, in relation to working

Table: 10

International Comparison of Serious Accidents at Work, 1973 (Number of Accidents for which compensation was paid – per 1,000 workers)

Country	Mining	Coal Mining	Manuf. Industry
Turkey	4.10	5.50	0.19
France	0.69	0.64	0.13 (a)
Germany	0.69	—	0.17
UK	0.43	0.41	0.04
Cyprus	0.28	—	0.05
Spain	0.57	0.83 (b)	0.06
Greece	0.42 (a)	—	0.13 (c)
Italy	0.33 (b)	—	0.09 (b)
Yugoslavia	0.18	0.25	0.09
Pakistan	1.07 (c)	0.90 (c)	0.16 (c)
Syria	1.01 (a)	—	0.35

Year Book 1974. International Labour Office, pp: 719-726
 (a) 1972 figure (b) 1971 figure (c) 1970 figure

conditions, accidents and occupational illnesses are showing an increase as a result of technological developments that are part of the process of industrialisation. If so, is this not something we should be pleased about?

The sad face of reality is to be seen in the statement given to a Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) reporter by the Labour Ministry's

Directorate of Workers' Health, in which the latter tried to absolve itself of responsibility for the rising number of accidents at work. It said, "There are 600,000 workplaces in Turkey. Our personnel can supervise only 20,000."⁽¹⁴⁾ This means that 96.7% of the workplaces in our country are removed from any form of health control, that they operate according to the whim of the employer. Clearly, in 96.7% of the workplaces, even the weak laws that do exist do not apply. The employers say, "I am the law".

Thus, Turkey has one of the *highest* rates of accidents at work in the world. This can be seen in the table above. (Table: 10)

Looking at trends in serious work accidents in our country, we see that their number is increasing in the mining and coalmining industries, not declining in the construction industry either. (Table: 11)

Table: 11
Serious Accidents at Work 1964-1973 (per 1,000 Workers)

YEAR	Mining	Coal Mining	Manufact. Industry
1964	2.90	3.50	0.20
1965	3.90	4.90	0.17
1966	4.80	3.90	0.23
1967	2.80	3.50	0.19
1968	2.90	3.50	0.19
1969	3.50	4.90	0.22
1970	3.20	4.00	0.10
1971	2.40	3.00	0.17
1972	3.10	3.70	0.17
1973	4.10	5.50	0.19

Year Book 1974. International Labour Office, pp: 719-726.

Nevertheless, the two tables shown above do not give a full idea of the horror of the situation. That is first, because these figures include only the serious work accidents. Second, because they include only those work accidents for which compensation was received. For this reason, we must look at the number of work accidents in total and in proportion to the number of insured workers. This can be seen in *Table 12*.

Table: 12

Number of Insured Workers, Reported Occupational Illnesses
and Accidents at Work by Year

YEAR	Number of Workers	Reported Occupational Illnesses	Accidents at Work
1950	342,000	260	19,775
1955	533,216	199	31,505
1960	620,900	424	63,014
1965	895,802	1,134	92,961
1970	1,313,500	687	144,731
1971	1,404,816	287	150,170
1972	1,525,012	248	163,204
1973	1,649,079	159	177,004
1974	1,799,998	221	179,550
1975	1,825,000	325	—
1976	2,017,875	641	201.000*

Compiled from *Birlik Haberleri (Association News)*, no:21, *TIB Bulteni*, no:42, and "Economy of Turkey" in TIB 1976 Report.

* Calculated on the basis of the 10% figure for 1976 given in the *TIB Bulteni*.

Firstly, let us remember that *Table 12* includes only the insured workers. When we consider that the illnesses and accidents which befall illegal and uninsured workers who have no protection are not included, we understand how little the figures reflect reality.

Further the low figures for occupational illnesses are striking. This shows that the workers are reluctant to report illnesses to the workplace. The meaning of this becomes clearer when one puts it together with the widespread unemployment in our country. Our working class lives and dies in the workshop. Such is the standard of living provided by capitalism in Turkey.

Most important, although the table does not reflect the full truth, is the large number of accidents at work. The number of work accidents in Turkey is an average 10% of the number of insured workers. In 1976 for example, this meant 550 workers everyday... 23 workers every hour ... 2 workers every five minutes ... involved in work accidents.

Up to now we have dealt only with illnesses and work accidents, serious or mild. However, there are also what our workers call "occupational homicides". According to official figures published by the Social Insurance Department, 4129 workers were killed in work "accidents" in the five years from 1969-1974. In 1975 alone, this figure was 1083.⁽¹⁵⁾ However, the real figures are much higher. This can only be called *mass slaughter*.

Fulfilment of Basic Needs

An important indication of the living conditions of our working class is the degree to which its basic needs are met.

Let us take the question of nutrition. As pointed out in the book *The Question of Nutrition in Turkey* published by TOB-DER (Teachers' Association), "The minimum daily intake necessary to protect the health of an individual is 150gm of meat, half a kilo of milk, one egg, 300gm of fruit and vegetables, about 200gm of cereal, and a sufficient amount of oil and sugar. The current (i.e., 1974 R.Y.) cost of these items is as follows:

150x30.00	450 kuruş* meat
500x 6.00	300 kuruş milk
1x 1.25	125 kuruş egg

* 100 kuruş=1 Turkish Lira.

300x 5.00	150 kuruş fruits and vegetables
1x 2.00	200 kuruş bread
50x50.00	250 kuruş oil
100x 9.50	95 kuruş sugar

TOTAL 15 lira 70 kuruş⁽¹⁶⁾

According to this, already in 1974, a five-member worker's family had to spend 78.50TL only on food. Between 1974-1977, the price of food increased by 84.6%.⁽¹⁷⁾ According to the OECD, in the summer of 1978, the cost of living index jumped 70% over the figure for 1977.⁽¹⁸⁾ This means that by the end of 1978, 1974's 78.50 lira would be 246.33 lira. And this only for food! The level of wages tells us what this means. Our working class is suffering from *hidden starvation*.

When we come to the dwelling places which house our workers, there are no tables or statistics that have any relevance at all. For example, according to the Third Five-Year Plan, only 10% of existing dwellings were classified as uninhabitable at the beginning of 1973. If we consider that the total number of dwellings in that year was 2,800,000, it means that only 280,000 were "uninhabitable". On the other hand, the number of *gecekondu** was more than 700,000 at the end of 1972. In order to understand what is termed "uninhabitable", we must know the value assigned to human beings by capitalism in Turkey.

Our working class lives in these *gecekondu* which are not included in the category of "uninhabitable" dwellings.

Illegal Workers

According to the Labour Law, each workplace must submit a declaration telling the number of workers employed, and must insure them. However, the great majority of workplaces in our country, have never filed a declaration, and have continued to employ illegal workers.

* Gecekondu are shanties constructed in one night. (gece=night)

Table: 13

Number, Percentage of Workplaces Employing Illegal Workers

YEAR	Number of Registered Workplaces	Number of Workplaces Submitting Declarations	Percentage of Workplaces Employing Illegal Workers
1969	248,643	103,652	58 %
1970	279,405	109,391	61 %
1971	364,240	154,812	57 %
1972	429,453	174,344	59 %
1973	526,305	184,427	65 %
1974	578,714	195,929	66 %
1975	642,672	205,441	68 %
1976	738,646	216,941	71 %

TIB Bulteni, December 1977, no:42, p.25.

Moreover, their number and proportion is increasing with every passing year. (Table: 13)

Here we see that the number and proportion of workplaces employing illegal workers have increased every year since 1969, and that their proportion has reached 71% of all workplaces. When we consider, as was pointed out in the work we have referred to above, that an average of four workers is employed in each of these workplaces, it appears that *more than two million illegal workers were employed in 1976*. The number of insured workers in the same year was two million. This means that, excluding agriculture (since agricultural workers have no social insurance rights), roughly only 50% of our workers are covered by social insurance.

Unemployment

In Turkey, views which consider the army of unemployed as outside the working class, and which therefore take the condition of the unemployed and that of the employed section of the working class in isolation from each other, are fairly widespread, particularly among bourgeois scientific circles. In that case, why are we dealing with the question of unemployment in the section on the working and living conditions of the working class?

Stalin said the following: "Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class, what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not. If there is a reserve army of unemployed, whose members cannot live except by the sale of their labour-power, then, the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class; and if they do form part of the working class, then their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the workers engaged in production. I therefore think that when describing the living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, the condition of the reserve army of unemployed workers should also be taken into account" (19)

Under the headings in the present section thus far, we have discussed such questions as accidents at work, "occupational homicides", nutrition and illegal employment. Yet, in our country, there are millions of unemployed who are even deprived of some of these "problems"!

The most distorted figures in capitalist countries, including Turkey, are those dealing with unemployment. Nevertheless, the moment unemployment becomes a great social problem threatening the system itself, "confidential" reports begin to circulate, the bourgeoisie becomes deeply "concerned" about unemployment. For example, one such "confidential" report, the *Report of the Special Commission on Employment and Manpower*, says, "In 1971, there were approximately 2,000,000 hidden and official unemployed in Turkey, 1,750,000 in agriculture, 250,000 in other areas. Moreover, 400,000 are added to the workforce every year. Since the beginning of the planned period, the

average employment created by the economy annually, is in the region of 135,000. In recent years, emigration to foreign countries has reached 100,000 per year. Thus, each year sees 165,000 added to the present two million unemployed. We can speak of the danger of a 'workforce explosion' in the 1980's if these conditions continue".(20) Although it does not give entirely correct figures, the report does signal the "danger".

The longstanding problem of unemployment in Turkey, has in fact reached the level of an explosion. The OECD reports that, at the end of 1978, at least 20% of the employable population, 15-64 years, i.e., at least 3.5 million, are unemployed in Turkey. The Minister of Social Security says 7 million. Although the figures vary, we see that everyone is forced to admit that unemployment is on a huge scale.

Unemployment pulls down the standard of living of our entire working class, employed or unemployed. Since unemployment means that the entire income of a section of the working class is wiped out, this reduces *the real wages of the working class as a whole* even further. Alongside this, employed workers must put aside a definite sum for a "rainy day". This also reduces real wages. Thus, on the one hand, unemployment is a factor in the low level of wages discussed above. On the other hand, even those low wages (as a whole) are higher than the standard of living of our working class.

Conclusion

We have thus seen the broad outlines of the working and living conditions of our working class. Now let us summarize briefly and make a general evaluation of the results obtained.

The working class of Turkey is under very heavy exploitation. In 1973, the rate of surplus-value in the large manufacturing industry taken alone, was as much as 400%. The figure for the whole of the working class is much higher. Moreover, the general tendency indicates that the rate of surplus value will continue to increase.

The rate of exploitation of the working class of Turkey is much higher than that of the working class of the advanced capitalist imperialist countries. For example, in 1969 it was 2-3 times higher than the rate of exploitation in the United States.

In Turkey, there is a large and growing gap between the workers'

wages and the value of labour-power.

The official minimum wage is much much less than the value of unskilled labour-power. The difference between the two is constantly growing. In 1978, the value of unskilled labour-power is seven times the current minimum wage. Hence, while the minimum wage should be 800TL at the end of 1978, it is only 110TL. Moreover, there are still sectors in which the official minimum wage is not in effect. In those sectors where it is applied, the effect of the minimum wage is to hold down all wages. From this point of view, both in its application and in its determination at a level according to the value of unskilled labour-power, the minimum wage can justly be a focal point of struggle.

Leaving aside the minimum wage, not even the average wages in our country have been able to rise to the value of unskilled labour-power, i.e., to the level of the required minimum wage. Moreover, the difference between the two is increasing. For example, average wages in 1977 were only 51% of the value of unskilled labour power, i.e., half as much.

In a 15-year period, the workers' gross real wages were able to rise to 28-32TL from 18TL. In the 1971-1977 period, net real wages fell in the years 1972, 1975 and 1977. Real wage figures neither show the general picture nor reflect correctly what they do show. Nevertheless, when we compare increases in real wages with increases in the productivity of labour, increases in national and industrial incomes, we see that the position of the working class is constantly deteriorating in relation to the position of the bourgeoisie.

The working conditions of our working class are just as bad as wages. Turkey has one of the highest work accident rates in the world. Workplaces have no supervision at all.

In our country, workers are unable to fulfill even their most basic needs. For example, in 1978, a worker's family of five needed 246TL a day only for food. This means that our working class is suffering from secret starvation.

50% of the workers who should be covered by insurance are working without insurance, working illegally. Their position is even worse.

Yet there are millions of unemployed who are unable even to work illegally. Various figures put the number of unemployed as high as 7 million. Unemployment has reached the "explosion" point. This situation is reducing the standard of living of our working class as a

whole. Unemployment is reflected in the low level of wages. At the same time, it is necessary to stress that even those low wages show the standard of living of our working class as a whole much much higher than it actually is.

What conclusions can be drawn from the situation of the working class of Turkey as discussed in this section and briefly summarised above?

Firstly, we see that the law of the "*relative deterioration*" of the condition of the working class under capitalism is very clearly operating in Turkey.

Increases in workers' real wages, *even to the extent reflected in the figures*, are far behind the growth of labour productivity and the growth of national and industrial incomes. If we remember that the figures are not fully accurate, or completely inaccurate, if we remember working conditions and the questions of nutrition, illegal workers and unemployment, then the *relative deterioration* in the condition of our working class as a whole becomes something concrete that can be seen and grasped.

Secondly, the law of the "*absolute deterioration*" of the condition of the working class under capitalism is also operating in Turkey. This law has two aspects. One is "*absolute deterioration in the social sense*", the other is "*absolute deterioration in the physical sense*".

The fact that the needs of society as a whole will increase with the advance of capitalism and development of the productive forces, is a law that was demonstrated by Lenin. In Turkey, where the general level of productive forces has developed to a medium level, capitalism is passing through stages rapidly, making qualitative leaps. This means that the needs of the whole of society, the needs of the working class as a part of that society, are also increasingly rapidly. As we have seen, however, the living conditions of the working class are far from showing a development that can meet its rising needs.

Moreover, the gap between wages and the value of labour-power is constantly growing. Let us remember again the facts that the figures do not reflect. This means that, not only does the condition of the working class of Turkey as a whole fail to correspond to its rising needs, but the difference between the workers' standard of living and its needs is constantly growing. Thus, there is an *absolute deterioration in the social sense* in the condition of our working class.

Is there an *absolute deterioration in the physical sense* in the

condition of our working class? The clearest numerical indication of such a physical deterioration is a fall in real wages. Looking at the changes in real wages, we see that there was an actual decline in 1971-1972, 1975 and 1977. For this reason, we can say without any doubt that, in these years, there has been an *absolute deterioration in the physical sense* in the condition of our working class.

However, absolute deterioration in the physical sense is a tendency. We cannot restrict it to only certain years. Keeping this in mind and looking at real changes in net wages between 1971-1977, we see that, according to one index, in 1977, workers' real wages were below those of 1971. If real wages were 100 in 1971, they were 99.1 in 1977. Leaving aside declines in the interval, the fact that wages showed a real decline in relation to those of 7 years before, is proof of the existence of a tendency of absolute deterioration in the physical sense as well.

The index which led us to this conclusion (the Istanbul Cost of Living Index) is the index which most accurately (relatively) reflects high price increases. In our opinion, it is perfectly correct to generalise from the changes in real wages obtained from this index. Indices generally give a low reflection of price increases. At the same time, the average wage figures we have relied upon tend to show average wages higher than they actually are. The result of these two factors is that the real wage figures we have obtained are too high. This is one aspect of the matter. Another is that the sector covered by real wage figures consists of only half the insured wage-earners. Besides this, there are many workers who have long since become part of the working class, but are not yet covered by insurance. There are broad sectors where even the minimum wage is not in effect. Most important, there is an army of unemployed. Alongside these are prices which continue to rise at an incredible speed. To summarize, real wage figures in Turkey are limited, both as to what they cover, and as to how they reflect the facts. From this point of view, we can put great emphasis on the fact that there is today a tendency of *absolute deterioration in the physical sense* in the condition of our working class as a whole.

It can be seen that laws which govern tendencies in regard to the situation of the working class under capitalism, operate in their full severity in Turkey and similar countries. The operation of these laws in the imperialist countries on the other hand, has been slowed down by the factors we spoke of at the beginning of this section. In fact, from time to time, the operation of these laws has been overcome. It is this

fact which, objectively, brings about the difference between the working and living conditions of the working class of Turkey, and those in the advanced capitalist imperialist countries.

This objective economic difference in the working and living conditions of the working classes in the advanced capitalist and under- or medium-developed capitalist countries, is of crucial importance in understanding the opportunist and revisionist trends in the world working class movement. (This does not mean that there is no objective basis for opportunism in Turkey.) Lenin said the following in a speech delivered in the Comintern in 1920:

“Here we must ask: how is the persistence of such trends in Europe to be explained? Why is this opportunism stronger in Western Europe than in our country? It is because the culture of the advanced capitalist countries has been, and still is, the result of their being able to live at the expense of a thousand million oppressed people. It is because the capitalists of these countries obtain a great deal more in this way than they could obtain as profits by plundering the workers in their own countries. (...) It is these thousands of millions in super-profits that form the economic basis of opportunism in the working class movement.”⁽²¹⁾

The monopoly profits that Lenin spoke of are continuing and increasing in our day. Just as yesterday, Lenin looked first at the economic basis in order to understand opportunism in the working class movement in Western Europe, it is again necessary today to look first at the economic basis in order to understand “Euro-communism” and various “democratic” trends.

There is no doubt that there will be revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries as well. There is no doubt that the proletariat, the only truly revolutionary force in society, will also make revolutions in those countries. It is even unnecessary to discuss these. The *objectively* revolutionary character of the working class, its *objective* historical task, derive from its position in production. The point we are discussing is the difficulties in regard to the proletariat’s arriving at a *subjective* understanding of its objective role, due, first and foremost, to the contemporary economic conditions in the imperialist countries. Engels’ letter to Marx, dated 8 October 1858, is of crucial importance in under-

standing this question. Let us read what Engels said:

“...the English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois. (...) For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable. *The only thing that would help here would be a few thoroughly bad years*, but since the gold discoveries these no longer seem so easy to come by.”⁽²²⁾ (Our italics)

How clearly Engels speaks! In fact, these are truths which all workers with common sense feel, understand, know. Those who try to confuse the workers are the falsifiers of Marxism, the “learned” opportunists.

In recent years, the economic and social life of the imperialist countries has begun to deteriorate. Since the beginning of the 1970's, there has been a stagnation, in some places even a decline, in the standard of living and real income of the workers and working people in the advanced capitalist countries. Finance-capital is attacking more ruthlessly in order to burden its own working class with the consequences of its retreat before the great successes of the world socialist system led by the Soviet Union, and of the national liberation movements, with the consequences of the severe and uninterrupted crises. Inflation and mass unemployment are persisting. In the report presented at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev said that, “...the present-day crisis is different.”⁽²³⁾ Under these conditions, the strike movement that is embracing broad masses of the working people is reaching its “highest level for the last tens of years”.⁽²⁴⁾ Thus we may consider that the period of relative peace and advancement that capitalism in the advanced capitalist countries has experienced from the Second World War up until our day, is coming to an end. If our thinking is not “wishful” thinking, if these societies go through ever sharper class battles, then we will see the superiority of the working class of the advanced capitalist countries. Then we will see the incomparable organisational ability of this most select unit of the world proletariat, its superior level of knowledge and incredible power.

Nevertheless, that day has not yet come. Today, the workers and working people of Turkey and similar countries are under much heavier exploitation than those in the advanced capitalist countries. They are under a “double yoke”. As a result of this, economic and social life in these countries is facing objective dilemmas from which it cannot escape.

The scale of the problems and the depth of the crises are such that cannot be compared with the West. The working class and all working people are suffering under unbearable conditions. For these reasons, the under- and medium-developed capitalist countries, Turkey among them, are becoming the weak links of the imperialist chain. The class struggle in these countries is assuming unprecedented dimensions with frequent explosions.

Starting from these different positions of the imperialist and under and medium-developed countries, Lenin determined the position and role of the latter in the world revolution and, more correctly, introduced this into consciousness. He said the following: "We say that it is easier for the movement to start in the countries that are not among those exploiting countries which have opportunities for easy plunder and are able to bribe the upper section of their workers."⁽²⁵⁾

In the same year (1918) Lenin further developed this idea which must never be forgotten by those who are considering the question of revolution in the capitalist countries; and he made the following generalisation: *In Europe (in the imperialist countries) it will be immeasurably more difficult to start the revolution, whereas it is immeasurably more easy for countries such as Russia (under and medium-developed capitalist countries) to start; but it will be more difficult for the latter to continue the revolution and establish socialism than it will be for the former.*⁽²⁶⁾

Yes, Turkey and similar countries are today much closer to revolution than the imperialist countries. Because revolution does not come about by our petty-bourgeois socialists talking and listening to themselves until dawn. "Revolution can only be made by masses thrust into motion by great economic needs."⁽²⁷⁾ (Our italics) It is for this reason that Turkey is a weak link of the imperialist chain.

4. The Struggle of the Working Class of Turkey is Increasingly Assuming a Political Character

Some New Developments in the Struggle of the Working Class of Turkey

The economic struggle of the working class of Turkey is accelerating under the impact of such factors as the specific character of capitalist development in Turkey and the deepening economic crisis, the living conditions of the working class and people, the persistent political crisis, and the revolutionising influence of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Only 10 years have passed since the first factory occupation carried out by 1800 workers of the Derby rubber factory in 1968. When "legal" methods failed, the Derby workers won the freedom to choose their own trade union using another democratic method. Today, factory occupations are a common method of struggle for our working class. Kavel, Turk Demirdokum, Singer, Sungurlar...

On the 15-16 June 1970, more than 100,000 workers in Istanbul and the surrounding area pulled the switch and stopped work in 135 factories. For two days, there were bloody clashes between the workers, the army and police all over Istanbul. The reactionary government was able to control the situation only by declaring martial law. The 15-16 June inaugurated a new period for the working class movement of

Turkey. Only 8 years have passed since then. But today, giant demonstrations of 100,000 workers are a common method of struggle.

We shall not try to explain this development at length, nor to thoroughly show its scale. Everyone can see the events with their own eyes. We shall only underline certain important characteristics of this movement and indicate the direction in which the struggle is moving. Our aim is to show the stage which the working class movement has reached, to show its meaning. Some important mistakes on this subject are being made in revolutionary circles.

On the other hand, the level of struggle achieved by the working class of Turkey will also be an indication of the class consciousness it has achieved. Nothing reflects class consciousness like social practice. Their useful aspects notwithstanding, all enquiries and questionnaires are restricted in many ways. The class struggle, however, is objective, concrete.

We may list some important tendencies shown by the economic trade union struggle of the working class of Turkey in recent years as follows:

First, the speed of trade unionisation seen in the working class movement in recent years. Lenin said: "The trade unions were a tremendous step forward for the working class in the early days of capitalist development, inasmuch as they marked a transition from the workers' disunity and helplessness to the rudiments of class organisation".⁽¹⁾ Truly, organisation in trade unions and trade union consciousness are an important step towards the attainment of genuine class consciousness.

Even the simple percentage of workers belonging to trade unions in a given country shows the extent to which the workers of that country see themselves as a class separate from other classes, the extent to which they see their own interests as different from those of all other classes and strata.

According to 1971 figures, 20% of the workers in France belong to trade unions, in Federal Germany 25%, in Italy 30%, and in Turkey 30%.⁽²⁾ This last percentage continued to grow rapidly in subsequent years, reaching 42.8% of all wage-earners eligible to become members of trade unions in 1975 — parallel with the movement of the masses.⁽³⁾ We cannot underestimate this development. A rate of trade-unionisation higher than that in the countries which historically cradled the world working class movement, is a fundamental indication, to be underlined

in red, when speaking about the level of maturity attained by the working class of Turkey.

Second, in recent years, the working class movement in Turkey, has seen the workers make rapid strides in the direction of class trade unionism. It is to hinder this, that hundreds of thousands of workers have been classified as civil servants. Fascist assaults are being organised against workers in Seydisehir, Sungurlar, Anbarli, Profilo and many similar places. But no obstacle can halt the struggle of our working class to break the chains of class collaboration, the process whereby it is gaining consciousness and becoming organised.

The trade unions have been profoundly affected by the growth of consciousness and politicisation that has gathered momentum in the years following the 1971 fascist-style regime. This process is being accelerated by the inevitable brutality in worker-employer relations due to the specifics of capitalist development in Turkey and the one-sided tradition (the tradition of repression based on force) the ruling classes inherited from the Ottoman Empire, by the crisis in society and the fascist escalation.

On the one hand, class trade unionism is growing rapidly. Turk-Is, on the other hand, is a cauldron of discontent. While Turk-Is is becoming constantly weaker in the hands of the yellow trade unionists, the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK), "which upholds the principles of labour-capital antagonism, unity of the economic and political struggle, and socialism", is growing rapidly. This development confirms that our working class is turning towards socialism, that it is understanding its own class interests better with every passing day.

One small warning. The history of the working class has seen many times, how in periods of rising militancy and spirit of struggle in the ranks of the working class movement, class collaborationist leaders have used demagogic militancy in attempts to halt the masses who have escaped their control and distort the aims of the movement. For example, Halil Tunc, the "worker's leader" and yellow, gangster trade unionist, who built a 500,000 TL aquarium in his home, when pressed, speaks about "general strike" and "siezing the factories". While exposing this demagogy, revolutionaries must know that, in periods when the movement of the masses is rising spontaneously, the effect of even such demagogic militancy is much different than in normal periods. In periods when the air is filled with "explosive material", those who talk about "siezing the factories against lockouts", "general strike" and other such

“threats”, could, without any such intention, start a fire. Therefore, the question of how to use these various demagogics in drawing the backward sections of the class into the movement, in broadening the movement, is an important question facing the genuine organisations and leaders of the working class.

Third, the fact that our working class is acting without the “consent” of the bourgeoisie, that it is going beyond the limits of the existing laws, shows that it has understood the truth that it will be able to take its rights only through struggle. In Europe, many strikes are lost because the working class does not trust to its own strength, because it sees “public opinion” as the factor leading to success. For example, whenever there is an important strike in England, all the newspapers (including, unfortunately, the left newspapers as well) begin propaganda to the effect: “Don’t do anything that will lose the support of public opinion. If you do, you will lose your strength”. Lenin, on the other hand, said the following: “Whereas the liberals (and the liquidators) tell the workers: ‘You are strong when you have the sympathy of ‘society’, the Marxist tells the workers something different, namely: ‘You have the sympathy of ‘society’ when you are strong’ ”.(4) And events show that the working class of Turkey is learning this truth.

Fourth, waging a merciless struggle against the fascists, the fascist escalation, and all manner of anti-democratic trends, our working class is, at the same time, distinguishing “left” sounding provocateurs and purging them from its ranks. The fact that Maoists are being thrown out of many workers’ meetings and that many trade unions have taken a decision not to admit Maoists, is an example of this. It shows that political maturity is advancing with giant steps.

Fifth, the demands put forward by our working class in strikes, protests and meetings, indicate the degree to which it has understood its responsibility as the vanguard of all progressive classes and strata, its responsibility to defend their rights. The slogan which comes to the fore in all working class actions, on a nation-wide scale, “We are workers, we are strong, we are the vanguard of the revolution”, is a product of this understanding.

Another important fact which shows the maturity of our working class, its revolutionary character, that it is embracing the revolutionary movement of Turkey as a whole, is the fact that, in every great workers’ demonstration, pictures of Deniz, Yusuf and Huseyin, the three youths who died on the scaffold, pictures of other heroes, patriotic revolu-

tionaries, who fell in the struggle for the sake of the people, cover Taksim Square from one end to the other. Our working class does not approach things in an opportunist or pacifist way, and it is not afraid to declare its own those who fell in the struggle against fascism. Our working class says what Lenin said about the revolutionary Narodniks in Russia: "Their road was wrong. That road cannot lead us to the liberation they too wished for. We are not taking that road. But we do not forget those who sacrificed themselves without flinching for the sake of the people. They too are a part of our revolutionary tradition. And, although they were not able to ensure the liberation of the people, their fearless self-sacrifice undoubtedly contributed in the development to the present-day level."⁽⁵⁾

Sixth, our working class does not stop with the understanding that it is a different class whose interests are different from those of other classes, that, at the same time, it has the responsibility to lead all progressive classes and strata. It understands as well, that the interests of the working class are common on a world scale. Internationalism, international ties and feelings are one of the most distinctive trends that have risen in the workers' movement in recent years.

Seventh, in one sense a general conclusion which sums up and unites in itself all that we have said until now: the economic struggle of our working class is increasingly gaining a political quality. And our working class is increasingly gaining a profound understanding of the unity of the economic and political struggle. The fact that every important action by our working class in the last few years has had a political content, is an indication of this truth.

Leaving for the moment the significance of the factors we have enumerated above, we can, without being deceived by any "modesty", make the following generalisation: Turkey is one of the countries in which the struggle of the working class has reached the highest level *in the world*. It is the country where this struggle is most severe *in Europe*.

The Political Quality of the Economic Struggle is Becoming Permanent

In the second section, where we discussed the specifics of capitalist development in Turkey, we said that finance-capital had siezed the

state, had united with it, and that state-monopoly capitalism had appeared. We spoke of the "dilemma" of the monopoly bourgeoisie, and, in relation to that, of the continuous economic, social and political crisis, and the constant danger of fascism. These are the main underlying reasons why the economic struggle of the working class is, increasingly, *objectively*, gaining a political quality.

In addition, the products of the 58-year long struggle of the Communist Party of Turkey, and its present-day struggle, have an important subjective influence.

The fact that finance-capital in our country has siezed hold of the state and uses it for its own class interests, that the state and the monopolies have coalesced into a single mechanism, means that, at one point, the state intervenes directly in the solution of every major question. The state openly intervenes in worker-employer relations on behalf of the monopolies. This state "arranges" the most basic elements which make up the objective living conditions of the workers: wages, social security, holidays, etc. The state's role in the redistribution, through taxation, of the national income to the benefit of the monopolies is growing. In this situation, the demands raised by the workers are increasingly being directed against, not the capitalists, monopolies and holdings alone, but against the whole policy of the state, against the class essence of that policy. This coalescence of the state and the monopolies, state-monopoly capitalism, means that, whatever it does, the state is, of necessity, the protector of the monopolies, "they are tied to each other by a thousand and one strings".

Let us take one of the most important focal points of the struggle in recent years, the struggle for the referendum. Our working class wants to freely choose its own trade unions, by referendums in the workplaces. Because the employers are frightened to death of this, the laws forbid it. The laws were enacted in the years when trade unions did not represent the interests of the working class, when the yellow trade confederation, Turk-Is, had siezed the factories, in order to prevent the working class turning to class trade unions. For that reason, the struggle for the referendum has been an important demand in the struggles waged by the working class since 1968. Against whom? Against the finance oligarchy and its state which refuses to change the laws.

Some regard the fact that the economic struggle in those countries where state-monopoly capitalism has developed or is developing, "is

increasingly gaining a political essence", as something "new", peculiar to today. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Lenin indicated this when he said, "Each clash in the factory *necessarily* brings the workers into conflict with the laws and representatives of state authority" (6) (Our italics.) This means that, the fact that economic struggles *spontaneously* assume a political content appeared frequently much earlier, that this took place more frequently with the development of the proletariat's consciousness and level of organisation. There is nothing "new" in this.

What we must take care to note is that, with the process of concentration and centralisation of production and capital, this phenomenon of the economic struggle gaining a political content is increasingly becoming more permanent on a world scale and in individual countries. It is clear that workers' actions will increasingly come into conflict with the monopolists and their state, the more capitalist enterprises coalesce among themselves and with the state.

The Comintern Programme has this to say about the phenomenon of the workers' economic struggle gaining a political content, a phenomenon which appeared "frequently" in the pre-imperialist period and became more permanent when monopoly capitalism became dominant and began to use the state in its own interests: "Under these conditions, every important action by the proletariat becomes an action against the state power, i.e., it becomes a political movement". (7)

This tendency, which gathered momentum in the period of monopoly capitalism, became more continuous under today's conditions of *state-monopoly capitalism*.

This is what is happening in Turkey. As a result of the coalescence of the state and the monopolies, which greatly accelerated in the 1970's, the economic struggle of our working class is steadily, *objectively*, gaining a political content. This coalescence, regardless of the wishes of the ruling classes, accelerates the political development of the working class. The role that the state plays in economic, social and political life can much more easily become a part of the worker's consciousness.

The coalescence of the state and the monopolies is further deepening the "traditional" crisis of capitalism in Turkey. The monopoly bourgeoisie sees the way out in fascism. The working masses' rapidly rising hopes for a decent life, on the other hand, come into contradiction with the intentions of the monopoly bourgeoisie. In this way, all the country's internal economic, social and political conditions

are becoming entangled in the continuous political crisis of recent years. While the brutality of the monopoly bourgeoisie is increasing, the struggle of the masses is also rising. Finance-capital is marching on the people with the state, the military, the police and the fascists. For example, while there were 40 political murders in the year between April 1975 and April 1976, this figure reached 900 in the first 10 months of 1978. Now the army and police attack, make arrests and murder people at every important workers' action. As we know, every attack by the state and its police forces imparts a political character to the workers' actions.

In this way, due to the coalescence of the state and the monopolies, finance capital's desire for fascism, and attacks from all sides, the process whereby economic struggles are *objectively* assuming a political quality is accelerated. And it can be said that this phenomenon which appeared "frequently" at the time of Marx and Lenin, has become a widespread and permanent phenomenon in Turkey today.

How Must We Evaluate the Level of Struggle of the Working Class of Turkey

We see that our summary of the economic struggle of the working class of Turkey brings with it some important questions.

Everyone sees the huge dimensions of the working class movement. And everyone sees that the economic struggle is not restricted to questions of "three penny or five penny", that it includes political demands as well. This finds an immediate reflection in peoples' minds. And the present stage of the class struggle forces some questions to the fore in discussions.

These are questions of the level of struggle and level of consciousness of our working class, of its being a "class in itself" or a "class for itself". Of course, these are also connected with a series of other questions: the dialectical relation between politics and the economy, between reform and revolution, between the immediate and the fundamental interests of the working class, etc. All these questions are closely connected with each other. They are a united series of questions. In the concrete class struggle, they cannot be separated from each

other. However, by way of a logical abstraction, we will take a brief look at the relation between the economy and politics, at the level of struggle and level of consciousness of our working class.

In our day, an understanding of the relation between the economy and politics has gained special importance. A wrong evaluation of this relation, a wrong understanding of the level of struggle and consciousness of our working class, entails a wrong evaluation of the tasks of the revolutionary forces. In truth, we see today that all manner of deviation arises from the delineation between the economy and politics.

One idea finds constant repetition in the press of the petty-bourgeois socialists. The working class of Turkey is making the leap from being a "class in itself" and preparing to become a "class for itself". We must deal with this, for it is a topic which has a profound influence on the tactics of the party, as well as on the method and forms of their application.

Where to begin? In our opinion, the most correct starting point is to draw a universal "model" of the *birth and stages of development of the class struggle*, using the writings of Marx and Engels on the British proletariat, historically, the vanguard. This will provide us with an answer to the questions: what is the class struggle, what is a political struggle, what is a class in itself, a class for itself? Then, in the light of these answers, we shall return to Turkey.

The development of the proletariat as a class, its rebellion against the bourgeoisie and the system imposed by it, has passed through various historical stages.

"The earliest, crudest, and least fruitful of this rebellion was that of crime".⁽⁸⁾ Theft, for example, increased very much with the increase in society of workers who could not understand why they themselves lived so poorly, while the bourgeoisie lived so well. The worker cared nothing about the "inviolability of property"... However, in a short time the workers understood that this does not solve anything. Theft involves only one person in rebellion against the system. The whole force of the system is brought to bear against that person, and crushes him. This is a very primitive method of struggle. For this reason, crime never became a universal mode of expression of the opinion of working people. Since protests were carried out by single individuals, one cannot speak of class struggle at this stage. Thus, at this stage, the working class is a "*class in itself*".

As a "class", the proletariat showed its first reaction against the

bourgeoisie, against the machines brought into use with the industrial revolution. The workers directed their attacks, not against the bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production themselves. They smashed the machines which threw them into unemployment, burned down the factories. Worker against machine. This method of struggle too is limited — a host of small islands cut off from each other. At this stage, the workers are still dispersed on a country-wide scale and, “(At this stage the labourers still form an) *incoherent mass* scattered over the whole country and broken up by their mutual competition”.⁽⁹⁾ (Our italics) One again they are powerless against the system, once again the system crushes the “criminals” mercilessly. At this stage, the working class has understood its own class interests and its enemies. But still it is not organised against its main enemy. It is *still a “class in itself”*.

Next comes the stage of workers’ combinations, trade unions and involvement in the political struggle. The transition from the first workers’ combinations to organisation on a nation-wide scale and political struggle, is a process which involves various stages. At the beginning of this process the proletariat is a “class in itself”. As the process advances, it gradually develops from the point of view of consciousness and organisation to become, at the end of the process, a “class for itself”.

This stage begins first with clandestine or illegal workers’ combinations and illegal strikes. Naturally the clandestine workers’ combinations do not yield significant results. On the one hand, the proletariat is only just taking shape, on the other hand there are police terror and difficulties in contacting workers. These combinations are initially established in the form of “temporary combinations”, with the aim of organising a particular strike, after which they are dissolved.

With the development and complete entrenchment of industry, the proletariat increases numerically, becomes concentrated in broad masses in the cities, gains strength and itself feels that it is doing so. The struggle expands, strikes increase. Conflicts between single workers and single bourgeois assume, to an increasing extent, the character of conflicts between the two classes. Together with the mounting struggle, the working class wins the right to organise legally. This gain gives rise to very rapid formation of a great number of combinations and, growing out of these, trade unions. The first trade unions are local. Strike actions are also localised, so gains are restricted. The great majority of strikes are

defeated. "But what gives these unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempts of the workers to abolish competition. They imply the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves. (...) The workingmen cannot attack the bourgeoisie, and with it the whole existing order of society, at any sorer point than this."⁽¹⁰⁾

Thus, while on the one hand, the working class begins to understand the importance of unity, the advance of industrialisation, on the other hand, develops the means of communication. As a result, workers in different regions are easily able to establish contact with each other. It is precisely this contact, the countless local struggles which are all of the same character, that must be centralised in a single nation-wide struggle between classes. This is followed by the formation of trade unions uniting workers on a nation-wide scale. The workers come together under a single centre. The trade unions organise the workers as the *working class*.⁽¹¹⁾ The organisation of these strikes, combinations and *trade unions*, takes place at the same time as the political struggle of those workers who have formed a large party known as the Chartist. With the consciousness that the working class is a separate class developing on a national scale, and with its uniting together with the aim of struggling against a separate, enemy class — the capitalists, the struggle becomes the struggle of one class against another. This is now a class struggle. And the proletariat is now a "class for itself".⁽¹²⁾

In his work, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx says the following:

"Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself (a class — R.Y.). In the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases (i.e., the phases we have summarized — R.Y.), this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle of class against class is a political struggle".⁽¹³⁾

As this extremely important quotation also shows, Marx uses the concept "*class in itself*", to define the emergence of a class as an objective

reality on the basis of a particular mode of production. A class in itself, which has not comprehended its common interests and common position, and is not organised, is nothing but a "mass of people". The concept "*class for itself*" on the other hand, explains the comprehension by this class which exists objectively, of this "material existence", together with its social and political consequences.

Thus we have seen the stages of development of the working class struggle. Now let us look more closely at the meaning of these stages.

What is the class struggle of the proletariat? Lenin says, "When the workers of a single factory or a single branch of industry engage in struggle against their employer or employers, is this class struggle? No, this is only a weak embryo of it".⁽¹⁴⁾ Again, Lenin, in his article of 1913 entitled *Liberal and Marxist Conceptions of the Class Struggle*, says the following: "The Economists therefore recognised as "class struggle" the struggle for a wage increase of five kopeks on the ruble, and refused to recognise a higher, more developed, nation-wide class struggle, the struggle for *political aims*. The Economists, therefore, recognised the embryonic class struggle but did not recognise in it its developed form."⁽¹⁵⁾ "The struggle of the workers becomes a class struggle only when all the foremost representatives of the entire working class of the whole country are conscious of themselves as a single working class and launch a struggle that is directed, not against individual employers, but against the *entire class* of capitalists and against the government that supports that class." ⁽¹⁶⁾

Thus, it is possible to speak of the proletarian class struggle, when the working class (or at least the advanced representatives of that class) is conscious on a national scale that it is a separate class, and organises and wages a struggle against what is again a separate and enemy class, the *bourgeoisie*, and *its state*.

But if we define the class struggle in this way, it at the same time means political struggle. For "politics" means, "participating in the affairs of the state, in the leadership of the state, and in the *definition of the content, duties and forms of state activity*".⁽¹⁷⁾ (Our italics.) Thus we arrive at one of the cornerstones of the Marxist theory of class struggle, the famous sentence in the *Communist Manifesto*: "Every class struggle is a political struggle." Since class struggle and political struggle are struggles between classes, struggles which involve the state, the two concepts are two names for the same phenomenon. "These famous words of Marx", says Lenin, "are not to be understood to mean that any

struggle of workers against employers must *always be* a political struggle. They must be understood to mean that the struggle of the workers against the capitalists inevitably *becomes* a political struggle *insofar as* it becomes a *class struggle*." (18)

Class struggle (i.e., political struggle) arises and grows out of economic struggle (i.e., embryonic class struggle). By the force of its own logic, the economic struggle, rising step by step, gives birth to the political struggle. For this reason, Stalin explains the sentence, "Every class struggle is a political struggle", with the words: "This means that, if the proletarians and capitalists are waging an economic struggle against each other today, they will be compelled to wage a political struggle tomorrow." (19)

Let us explain by way of an example. The workers at a factory go on strike demanding, "the minimum wage should be 500 lira". And let us say they win the strike. But the next day, the capitalist sacks these workers and takes in new workers, who accept the lower wage. The workers understand that it is necessary, first, to remove the competition among themselves. No one may accept the lower wage. For this, broad organisation is necessary. They organise. But the acceptance of their demands in one factory does not achieve much, for while one factory is saved, twenty more fall. The employer of that factory is not the only "bad guy". Arrayed against the workers is a class whose interests are opposed to theirs. In that case, the same demand must be put forward in all the factories. This is done. But, how to ensure that the capitalists will not one day agree among themselves to lower wages. There is only one way. A *law* which stipulates that, "minimum wage is 500 liras", is necessary. But the state does not want to enact such a law. In that case, not only the capitalist class is the enemy of the workers. There is also the *state*, which is always at the service of the capitalist class to frustrate the workers' demands. In that case, a struggle must be waged to force the state to enact such a law. But this struggle is a political struggle! As can be seen, the struggle to achieve economic gains and to make these permanent, gains a political character, step by step. For this reason, Lenin calls the economic struggle the "embryonic form" of class struggle.

It is possible to follow what we have stated above, with the following important quotation from *Marx's Letter to Bolte of 1871*. At the same time, this quotation gives the classic definition of the political struggle.

"...Every movement in which the working class

comes out as a *class* against the ruling classes and tries to coerce them by pressure from without, is a political movement. For instance, the attempt in a particular factory, or even in a particular trade, to force a shorter working day out of individual capitalists by strikes, etc., is a purely economic movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., law, is a *political* movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers, there grows up everywhere a *political* movement, that is to say, a movement of the *class*, with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form of possessing general, socially coercive force".(20)

From all that we have said thus far, it becomes clear that the economic struggle gradually gives birth to the political struggle. *And a class whose struggle has become a political struggle (i.e. class struggle) is a "class for itself"*. A party which has truly embraced the working class of that country is not necessary for this to take place. The first point which the petty-bourgeois socialists confuse is this.

Moreover, it must be understood that, historically, it is that struggle of the working class which has reached the level of political struggle, which gives birth to parties. A class movement which has reached this level needs its own party and will create it. In England, why, in the initial stages of the struggle we have summarised above, did the working class not have its own party, and why did the Chartist Party emerge as the party of the working class in the final stage? Because, objectively, the working class did not feel the need for a party before that. Only when, having organised on a national scale, they wished to have their rights certified throughout the country, did the need for a party arise, and only then was such a party born. Marx explains this in his *letter to Bolte* as follows: "While these movements (the political movements of the working class— R.Y.) presuppose a certain degree of previous organisation, they are in turn equally a means of developing this organisation".(21)

What would happen if the party is formed before the struggle and understanding of the working class has historically reached the level of political struggle and understanding? For, the existence of the party also has a relative independence. In every society, in every period, there can be

workers and intellectuals sufficiently conscious to form a party. In addition, this is even more possible after the birth of Marxism as the proletarian ideology and its indication of the party's place in the life of the working class. It is our opinion that parties which are established before the development of that class objectively calls for the party, cannot become strong parties, even if the number of their cadres becomes relatively large. The clock has not yet struck.

Of course, this does not mean that parties which are established historically "early", should not be established. On the contrary, parties which precede the process of objective development of the working class, can play a very positive, very important role in accelerating the development of the class. Our purpose is to stress that one cannot expect parties formed in such situations to become strong parties in this period.

Let us continue. Another question: In the historical summary we gave above, we saw that the process of economic struggle, beginning with workers' combinations, has several stages. Does the stage of political struggle (i.e. class struggle) also have various levels?

It does. And this is a second point confused by the petty-bourgeois socialists.

The example given by Marx of the struggle for the 8-hour working day law, or, an example from our country, the referendum struggle, are political struggles. But this is a political level at which the movement stops at "little" things, where what is demanded from the state are laws of any kind, or various economic, social and political reforms. The struggle at this level is not the developed level of the political struggle (and therefore the class struggle). It is not aimed at rooting out the system of exploitation altogether. The name for struggle at this level is trade union politics.

"...The political movement of the working class has as its ultimate object, of course, the conquest of political power for this class."⁽²²⁾ The proletariat cannot achieve its fundamental class interests through a political struggle which forces the administration to enact laws in the workers' favour. In fact, it cannot even achieve most of the laws it wants. For this reason, "The next aim in every struggle which is waged by one class against another is the struggle for political power."⁽²³⁾ At this level, the working class wages its struggle within and around its own party with the aim of *seizing the state* in order to change the system completely. For Marxism-Leninism, the political struggle at this level is developed class struggle in the full sense of the term. As Lenin says,

"It is not enough that the class struggle becomes real, consistent and developed only when it embraces the sphere of politics. In politics, too, it is possible to restrict oneself to minor matters, and it is possible to go deeper, to the very foundations. Marxism recognises a class struggle as fully developed, "nation-wide", *only* if it does not merely embrace politics but takes in the most significant thing in politics — the organisation of state power".⁽²⁴⁾ In order for the movement to rise to this highest level, there is a need for the true party of the working class, the communist party, its own class ideology, and its own independent class politics. The party is the indisputable basic element of this stage.

In remarking in *What is to be Done* that, "There is politics and politics".⁽²⁵⁾ Lenin was reminding us of this fact, that the political struggle of the working class also has various levels. The lowest level of political struggle is the political level born of economic struggle and interwoven with the demands of that struggle. Lenin calls this level trade-union politics. Trade-union politics is also politics, but it does not raise the question of abolishing the subjugation of labour to capital. The economic struggle, i.e., the trade union struggle, can also be conducted against the government, but it will still be entirely trade union politics.⁽²⁶⁾ The highest level of political struggle is the struggle waged to seize the state in order to abolish exploitation by capital. It is the communist party which raises the movement to this level, which prepares and organises the class for this level. At this most developed stage of the class struggle, the working class comprehends its class interests (together with its immediate and ultimate interests) *in the full sense*, and becomes a "class for itself" *in the full sense*.

One should not forget that between the backward level of the political struggle and the most developed level of class struggle, lies a span of time, *varying according to the level of consciousness and organisation of the class*, lie various intermediary stages and intermediary configurations. This is a process, a process which takes the working class to the most developed, genuine class struggle and makes it a "class for itself" in the full sense.

When we look at the history of struggle of the working class of Turkey, we see that up until the 1950's, the organisation and struggle of our working class is local and spasmodic. Countless outbursts took place from the 1850's to the 1950's, but either the organisations that were established came to an end of themselves or were closed down. Marx points out that the working class movement develops in pauses, each of

which is followed by a greater rise. Yet these pauses are not of this type. They are not followed by a greater rise in the movement. There are various reasons for this. But the *basic reason* is that in this 100 year period, the working class in Anatolia is, in general, not a true industrial proletariat, not made up of factory workers. Semi-proletarian aspects predominate among the workers of this period. A widespread and genuine industry does not exist in the country.

We know that the existence and struggle of the working class in the true sense of the term, is connected with the *factory system*, Marx says, "*The more the factory system has taken possession of a branch of industry, the more the working-men employed in it participate in the labour movement; the sharper the opposition between working men and capitalists, the clearer the proletarian consciousness in the working-men.*"⁽²⁷⁾ (Our italics) The key to the question lies in these words. With capitalism's ascent to the factory stage in a country, the working class, created, concentrated and trained by this system, climbs onto the true steps of struggle. It turns to political struggle, seeks and finds its party.

In England, the factory stage came with the industrial revolution. In Turkey, the factory stage of capitalism was born in the period between 1923 and the Second World War. However, before gaining its own internal dynamic, it lived until the 1950's, so to speak, in an "oxygen chamber". Therefore, it is only the 1950's which we can evaluate as the stage when the factory industry stage of capitalism reached sufficient maturity in Turkey.

In England, the period between the factory stage, beginning with the industrial revolution, and the point at which the working class became a "class for itself" was very long. Although there may be many historical and social reasons for this, the fact that England was the first to take this road is very important. In Turkey, a long time was not needed for the working class to become a "class for itself" after the onset of the factory stage. Clearly, since the 1960's, our working class has become a completely different class. It has become more numerous and stronger on a national scale, has formed powerful organisations and has thrown itself into a struggle incomparably superior and more militant than in any other period in its history. When we come to the 1970's, the working class of Turkey is indisputably a "*CLASS FOR ITSELF*". Its struggle has assumed a political character. Its struggle is a class struggle.

It can be seen, that the years in which the factory stage began in Turkey and the years of qualitative change in our working class

approximately coincide. Various reasons can be given for this. The historical period in which the working class of Turkey underwent these transformations is entirely different from the corresponding period experienced by the English working class. The situation in which the working class of Turkey is placed, a situation which, in one way or another, it has inherited today, and which influences it, is very different. The independent ideology of the world working class — Marxism-Leninism — has emerged as an objective force making itself felt in every corner of the world. The world working class has brought to our day an accumulated wealth of experience, tradition, methods of struggle and forms of organisation. The working class is a mature class on a world scale. The contribution of the TKP, fighting under severe terror since 1920, in this tradition of our working class, is great. On the other hand, the existence of the world socialist system, consisting of the world's first workers' states, is an example for the labouring masses from real life. The socialist world led by the Soviet Union is the most effective weapon against the myth of the "inviolability" of the system of exploitation. In our day especially, with the "shrinking" of the world due to developing technology, the new life established by the workers of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in particular, exerts a constant influence on our working class.

Yes, the working class of Turkey is today a "class for itself". It is obvious, that underlying the errors of the petty-bourgeois socialists is a false interpretation of the concepts, class for itself, class struggle and political struggle. They call a class which has not reached the highest stage of political struggle, a "class in itself". This is wrong. It leads to the belittling of our working class and its level of struggle, to a kind of "elitism". The inability to understand the reality before one's eyes because of the narrow meanings imparted to concepts by oneself, is the beginning of one's isolation from the masses.

On the other hand, a word of caution is necessary in another direction. It is also a dangerous mistake to *exaggerate* the role in the revolutionary struggle of the fact that the struggle is objectively winning a political character due to the merging of state and monopoly and the mounting drive towards fascism. This mistake would lead to *economism* and *tailism*. It would lead to forgetting the place and the role of the party. For, in general, the present stage reached by the force of objective circumstances, is not the highest stage of genuine class consciousness. That stage will be reached through the struggle of the TKP. The under-

standing mentioned above is a current danger, particularly for some sections living and working abroad.

A good example of the economic struggle of the working class of Turkey objectively gaining a political content, is the struggle to freely choose a trade union. This is not one of the ordinary questions facing workers. This is a *compulsory* demand of the present stage of the working class movement. Our working class wants to organise — on a trade union level, in genuine class trade unions, on a political level, in the Communist Party. Whatever individuals may think, the *movement's logic* demands this at the present level of development of the class struggle. However, the lack of freedom to choose a trade union is one of the factors preventing the realisation of either of these. The lack of freedom to choose a trade union is one of the most important elements permitting “yellow trade unionism” to survive under present conditions. It is one of the several important difficulties blocking the further growth of the working class movement, the further development of class consciousness, and hence political organisation, among the worker masses. As long as this right is not achieved, the organisation of the working class will proceed with difficulties, not only in the trade unions, but also in its political organisation within and around the ranks of its Communist Party. For the reasons enumerated above, the freedom to choose a trade union has, in recent years, become one of the most important targets of struggle of our working class. And, because it is waged against the government, the state, it is a political struggle.

Let us consider the struggle to abolish all anti-democratic laws such as the “associations act” and the “universities act” There are also questions which must be resolved with the political power, with the state. The struggle around them is also political struggle.

But what kind of political struggle? It is not the most developed political struggle (most developed class struggle) as understood by Marxism-Leninism. And, in any case, without being equipped with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the struggle of the working class cannot reach this level by itself. In his speech on the 55th anniversary of the founding of the TKP delivered on 10 September 1975, Comrade I. Bilen, General Secretary of the TKP Central Committee, first touched on the new phenomena in the struggle of the working class of Turkey and then said, “The task of the Party is to transform the spontaneous movement of the working class into conscious, organised movement”. He continued, reminding us of the following words of Lenin which are a *key* to

understanding the Turkey of today: "The greater the spontaneous movement of the masses, the greater the urgency of the task of making them conscious, organising them", and concluded, "*The TKP is faced with just such a situation*".⁽²⁸⁾ (Our italics)

Comrade Bilen's observation is correct, it is realistic, it is revolutionary. To say that the struggle of our working class is today "class struggle", but that is not at its most developed level, does not in any way belittle the gigantic dimensions assumed by that struggle. If we recall that the great advance of our party, the TKP, began in 1973, this high level of struggle attained by our working class, is the greatest proof of its maturity and "preparedness".

The development of the struggle towards the highest, the true class struggle, is a process. *It is a process operating from two ends.* From one end, the maturation produced by the spontaneous economic struggle, leads the working class towards the "spontaneous" political struggle. At this stage, the working class feels profoundly the need for a party. If it cannot do without political struggle, it cannot also do without a political party. Plekhanov explains this by saying, "...the more it is conscious of its economic tasks, the more resolutely it separates into a political party of its own".⁽²⁹⁾ The greatest proof of this development is afforded by the fact that in every action, in every strike, the broad masses of the working class of Turkey raise, alongside slogans expressing their urgent economic demands, the slogan for "Freedom to the TKP".

At the other end, lies the steady strengthening of the Communist Party, its activity to raise consciousness and organise, its embracing of the masses. The strengthening of the Communist Party along the Leninist line is both the main factor transforming the struggle into a genuine political struggle, and the proof, on an *historical level*, of the fact that this struggle is becoming a genuine political struggle. For, just as the fact that the working class is reaching true political consciousness is a product of the party, the party itself is the historical product of that working class struggle. And since the adoption of its new programme and rules, the Communist Party of Turkey has been experiencing such a lively development. It has set to work with the slogan, "Every factory must be a fortress of the TKP". It is organising rapidly in workers' strongholds. Our slogans are written on the walls.

All this shows that inherent in the struggle of the working class of Turkey, which, in general, is at the level of spontaneous political struggle, is the true political struggle, true class struggle. And this latter is accelerating. To accelerate it even further is our duty.

5. The Revolutionary Situation and Mounting Danger of Fascism

Our country is living through a revolutionary situation which is from time to time retreating, from time to time advancing, but always, gradually deepening. In previous sections, we have dealt with the economic and social causes underlying this situation. Now, let us look at the revolutionary situation and the danger of fascism connected with it.

Since 1976, much has been written in Turkey on the question of the revolutionary situation. Very few writers dealt with it directly. Most either mentioned it in passing or "hinted" at it. The common aspect in the vast majority of these writings is that none of them give a clear answer to the question, "Is there or is there not a revolutionary situation?" In a concealed way however, they all answer this question in the negative.

Taking a careful look at these writings, we see that there are four mistaken views. The *first mistake* is to deny the existence of a revolutionary situation. The *second mistake* is to assume that the existence of a revolutionary situation means that revolution will take place immediately, or that this is what we want to say. The *third mistake* is the view that, "What is happening in our country is not a revolutionary situation, but individual terror". And the *fourth mistake* is the view that, "There is no revolutionary situation, there is fascist escalation."

Incomplete or mistaken knowledge (excepting conscious distortions) of the Leninist understanding of the revolutionary situation is an important factor in all four mistakes. Therefore it is useful to take a brief

look at this understanding.

The objective and subjective conditions of the revolution, as well as the concept of the revolutionary situation itself, derive from the "Marxist-Leninist understanding of history". All history is the result of human activity. Nevertheless, man conducts his activity under historical conditions that are determined outside of himself. He is dependent on the environment in which he finds himself. Thus, we call *objective conditions* those conditions which are formed independent of the desire or will of the makers of history (the masses).

The basis or essence of objective conditions is, in Marx's words, the economic conditions which run like a red thread under everything. Together with these fundamental conditions, the sum total of all social and political, internal and external conditions, go to form the objective conditions. The degree to which the objective conditions are ripe for revolution manifests itself in the degree of sharpness of class contradictions.

The *subjective factor* is human activity, conscious activity. From the point of view of the revolutionary process, we can say that the subjective factor consists of three relatively independent, but closely inter-acting elements. These are, 1) the revolutionary consciousness of the masses, their determination to make a revolution, 2) the level of organisation of all working people, the working class first and foremost, 3) the communist party, its capacity to lead and its correct policy — in one sense, a reflection of all the above elements.

The *revolutionary situation*, a stage different from all ordinary situations, takes shape on the basis of the determining objective conditions, with the conjuncture of favourable objective and subjective conditions. It is an *objective* situation which reveals the rising class struggle.

We shall deal with the revolutionary situation at greater length below. Now, let us look at the relation between the objective conditions and the subjective factor which together lead to the revolutionary situation, to revolution.

We said above that the fundamental determining factor in regard to revolutionary transformations is the objective conditions. The objective conditions determine which historical duties will be fulfilled, what possibilities exist for the fulfillment of these duties. If the objective conditions in a given country have not matured sufficiently, whatever one does is in vain. Lenin explained this truth in the following words: "...no Bolsheviks in the world could have 'created' even a single 'popular

movement',..., if the deepest economic and political causes had not set the proletariat into action".(1)

The fundamental factor is the objective conditions. However, the subjective factor is not a lifeless follower. At a certain stage of development, the subjective factor becomes the determining factor. When the objective conditions reach a certain minimum of maturity, the fate of the revolutionary process gradually becomes dependent on the subjective factor. In other words, nothing can take place if the objective conditions do not exist. However, if they do exist, social transformations will be dependent on the subjective factor.

There is more to be said on this question. In the final analysis, the subjective factor is dependent on the objective conditions. However, this is not a *blind* dependence. The subjective factor has, at the same time, a relative independence. It can lag behind the objective conditions, or go ahead of them. When the subjective factor lags behind, historical opportunities are missed. When it goes ahead, it may accelerate the maturing of the objective conditions by aiding the more rapid sharpening of class contradictions.

In addition, we must not forget that, in social-political life, objective and subjective conditions are interwoven. By way of a logical abstraction, we are, in a sense, separating them from each other, only for the purpose of understanding the question better. For example, relations between different classes, between classes and the state (which we call political relations), are objective relations. Nevertheless, they are not objective in the same way economic relations are objective. They are ideological relations which take shape by passing through people's consciousness. In other words, objective political changes, changes in the political alignment of class forces, reflect more than changes in the economy alone. They also reflect a certain subjective aspect, as well as the results of the activities of various classes and parties.

The final note we would like to mention in regard to the relations between objective conditions and the subjective factor is that, in our day (under the conditions of imperialism), the importance of the subjective factor is gradually increasing. It is steadily increasing under the conditions of imperialism when the objective conditions requisite for revolutionary transformations have, in fact, more than matured, have, in some respects, become even "over-mature" in the advanced capitalist countries. It was for this reason that Lenin gave great importance to the subjective factor, to the role of the communist party first and foremost.

Events during and after the First World War proved Lenin correct in ascribing such importance to the subjective factor. In the course of the war, from 1914 onwards, a revolutionary situation developed in Europe. Revolutions took place in Germany, Austria, Hungary and Finland. In many of these countries, Soviets were formed. However, the counter-revolution succeeded in drowning them all in blood. The Comintern saw the lack of communist parties able to lead the masses, as the *principal reason* for the defeat of the revolutionary movement in these countries. It adopted a series of resolutions regarding the increasing role of the subjective factor. Let us give two examples. At an extended plenum meeting in 1926, the Comintern Executive Committee adopted the following resolution: "The objective conditions for the victory of socialism in Europe are becoming more mature. The subjective factor, that is, to what extent the working class is becoming consolidated, how strong the communist parties are becoming, to what degree they are becoming genuine Bolshevik parties, is gaining more and more importance".⁽²⁾

The Fifth Congress of the Comintern arrived at the following conclusion on the same topic: Under the conditions of deepening crisis of capitalism, "the main question of an entire historic epoch is the subjective factor, i.e., the degree of organisation of the proletarian ranks and their vanguards".⁽³⁾

The importance of the subjective factor has increased, not decreased, in our day. Let us listen to Rodney Arismendi, one of the foremost Leninist militants of our time: "Both the objective conditions on our continent and the general peaceful development determined by the increasing role of the socialist camp, as well as the deepening crisis of capitalism, are making the maturing of the revolutionary situation increasingly dependent on the ability of the vanguard to lead the masses in struggle, on the flexibility of its tactics, on the militant and energetic character of its activities".⁽⁴⁾

Some caricatures of the Mensheviks regard emphasis on the growing role of the subjective factor in our day as "subjectivism" and "voluntarism". Leninism, however, considers the increased importance of the subjective factor in its relation to the objective conditions. Lenin saw the difference between Marxist theory and voluntarism in the following way: "Marxism differs from all other socialist theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of evolution with

the most emphatic recognition of the importance of the revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius, and revolutionary initiative of the masses — and also, of course, of individuals, groups, organisations, and parties that are able to discover and achieve contact with one or another class".(5)

After this introduction to the objective conditions and subjective factor, let us return to the "revolutionary situation" and come to the *first mistake* which says that there is no revolutionary situation in Turkey.

A revolutionary situation is the totality of social and political conditions necessary for revolution to take place. "Revolutions are never born ready-made; they do not spring out of Jupiter's head; they do not kindle at once. They are always preceded by a process of unrest, crises, movements, revolts, the *beginnings* of revolution..."(6) This period of crises is called a revolutionary situation.

A revolutionary situation is born and gradually matures as the product of a complex whole created by internal and external conditions. The *point of formation and the speed of development* of the revolutionary situation, as well as the *forms of social struggle* in this period, depend on various factors, the main among them being the degree of sharpness of class contradictions, the condition of the state apparatus, the force of the attack by the revolutionary class, the breadth and depth of the mass movement, and the international situation.

Lenin enumerated *three symptoms* which show the existence of a revolutionary situation: 1) When, the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than "usual", they do not want to live in the old way 2) When there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the "upper classes", a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. 3) When, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow themselves to be robbed in "peace time".(7)

Let us proceed. "*Without these objective changes, (i.e. the symptoms we have mentioned above — R.Y.), which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation*".(8) (Our italics.)

We see that, although the revolutionary situation bears within

itself subjective elements such as the level of political consciousness and the mass struggle, Lenin calls it the "objective condition for revolution". For, although these reflect human will and desires to a great extent, they are yet independent of the latter. Leaps in the level of political consciousness, such elements as a high level of mass struggle, cannot be introduced from outside on the wish of any person. Their appearance is connected with the objective conditions of the revolutionary crisis. For this reason, *the revolutionary situation is the objective condition for revolution*. No organisation or party, nor even a single class, can create a revolutionary situation through its own wishes or efforts.

In a given country, a revolutionary situation and its three symptoms reveal themselves in the following: 1) Violent struggle between various class forces, 2) Anarchy in various spheres of social life, 3) The destruction of material values. (See: K. Zaradov, *Leninism and Problems of the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism*, the relevant section.)

Thus, basing ourselves on Lenin, we have drawn the framework of the revolutionary situation. Looking at this framework, we see how meaningless are the discussions about whether or not there is a revolutionary situation in Turkey.

In the 15 years leading up to the crisis, Turkey's average rate of growth was about 7%⁽⁹⁾ — at that time, one of the highest growth rates in the world. However, in 1977, the percentage increase in the gross national product fell, in real terms, to 4%. It is certain that it will be slightly more than 2% in 1978.

In the second half of 1977, the manufacturing industry worked at 50% capacity. In the same period, the automotive industry operated at 43% capacity. The basic metals industry worked at 51.2% capacity. The chemical industry, 53.5%. This trend continued in 1978. This year, the whole of industry is working at 50% capacity. As a result, many small firms have gone out of business (another aspect of the crisis is that, through it, finance-capital's domination over the economy, and its hold over the state, are passing to a higher stage). Many large firms have halted production for months. For example, in 1978, BMC closed its lorry and tractor factory in Izmir for 4 months.

This cut-back in production which is taking place parallel with the deepening of the crisis, has aggravated the problem of unemployment. Mass lay-offs are rising in number. For example, the 25,000 once

employed by Koc Holding has fallen to 20,000.

As we mentioned earlier, today the unemployment rate is over 20%. The "authorities" are conducting a debate on unemployment. In his speech in Bonn in the spring of 1978, Ecevit spoke of 16% unemployment. Soon after, the Finance Ministry announced a figure of 20%. In its annual report on the work force, the American Embassy said that there were 5 million unemployed in Turkey. In April 1978, the Minister of Social Security said that 7 million were unemployed. Whatever it may be, it is not difficult to understand that the true figure is over 20%. Even with 20%, Turkey ranks first among OECD countries in the rate of unemployment.

Alongside this, is the plague of inflation. Already fluctuating around the high rate of 15-20% in the years 1970-1976, inflation jumped to 40% in 1977. According to OECD statistics, in the summer of 1978, there was a 50% rise in wholesale prices and a 70% increase in the cost of living index over 1977. In 1978, prices are rising by an average of 5% every month.

The giant dimensions assumed by the struggle in the past 4 years is a result of this breakdown. The oppressed classes will no longer live in the old way. They refuse to crawl into a corner and accept their "fate". What can the opportunists be thinking! Is it for fun that people go out onto the streets, risk their lives! The masses do not rise up unless life has become unbearable, unless they can endure it no longer. The working class wages a struggle in all countries at all times. But the degree of violence, the forms of this struggle, are determined by the social and political conditions under which it takes place, by economic conditions first and foremost. Thus, in some periods and in some places, the struggle is waged by holding "peaceful" discussions with MP's in front of the parliament, or by signature campaigns. And sometimes, as in Turkey today, the masses cast aside bourgeois laws and march into the flames.

In our country today, the "upper" classes cannot rule in the old way. As Comrade Bilen pointed out at the Berlin Conference, even contradictions and clashes between the monopoly and non-monopoly bourgeoisie are here and there assuming a bloody character. There is a crisis in the policy of the ruling class. Governments come and go. Parliament does not function properly. These conditions help the struggle of the masses reach unprecedented dimensions. In the last four years, May Day Square in Istanbul has seen the most massive May Day demonstrations in the capitalist world. In the last two years, our working

class conducted the greatest strike in its history, the strike against the MESS bosses. (MESS is the organisation of employers in the metal industry.)

Let no one be deceived by the appearance of a certain pause in mass actions since the MESS strike and May Day 1978. After every great action, the working class needs a certain amount of time to rest and recoup its forces. History does not dispute this. Naturally, the fact that the class collaborationists and opportunists are refraining from mass actions in order not to "wear out" the social-democratic government, has a share in this situation. However, under today's economic and social conditions, no one will have the power to rein in the mass movement. The struggle will sweep them away, together with the system.

Let us understand well the atmosphere in which we are living. Leaving aside the past two or three years, the number of political murders in the last ten months alone is 950. An average of three persons is murdered every day. In 1978, parallel with the rapid economic and social collapse, there was a huge increase in the rate of political murders. Political murders increased 352% over 1977. Since there are still two months to the end of the year, this means that the number of political murders will exceed one thousand in 1978. Only know-nothing philistines and opportunists who have sold their souls to capitalism, can abstract from the economic and social situation and say, "This is the work of organised forces!"

Today, anarchy rules in every sphere of social life. In the most well-guarded big cities, there are two robberies every day. Education has come to a halt. Bribery and fraud have assumed epidemic proportions. To a large extent, the state apparatus is not functioning. British and Federal German services, which Ecevit has called in to help strengthen the police, cannot conceal their "astonishment" at the state of the police in Turkey.⁽¹⁰⁾ All of these developments indicate the breakdown of superstructural institutions in our country.

Today, the struggle has spread to even the most remote areas. Whatever government comes, it cannot "pull into line" even the "opposition". Bombs and fires come one after the other. Material values are being destroyed. The fear of death is part of every-day life. Mothers send their children off to school, and those who stay at home send their loved ones off to work, in fear for their lives.

Does this situation in our country resemble the present situation in Britain, France, Belgium, or even Greece? Is it an ordinary situation?

If not, is there not a name for this extraordinary situation?

There is: *Revolutionary Situation!*

When we come to the *second mistake* on the concept of revolutionary situation, the view that we are saying that there will be a revolution immediately, we believe that what we have written is clear enough to exclude any such "misunderstanding". For example, the article, "The Possibilities and Dangers are Increasing" in no: 56 (13 November 1976) of *Iscinin Sesi* (the *Worker's Voice*) said the following: "...Just as every revolutionary situation does not end in revolution, nor can we conceive of the revolutionary situation as an integral whole. The revolutionary situation is a process which contains within itself various stages. And Turkey is still at the beginning of this process".(11)

To show the existence of a revolutionary situation, is not to say that there will be a revolution. As Lenin said, it is the basic and indisputable task of every communist to show the existence, breadth and depth of the revolutionary situation. More than this, is fortune-telling. For example, there were revolutionary situations in Russia in 1859-61 and 1879-80. In Europe in 1914-24, and in Greece in 1965. But these either died down without reaching revolution, or the revolutionary explosion was crushed due to the weakness of the subjective factor.

Let us read together what Lenin said about the revolutionary situation in Europe in 1914 and subsequent years: "Will this situation last long; how much more acute will it become? Will it lead to revolution? This is something we do not know, and nobody can know. The answer can be provided only by the *experience* gained during the development of revolutionary sentiment and the transition to revolutionary action by the advanced class, the proletariat".(12) This quotation shows that the transformation of the revolutionary situation into a revolution is dependent on the contribution of the subjective factor. Lenin puts this idea more clearly in the following lines: "...Not every revolutionary situation gives rise to a revolution. Revolution arises only out of a situation in which the above-mentioned objective changes (i.e., the three symptoms of a revolutionary situation — R.Y.) are accompanied by a subjective change, namely, the ability of the revolutionary *class* to take revolutionary mass action *strong* enough to break (or dislocate) the old government, which never, not even in a period of crisis, 'falls', if it is not toppled over".(13)

The first conclusion to be arrived at from these extremely important words is that the bourgeoisie, *even in the most severe crises*,

will never fall of itself, unless you strike the blow. For some reason, this crucial warning is “forgotten” by some.

Another conclusion is that revolution will take place only when the revolutionary situation is united with the ability to take action strong enough to dislocate the government, i.e., when the objective condition for revolution is united with the subjective factor. Lenin calls this situation the “*nation-wide crisis*”. This means that the *last stage in the revolutionary situation*, a process with various stages of maturity, is the *stage of the “nation-wide crisis”, the stage which leads to revolution.* The fact that a revolution is always born out of a nation-wide crisis Lenin called the “*fundamental law of revolution*”.

Thus it is impossible to think that a revolutionary situation will immediately become a revolution. The revolutionary situation is nothing other than that situation in which revolution can take place if, under deteriorating economic, social and political conditions, the masses are sufficiently organised and able to attack with sufficient force. We must not think of the revolutionary situation as a stage at which there are street battles everywhere and the life of society has come to a complete halt. Such a situation is “five minutes away from revolution”. It is the nation-wide crisis stage of the revolutionary situation.

The *third mistake* was the view that, “There is no revolutionary situation, there is individual terror”. This view points to a distorted logic. Of such people, Engels said that they think they can change something by changing its name.

The above mistaken view of the question implies that the situation can be eradicated by the application of a few “effective” measures. “Let the government halt the anarchy!” Nevertheless, many governments have come and gone, and the anarchy has continued. Cries of “Stop the anarchy” are nothing but the bewilderment of petty-bourgeois pacifists in the face of events.

The view that, “There is no revolutionary situation, only individual terror”, shows a distorted logic, because what should be asked is not, “What must we call the methods used”, not, “Are certain circles inciting anarchy”, but, “Why are these methods able to spread, persist and increase so much?” If today there is fighting, if blood is being spilled, not only in every city, but in every small town, and in many villages, then violence has become a *social phenomenon*.

Underlying this social phenomenon is the crisis of capitalism in Turkey, social injustice, unemployment and rising prices. If this

phenomenon had not found a suitable objective environment, it would not have been able to spread or become persistent due to the force of any organisation. It is for this reason that "anarchy" has become a social phenomenon, and it is for this reason that it will continue until the crisis is solved. Even bourgeois politicians see this.

When we pose the question correctly (why "anarchy" is able to spread and persist to such a degree), it becomes clear that the reason for "anarchy" on such a scale is the revolutionary situation. In other words, *"anarchy" is the manifestation of the revolutionary situation in daily life*. Those who do not understand the revolutionary situation in the disorder, "anarchy" and confusion — how will they understand the revolution? As Lenin said, "Those philistine gentlemen... are probably dreaming of a revolution (that is, if any idea of revolution ever enters their heads) in which the masses will all rise *at once, fully organised*".⁽¹⁴⁾

There is no harm in repeating that the "anarchy" in Turkey today is a social phenomenon, that it cannot be prevented, that it is gradually spreading, and that it is a symptom of the further deepening of the revolutionary situation.

The *fourth mistake* is the view that, "There is no revolutionary situation, but fascist escalation". Like the previous view, this also suffers from a "sick" logic, and reminds us that at a definite stage of development, *"At a certain stage of the economic development of a country, certain well-meaning stupidities necessarily arise in the heads of its intellectuals"*.⁽¹⁵⁾

To say, "There is no revolutionary situation, but fascist escalation", is to fail to understand economic and social conditions in Turkey, the revolutionary situation and fascism. The revolutionary situation and the danger of fascism in our country arise from the same source, from the present economic and social basis. They originate in the crisis of capitalism. The giant dimensions of the class struggle put into question the future of capitalism in Turkey. "The reactionary ruling circles, the bourgeoisie, are trying to protect this link by way of escalation to fascism".⁽¹⁶⁾

Wherever the struggle of the people rises, "democracy" comes to an end and fascism, brutality, naked dictatorship begin. Lenin said the following: "Before the war Britain enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than any other country in the world. (...) There was freedom there because there was no revolutionary movement there".⁽¹⁷⁾ We see the

same idea in the Report of the Central Committee presented at the 25th Congress of the CPSU by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU: "...imperialism will stop at nothing, discarding all semblance of any kind of democracy, if a serious threat arises to the domination of monopoly capital and its political agents".⁽¹⁸⁾ This is natural, for fascism is born of the instinct of finance-capital, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, i.e., the state, to protect itself.

Fascism can never be, has never been, a real danger in periods and in countries where things are going fairly comfortably, where the class struggle is low. Whenever the class struggle in a given country rises or sharpens, whenever the masses take the road of liberation, and whenever the bourgeoisie cannot rule by the "usual methods", then the ruling forces see their interests in fascism. Seeing its power endangered, the bourgeoisie resorts to naked dictatorship, fascism. It was not said in vain, that as you get closer to the jackals' lair, their howling increases. This is what is happening in Turkey. *The mounting fascist danger cannot be separated from the maturing revolutionary situation.*

We have thus seen the four mistaken views on the subject of the revolutionary situation. Now, do these four distinct views have anything in common? Indeed they do — the desire to restrict revolutionary theory and the revolutionary struggle to a level acceptable to the bourgeoisie (at the very least, its liberal wing), i.e., petty-bourgeois pacifism and tailism. It does not suit them to see the existence of a revolutionary situation, for that would require them to take the necessary measures, to organise accordingly, and to apply tactics in violation of the laws of even the most "democratic" country in the world. The revolutionary situation demands methods of organisation and struggle which are unacceptable to even the most "progressive" bourgeoisie.

Contrary to the hopes of some, this past year of social democracy in our country has shown that the dilemma of either fascism or an advanced democratic people's revolution is structural and is continuing. It has become obvious that a "third way" could only be a *temporary intermediate stage* in the social life of our country. On the one hand, the revolutionary forces are rapidly growing and strengthening. On the other hand, the danger of fascism is steadily increasing.

Nor does the social-democratic government's attitude towards the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) explain anything. Because fascism in Turkey is not restricted to the NAP. Fascism is the choice of finance-capital. The NAP is the present-day striking force of fascism. If the

government were to close down the NAP (which would, as government practice shows, mean closing down as many revolutionary organisations at the same time), other striking forces would emerge the following day.

When the present social-democratic dominated government came to power, the Central Committee of the TKP stressed that the Ecevit government was not the progressive government demanded by our people, that it would not be able to solve the problems. Some objected to this saying, "How can we oppose the new government? It has just come to power. How do you know what it is going to do?" And, just to play it safe, they added, "If it makes mistakes, then we will criticize it together". However, the social structure, ideology and leading cadre of the Republican People's Party allowed the TKP to speak with certainty.

And didn't it happen in the year that has elapsed since, that this government was unable to solve any problem, that it did not force fascism back, but, on the contrary, began to apply repressive measures against communists and progressives. When it did not get what it wanted from the Common Market countries, did it not make a new approach to American imperialism (which will apparently establish a joint arms industry in Turkey)?

This development was not difficult to see. Wednesday shows how Thursday will come. For communists, it is clear what social-democracy is, and what it is in Turkey.

Social-democracy is bourgeois ideology which strives to infiltrate the working people. Social-democracy is a trend which tries to prevent a revolutionary explosion by means of reforms, to patch up capitalism. That is why it speaks against exploitation while in opposition, and then does nothing other than "democratise" exploitation when it comes to power. Is there anywhere in the world that a social-democratic government has abolished exploitation, inequality, brutality?

The working people who follow social-democracy do so because they are deceived by social demagoguery. They are, in truth, enemies of exploitation. This contradiction remains latent in periods of social calm, especially if the social-democratic party is in opposition. However, it gradually surfaces in periods of economic and social crisis, and determines the fate of social-democracy. When the masses make a *genuine* attempt to eliminate exploitation, the vast majority of the social-democratic cadres openly take their stand in the capitalist camp. We saw the most recent example of this in Portugal.

There are both right and left wings in the social-democratic parties.

Right-wing social democracy is in the lap of the monopolies. The left-wing social-democrats strive to be the spokesmen of the working people in the party. In general, they support a dialogue with the communists. However, the left-wing has never been in the leadership of any social-democratic party, excepting some temporary periods. These left-wings are useful in making the party attractive to the masses. But they are weak groups which carry no weight in the drawing up of party policy.

The social-democratic movement in Turkey is different than that in the West. There, social-democracy arose in the working class movement on the basis of Marxism. It subsequently broke its ideological ties with Marxism, maintaining its influence among broad working-class circles. In Turkey, social-democracy is the ideological basis on which the *liberal wing of the bourgeoisie* is relying, both to find a basis in the people's movement for its reaction against the finance-oligarchy, and to "tame" and confine this same people's movement within the boundaries of capitalism.

Not only in Turkey, but everywhere it has sufficient strength, social-democracy speaks against fascism on the one hand, and takes measures and actions against communists and revolutionaries on the other. Because it is frightened to death of the overthrow of capitalism. And, unfortunately, there is a close connection between social-democracy's fear of the working class, the working people, a popular uprising, and the coming to power of fascism. A correct understanding of this connection means, at the same time, a correct understanding of the dangers and possibilities facing our revolutionary working class.

Nowhere in the world did fascism come overnight. Everywhere it grew and arose within bourgeois democracy itself. The role that social-democracy, the reformist wing of bourgeois democracy, played in this rise of fascism, is no mystery for those who have followed the historical development of fascism in Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria.

The fact that fascism was able to come to power in many countries of Europe, cannot be understood solely by an analysis of contemporary economic and social conditions, fascism's social demagogy or the forms of its activity. These can go no further than showing why the monopolies of the time needed fascism. However, fascism is not pre-destined, it is not the "will of god".

If the working class, the largest, most organised force in capitalist Europe, had been able to stand united against rising fascism, it *could*

never have come to power.

Why was the working class of Europe unable to stop fascism? This question is also of urgent importance for us today.

In order to answer this question, we must go back to the 1918 period, to "social democracy's betrayal of the European revolution". The process which cleared away the obstacles to fascism began in those years, the years of revolutionary explosions in a Europe under the influences of a deteriorating economic situation and the great October revolution. The working class was in rebellion. In Germany, the Spartacists were fighting on the barricades. Soviets had been established in Bavaria and Hungary. The bourgeoisie was not strong enough to crush the revolution. The working class was reaching out for power, was close to taking it, in all of Central Europe. Who would rescue capitalism from its impending overthrow? Social-democracy, which had made its first great betrayal of the working class movement in 1914, by voting for the war credits of the European bourgeoisie and calling upon the workers to join in the war. It was social-democracy which strangled the German revolution in 1918, which strangled the 1918-1919 revolution in Austria, by forming a coalition with other bourgeois parties in the name of "saving democracy". This was the second great betrayal by social-democracy.

Otto Bauer, one of the foremost social-democratic leaders of the time, explained the situation in his book, *The Austrian Revolution of 1918*: "...Dictatorship of the proletariat!', 'All power to the Soviets!' was all that could be heard in the streets... No bourgeois government could have coped with such a task ... It would have been overthrown in a week ... Only the social democrats could have safely handled such an unprecedentedly difficult situation, because they enjoyed the confidence of the working masses..." With such words, the social-democrats entered into a coalition with the parties of monopoly at the moment when the class struggle was reaching its highest levels. Otto Bauer became foreign minister, while another social-democrat, Deutsch, became minister of war".

With this, began the white terror against workers and working people. Tens of thousands of workers were killed, their organisations dispersed. The revolution was crushed. The result was that fascism was able to come to power in 1934.

There is more. In later years, when the jackboots of fascism were heard everywhere, the social-democrats betrayed the workers a third

time. They rejected calls for unity by the working class and the communists. They deceived the masses with such rubbish as, "Save the regime", "Prevent the catastrophe", and, "We will stop fascism with peaceful, democratic methods". At the same time, they launched a campaign of intensive anti-communism. Waging a phoney struggle against fascism with speeches in parliament, they employed all their skills against the communists. Not touching Hitler's rabid "Storm Troopers", they banned and dispersed the "Red Front", the militant front of the German working class. From 1932 to the first quarter of 1933, the most critical period from the point of view of preventing fascism from coming to power, they once again rejected the countless calls for unity made by the communists. (Let those who say, "We will not divide the nation into fronts", have a ringing in their ears.)

It was in such a way, that fascism's rise to power in Europe was prepared.

When we return to look at our country today, we are tempted to say that, "History is repeating itself". The Republican People's Party is opposing the National Democratic Front, the hope of our people, with phrase-mongering. It is rejecting the Communist Party of Turkey's countless calls for unity. It is trying to split the trade unions and other mass organisations, to render them inactive by tacking them onto its tail. Fascist dogs, commandos, are everywhere — even when there are countless "constitutional" reasons for banning them. The TKP, on the other hand, is "illegal". Branches of the Progressive Youth Organisation (IGD), the dynamic organisation of our youth, are being closed down on false grounds. The TKP Programme and a pamphlet about the TKP trial are being confiscated. The social-democrats can join the "Socialist International", but it is against the law for the Progressive Women's Organisation (IKD) to join the Women's International Democratic Federation. There are many more such cases. The social-democrats are purging their left-wing individuals and groups on the side of the people. They are openly embracing imperialism, making concessions that even the Demirels could not make.

The social-democrats and opportunists are using all their strength in the trade unions and other mass organisations to restrain the workers and working people from effective mass actions. To a certain extent, they have been successful in this. But this is temporary. Unemployment, rising prices, the life of the working people in general, have become unbearable. To be able to survive now requires great skill. Under such

conditions, the popular movement will not end. Our working class, the working masses, are seeing better every day, and *through their own experience*, that liberation from fascism, unemployment and rising prices, is through a people's revolution under the leadership of the working class, through an advanced democratic revolution. They are understanding that the bourgeois parties have nothing to offer them. In our day, it has become perfectly clear that the bourgeois parties can provide no solution to the profound social problems. In political life there is a *vacuum* which is imposing itself on consciousness more and more. Let us be clear on this: political life recognizes no vacuums. If we do not fill it, others will.

6. Conclusion: The Revolutionary Situation Demands Innovation in all Areas

“What we are discussing is the indisputable and fundamental duty of all socialists — that of revealing to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat’s revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, helping it to go over to revolutionary action, and *forming, for that purpose, organisations suited to the revolutionary situation*”.⁽¹⁾ (Our italics.)

In close connection with the present general stage of world capitalism and the specifics of capitalist development in Turkey, conditions in our country have slowly, over a long historical period, developed into a revolutionary situation. The opportunists are striving to deny this truth (for the “leftists”, there is always a revolutionary situation). Like Kautsky, who waited for the revolution to believe in the existence of a revolutionary situation, they are looking at events from the outside. When the revolution explodes, they will then believe in the existence of a revolutionary situation, once again become revolutionaries, and rush to the ranks to “offer their services”. But all careerists, “civil servants” of socialism and opportunists who side-step the duties of the day, will do the same.

Whether or not revolution will take place, the existence of a revolutionary situation today is an objective reality. And the realisation of a revolution, to an increasing extent, depends on conscious preparations by the revolutionaries, their ability to prepare the working class and working people for the "final battle". We know that, "Neither the oppression of the lower classes, nor a crisis among the upper classes can cause a revolution; they can only cause the decay of a country" (2) Revolution can only be made by *drawing* the masses into action, resistance, uprising and rebellion.(3) However suitable the objective conditions may be, there will be no revolution unless we make it. For this reason, we must see what is before us very clearly, in order not to miss historical opportunities. This truth imposes certain immediate tasks on communists and revolutionaries in the course of the revolutionary situation.

To carry out the tasks imposed on us by the revolutionary situation means, in one sentence, to *build up the subjective factor of the revolution*.

In the quotation from Lenin with which we began this section, the tasks of the communists in the course of the revolutionary situation are as follows: The indisputable tasks of all communists in a revolutionary situation are, 1) To reveal to the masses the existence of a revolutionary situation, explaining its scope and depth, arousing the proletariat's revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary determination, 2) To help the proletariat go over to revolutionary action, 3) To form organisations suited to the revolutionary situation.

Our urgent tasks in the present situation in Turkey are as follows:

First and foremost, to *give new impetus to the ideological struggle*. To illuminate the consciousness of communists, revolutionaries, the working class and working people. This is the *main link* among all the tasks. We all know Lenin's famous statement that, without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary struggle. And truly, if the masses rebel without a correct revolutionary line, their uprising will smash blindly against the rocks. What does it matter if there are powerful organisations, 1,700,000-strong communist parties, if they do not have a correct revolutionary line? It is for this reason that Zaradov says, "In the formation of the subjective factor of revolution increasing importance is being acquired by the ideological struggle".(4)

There are a thousand different questions and problems peculiar to the revolutionary movement of Turkey. We must provide clear and

distinct answers to them. We must fill the minds of militants ready to give their lives, ready to embrace whole-heartedly every sacrifice for the revolution, for communism. Let us not forget that since, in the last analysis, capitalist society knows only the bourgeois and proletarian ideologies, and the ruling ideology is the bourgeois ideology, mistakes are inevitable on every subject which is not dealt with in a Leninist manner.

The importance of the ideological struggle is more readily understood if we take into account as well, the fact that we are coming under ideological attack from virtually every other trend on the left.

The ideological struggle is always the most important. However, its importance multiplies many times over in revolutionary situations. For, as the mass movement rises, the importance of consciousness and the subjective factor grows parallel with it, and gradually becomes the determining factor.

As the revolutionary situation matures, the enemy's attack from all sides intensifies. As it does so, the importance of the struggle against opportunism in the revolutionary front increases.

To some, it seems "sectarian" to take a firm, uncompromising position against opportunism. However, the struggle against opportunism is not sectarianism. It does not mean to cast mass politics to one side. On the contrary, it is a struggle to settle those politics on a sound and realistic basis. The experience of the world communist movement, in present-day Europe in particular, confirms, that the more you postpone the struggle against opportunism, the more virulent it becomes.

In the petty-bourgeois sea that is Turkey, a country where the domestic and foreign monopolies have siezed power and are waging an armed struggle against the people, where the Communist Party is forced to work underground, there is an economic, social and political basis for opportunism. This must be understood. At the same time, let us not underestimate the ideological impact of the snake of opportunism which has once again raised its head in the world communist movement.

At all times, and in all places, opportunism hides itself in "*tactics*", begins with "*tactics*". "Tactically, we must act in such a way", are the magic words of all opportunists. They say: "For the moment, the people do not understand the question, therefore we must apply tactics". In this way, they renounce all principles and principled behaviour. As Stalin related in one of his writings, Lenin always said, "The only correct politics is principled politics". This is not

the case for the opportunists, however. They say "A little bit of unprincipled behaviour on such a minor matter would not be the end of the world". However, as Leninists know only too well, there is no such thing as being "a little bit opportunist". *Being a little bit opportunist is like being a little bit pregnant.* In the end, most certainly, a child is born. And that child is nationalism, chauvinism and counter-revolution. In other words, the disease known as opportunism has its own inner logic. If you do not destroy its seemingly unimportant small buds, it will grow and flourish.

Opportunism breaks out at points where the enemy's ideological attack is most intense. All experience confirms this truth. The foremost areas where the enemy's ideological attack is most intense today are the Leninist principles of organisation and the TKP, the "independence" of mass organisations and the question of the front. Proletarian internationalism and the Soviet Union, the proletarian hegemony and the proletarian dictatorship. Political tactics in general and political tactics in the revolutionary situation. The concept of revolution. This being the case, it is inevitable that opportunism will manifest itself in these areas.

Countless examples can be given in each of the above areas. Let us just take two examples which closely concern us today. The first example is the tallist, pacifist and opportunist view that. "If the Ecevit government goes, no better one will come, so let us refrain from mass actions". The second example is the consistent failure to explain the concept of revolution, its meaning and requirements, to the masses, and the surrendering of this concept to the "lefts". For some reason, in some publications, you can find everything under the sun except the word, revolution. Why? Perhaps, in order "not to intimidate the masses"; more likely because they themselves are intimidated by this word. Lenin, however, speaks of the need to step up explanations, agitation and propaganda of revolution in the revolutionary situation.

We must intensify the ideological struggle and the education of the people in all the spheres enumerated above. Our immediate task is to struggle against opportunism in order that we may be able to establish working class unity around revolutionary consciousness; to form the broadest front of the people and ensure the hegemony of the proletariat within it, in order that we may be able to make the revolution. The decisive defeat of opportunism in the revolutionary ranks will, at the same time, deal a *severe blow* against "leftism", which, as Lenin said, is,

in a sense, the punishment for the sin of opportunism. If we fail in this task, again as Lenin said, "...the new streams are seeking an immediate outlet, and if they do not find a social-democratic (communist — R.Y.) channel they will rush into a non-social-democratic (non-communist — R.Y.) channel".(5)

Alongside the struggle against opportunism, we must also accelerate the struggle against the ideology and attitudes of social-democracy. The spreading of social-democratic, i.e., bourgeois reformist ideas among the masses, particularly within the working class, is doing great harm to the revolutionary movement and its advance along a correct path. The social-democratic trend has a great share in the blunting of the mass struggle and in forcing it into a wait-and-see attitude. We must wage an active ideological struggle against this and show our people that a drowning man cannot grasp at straws; he must swim.

At the same time, we must wage a more effective struggle against every manner of "leftism" which directs the boldness and enthusiasm of youth into untimely channels.

We must intensify the ideological struggle against all these weeds. However, today this struggle cannot be waged in the same way it would under ordinary conditions. Ideological struggle in the revolutionary situation demands a *new* approach and *new* methods. It demands agitation and propaganda suitable to it. The theoretical questions of yesterday — the proletarian hegemony, the use of revolutionary violence, insurrection and revolution, the destruction of the bourgeois state, and questions of the dictatorship — are, *in their various aspects*, the practical questions of today. They will become much more immediate tomorrow if we fulfill our tasks. For this reason, we must today take these questions out of the realm of luxury of the "learned", and explain them to the conscious workers, the advanced sections of the working class — not as "fancy" philosophical topics, but by making them concrete, explaining their revolutionary content. This is the duty of publications first and foremost.

In the report of the Political Bureau presented at the Plenum of the TKP Central Committee held at the beginning of 1978, Comrade Bilen followed his remarks on the ideological struggle as one of the most important areas of struggle facing our party in this period, with an evaluation of the party's legal and illegal publications. He said that our publications have some shortcomings and stressed, in particular, the need to raise their ideological level.

The basic publication bringing consciousness to the advanced sections of the working class and people is *Atılım*, the organ of the Central Committee of the TKP. *Atılım* not only provides communists and militants with tactics on a day-by-day basis. Its special character is to give clear answers to the ideological questions of the day.

The second basic task facing us is to *strengthen the organisations of the working class and the people*. It is, first and foremost, to strengthen the communist party, the party of the working class. Alongside this, to establish or strengthen, step by step, the other organisations of the working class, and to accelerate the organisation of the working people.

The main task among these is to strengthen, expand and give breadth to the TKP. In a revolutionary situation, the subjective factor or, in the last analysis, the communist party, is the main link. And as the revolutionary situation matures, as it passes to higher stages and approaches revolution, the importance of the subjective factor greatly increases until, in the end, it becomes the *determining* factor. The working class is the subject of the revolution, but the party is the organiser of that class.

In 1973, the Communist Party of Turkey smashed the chains of liquidation and entered a period of great advance. There were many economic, social, political, international and internal party reasons for this development. As an examination of these reasons is not among the tasks of this book, let it suffice for us to mention a few of the most important reasons.

The development of the factory stage in Turkey in the 1950's, and the appearance of a truly powerful working class in the 1960's, were the most important economic and social reasons for this advance.

The deepening social and political crisis since 1968 brought with it the need for an ideology and an organisation to show the true way out of the crisis.

The same period saw the rise of the mass struggle, the growth of the revolutionary movement, and the birth of a broad sector of communist sympathizers in search of their party.

All these economic, social and political developments both created the objective conditions that enabled the party to break the liquidation into which it had fallen, and, at the same time, forced it to carry out this break.

Moreover, the post-1965 period in the international workers' and

communist movement created a favourable environment from the international point of view.

The most important of the internal party reasons was the role of the leader, Comrade Bilen. All the reasons we mentioned above passed through this prism in order to see the light of day. Leninism has always recognised the vital importance of the leader. However, there was another phenomenon that increased the importance of this role for the TKP. As the party had wasted away, or been made to waste away, in the period of liquidation, there was no possibility of any "pressure from the rank and file".

These are, in our opinion, the main reasons underlying the TKP's great advance of 1973.

Five years have passed since 1973, a short period in social life, in the life of parties. But the TKP has made truly enormous progress in this short period. It began to play an increasingly more effective role in the political life of Turkey. It gained crucial strength and made both friend and foe accept the fact. Today, the TKP has become the *main opposition party*, not in terms of a "head count", but from the social point of view.

Such a development is in itself an achievement in any other country, under normal circumstances. Nevertheless, under the present conditions in Turkey, much more must be done to meet the demands imposed by the revolutionary situation. In the Plenum Report, Comrade Bilen explains this by saying that the level of organisation we have achieved is still inadequate. The mass movement, the revolutionary movement, in our country today, has grown tremendously. The question of our ability to embrace the full range of the struggle is a very serious one. This is one of the reasons underlying the frequent fluctuations between advance and retreat in mass actions. For these actions are still "spontaneous" to a large extent.

The party's ability to fulfill its historical tasks depends on the quality of its cadres. It is for this reason that, in the Report presented at the Plenum of the TKP Central Committee, Comrade I. Bilen stressed that the slogan, "An end to amateurism!" still remains on the agenda as one of the questions demanding immediate solution. He indicated that the implementation of this slogan is closely related to the development of a conscious and experienced cadre. A knowledgeable, conscious, and aggressive cadre. "Everything will be determined by the cadres". The Communist Party will be able to fulfill all the

tasks that seem so difficult only to the extent that it grows in strength and becomes a mass party.

To be a mass party! Let us consider this a bit. In recent years, some have begun to identify the mass party with the size of its membership. Membership is an indication, but when? Lenin's theory of the party has two main principles. The first, and most important, is ideological consciousness and correct politics; the second, is the establishment of the broadest possible *influence* among the masses (not the number of members, but influence among the masses). Lenin demanded the most productive combination of these two main principles. This is the point of view from which we must look at the "mass party". "It is not a question of numbers, but of giving correct expression to the ideas and policies of the truly revolutionary proletariat".⁽⁶⁾ For this reason, to speak of being a mass party means, first and foremost, to be able to act as the spokesman of the masses, gain their broad support and draw them forward. A mass party is a very good thing for the purpose of facilitating the fulfillment of these tasks and communicating the message to the masses to the extent that it *does not lower* the ideological level of the party. However, we must not do as some and make the communist party's fulfillment of its tasks, even revolution, dependent on its becoming a large party. In this connection, it is useful, we think, to give a long quotation which clearly reflects Lenin's thoughts on this question:

"It is possible that even a small party, the British or American Party, for example, after it has thoroughly studied the course of political development and become acquainted with the life and customs of the non-party masses, will at a favourable moment evoke a revolutionary movement (...) You will have a mass movement if such a party comes forward with its slogans at such a moment and succeeds in getting millions of workers to follow it. I would not altogether deny that a revolution can be started by a very small party and brought to a victorious conclusion. But one must have a knowledge of the methods by which the masses can be won over. For this thoroughgoing preparation of revolution is essential (...) Without

thoroughgoing preparation you will not achieve victory in any country. Quite a small party is sufficient to lead the masses".(7)

The task of strengthening the organisations of the working class and people, the communist party first and foremost, is closely interwoven with the ideological struggle. The party that does not wage a successful ideological struggle, will see its rate of organisation steadily decline. If the ideological struggle is successful, the rate of organisation will gradually increase, morale in the ranks remain high, and fighting strength increase. Without forgetting this relationship, we must place the slogan to "organize", among the primary slogans of the day.

Organize! To organize using *new* methods, methods more aggressive, more creative than those of ordinary periods. Organisation of the working class is the guarantee of victory in the revolution. Everything is in our hands. It will go as far as we take it. Whatever the result of present social and political developments, whatever tomorrow brings, *real gains* can only be maintained through the organisation of the proletariat.

The third basic task before us is to establish and develop *organisations suitable to the new situation*, organisations necessitated by the revolutionary situation and made urgent by the fascist assault. The situation in the country is as clear as day. The collaborating-monopoly bourgeoisie is not inclined to surrender power easily. It is determined to use every means to maintain its hegemony, including the traditions of barbarity and violence it inherited from history. Threats of "civil war" in the capitalist press and Demirel's snarls about "returning to the breast of the people and making life a hell for you". show this — as does the 950 people murdered in the past 10 months. There is a new situation. What shall we say? Do we propose to turn to a "civilised" struggle within the framework of a "democratic and lawful state"? If so, would we be any different from any bourgeois liberal who has been thoroughly brainwashed by "democratic" prejudices? If not, shall we defend the legitimacy of every means in the struggle of the working people? Shall we rise as the spokesman of the concrete demands of the moment in order to establish the broadest *fighting* front of the people? Today, every revolutionary must give a clear answer to these questions.

Back at the beginning of 1977, in his closing speech at the Party Conference, Comrade I.Bilen, the General Secretary of the TKP, showed

the road to be taken. In that truly historical speech, Comrade Bilen said the following: "They are forcing us to the barricades. Our struggle passes through blood and fire. We will not allow them to shoot down workers and youths in the streets and squares. We will fight... We will establish organisations. We already are establishing them."

In recent days, the following has been heard on the Voice of the TKP Radio: "Are the working class and working people to remain with their hands tied in the face of attacks and provocations by fascist commandos, fascist terror groups and Maoist provocateurs, because the government does nothing to defend their lives? Certainly, they are not. The people are compelled to safeguard their own lives. This requires organisation, the winning of the broadest masses to the struggle, and the extension of the struggle to assume nation-wide dimensions⁽⁸⁾".

In its statement dated 5 October 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkey explained to our people the position of the Party and the road to be taken: "... Our working class and people will take upon themselves the task of ensuring security of life against the fascist terror and protecting democratic rights. It will organise for this, establish new organisations of struggle. The TKP is taking action to raise to a higher level of organisation the forms of struggle against fascism created by our people"⁽⁹⁾

If the TKP can successfully implement this Leninist approach to the question of new organisations suitable to the tasks of the crisis situation, it will constitute a great security for the victory of the revolutionary movement in Turkey. For we cannot leave the "popular organisation for self-defence" against fascism at that alone. The various forms of organisation necessitated by the revolutionary situation, the crisis and the fascist violence, are not burdened solely with the task of *defence*. They also have the task of directing the people forward from the needs they already recognise to higher stages of the revolutionary struggle. This is *independent* of human will and desire. For this reason, such organisations have the task, not of defence alone, but, at the same time, of *attack* directed against fascism and this system that must be destroyed. Lenin said, "In the final analysis force (in the sense of violence -R.Y.) alone settles the great problems of political liberty and class struggle, and it is our business to prepare and organise this force and to employ it actively, not only for defence but also for attack"⁽¹⁰⁾ To the degree that we understand this truth, we will, to the same degree, adopt the forms of organisation demanded by the revolutionary situation to that aim.

These three basic tasks imposed and made urgent by the revolutionary situation (the ideological struggle, organising, and establishment of organisations suitable to the revolutionary situation), come together to create a fourth basic task: *to help the masses go over to action*. To organise mass actions, demonstrations and protests on a nation-wide scale. To raise the mass struggle.

The profound crisis in the country, and factors such as the apparent halt in mass actions since the MESS strike and May Day 1978, and the upsurge of "gang" actions isolated from the masses, make the concepts of mass and mass movement an important topic of the day. These concepts will retain and increase their significance in the coming period. We therefore think it will be of use to touch upon these concepts briefly.

What is a mass? We must first answer this question. The concept of mass is distinct from that of "class" or "people". The concepts of class and people refer to phenomena which exist *objectively*. For example, a class is a broad group of people which is determined by its role in the process of production and relation, to the means of production. In capitalist society, the people is that group of classes and strata, in a definite country at a definite stage of development, whose interests *objectively* contradict the interests of the ruling exploiting class. It can be seen that the concepts of class and people imply something which exists and takes form outside the consciousness of individuals. Regardless of whether or not the members of a class or the people are conscious of their objective interests, they are still a class, the people. However, the concept of mass refers to those sections of the people or a class which have been drawn into action, the crowds in the struggle. Thus, the concept of mass changes according to changes in the structure of the struggle. Lenin explains this truth in the following way:

"It is (the concept of "masses") that changes in accordance with the changes in the nature of the struggle. At the beginning of the struggle it took only a few thousand genuinely revolutionary workers to warrant talk of the masses.(...) You have a mass when several thousand non-party workers, who usually live a philistine life and drag out a miserable existence, and who have never heard anything about politics, begin to act in a revolutionary way (...) When the revolution has

been sufficiently prepared, the concept "masses" becomes different: several thousand workers no longer constitute the masses. This word begins to denote something else. The concept of "masses" undergoes a change so that it implies the majority, and not simply a majority of the workers alone, but the majority of all the exploited. Any other kind of interpretation is impermissible for a revolutionary, and any other sense of the word becomes incomprehensible."⁽¹¹⁾

The concept of mass varies, not with the essence of the struggle, but with changes in its structure and scale. The *essence* of the struggle is its content or stage. It is the concept of *people* which varies with this. For example, some bourgeois sections are included in the people when the essence of the struggle is democratic. These same sections are not included when the essence of the struggle is socialist. The concept of mass, on the other hand, varies with the scale of the struggle.

In other words, the concept of mass becomes broader to the same degree as historical events gain in breadth and depth. Whereas in peaceful periods, a demonstration of 500-1000 people constitutes a mass, this grows and grows as events develop, as that sector of the class and the people drawn into action expands, until, at the moment of revolution, it becomes the "majority of the active and organised forces of the people". A correct understanding of this dynamics is of great importance today. At a time when events in our country have developed so much, when, due to the revolutionary situation, ever broader sections are participating in the struggle, this understanding will ensure the correct understanding of what a mass is, and what a mass action is. At the same time, we may have a correct understanding of what the TKP is aiming at when it speaks of "mass action", and what kind of action is needed today. Between 1962-1972 a meeting or demonstration of 2,000 people was a mass action. Today, it is not. Today, mass actions are those which bring out tens, hundreds of thousands.

Further, mass action and party work among the masses are two different concepts. The work of communists in factories, workplaces and neighbourhoods is not mass action, but party work among the masses. A contrary view could put our task of organising mass actions into the background.

The *present-day aim* of revolutionary mass movements is to repel the fascist onslaught, to convey revolutionary consciousness to the masses using their own experiences, and prepare them for revolution. An equally important aim is to undermine the system, to deepen the crisis. Alongside these, mass action is also aimed at winning the masses, expanding the circle of sympathizers, securing the leadership and gaining practical experience. We must bear these points in mind when planning mass actions.

Mass movements are of essentially two types: spontaneous mass movements and political mass movements in the true sense of the term.

Spontaneous mass movements are those not equipped with true class consciousness, not part of the general struggle in the country, divorced from the other forces. Their birth and development are essentially the product of objective conditions. This does not mean that spontaneous mass movements have no direction or organisation. Such an understanding would mean putting people on a par with sheep. In every movement of beings we call "human", there is definitely a certain direction and organisation--for there is consciousness. There can be organisation, direction, even political content in spontaneous mass movements. What is lacking is true class consciousness, harmony with the general struggle, unity. In short, the command of the communist party.

Political mass movements in the true sense of the word, on the other hand, are actions involving true class consciousness and unity of the masses with other forces. The element which transforms the spontaneous movements of the masses into true political mass movements, is the communist party. All movements not directed by true class consciousness (communist consciousness) are spontaneous. To transform such movements into true political struggle is one of the objects of the communist party's existence.

When the concept of mass movement is viewed in this way, we see that the mass movement in Turkey, having grown so much and assumed such giant dimensions, is still, to a great extent, at the level of a spontaneous movement. It is changing and becoming a true political movement to the extent that the TKP is gaining strength and authority among the masses.

Communists always support actions which are properly planned and organised beforehand and which are part of the general struggle. Nevertheless, they always, without a moment's hesitation, plunge into spontaneous mass movements. For, despite any shortcoming or mistakes

these movements may have, it is always better to struggle among the masses than to remain on the side-lines. Moreover, the communists' task of transforming these movements into class conscious movements can only be fulfilled in the struggle itself.

In the present situation in which Turkey finds itself, the use of all means to multiply revolutionary mass actions is increasingly becoming the key to all questions. We have seen that there has been a halt in mass actions since May Day 1978. As Comrade H.Erdal pointed out, "The cause of this tendency lies not in a reduction of the objective causes of mass movements, for, on the contrary, the causes of the objective dissatisfaction of the masses are constantly increasing. The cause of the decline in mass movements is the inadequate development of the subjective factor".⁽¹²⁾ And again, as Comrade Erdal has said, the most important cause of the inadequate development of the subjective factor is the "lack of success in organising PRE-PLANNED AND ORGANIZED mass movements for correct political aims by correctly evaluating the objective and subjective conditions"⁽¹³⁾

Some may say that we are, in any case, far from encompassing the scale of the progressive-revolutionary movement. They may therefore fear that a more rapid development of events would find us even more inadequate. This view is fundamentally wrong. The masses learn best from their own experience. Our people will best comprehend the road to their well-being in the struggle. *Revolution teaches!* It remains to us to clearly show our people the road to liberation, to conduct agitation and propaganda in a manner suited to the realities of the day, and with inexhaustible energy, to help the masses pass over to action.

The assault on communists has greatly intensified in the recent period. They are attacking from all directions, using every method. Fascist, Maoist wolf, gangster trade-union boss, social-democrat, petty-bourgeois socialist each has their own ways and methods. This base encirclement can be broken only by trusting in the revolutionary energy of the masses, by raising the mass struggle. The day is not the day for retreat, negotiation or "deliberation". It is clear that they would descend on the working class at any sign of retreat. The only way out is mass actions organised around demands which have taken hold in the consciousness of the people and have become mass demands.

Revolutionary mass actions will accelerate the expulsion of deviant ideas from among the people, strengthen our revolutionary organisations, and make possible the hegemony of the working class in the

revolutionary movement through its own party. They will accelerate the process whereby the masses of the people will achieve revolutionary consciousness, learning not from books, but from their own experience. They will draw into the struggle, those sections standing on the side-lines. *Most importantly*, they will deepen the crisis in which the bourgeoisie finds itself, hasten differentiation within it, and accelerate the process whereby the revolutionary situation matures. The worker-peasant alliance and the national democratic front will be established only in this process.

The Communist Party of Turkey correctly evaluates the situation in the country today, and shows the way out. "The day is the day of action. It is the day for mass action against fascism under the leadership of our working class."⁽¹⁴⁾

However deep the crisis in which it finds itself, we know that the bourgeoisie will not fall unless we overthrow it. To be able to strike tomorrow, we must intensify revolutionary mass actions today.

The revolutionary situation is objective. No one can create it by wishing it. However, as K.Zarodov has pointed out, where sufficient objective conditions exist, *where sufficient "explosive material" has accumulated, decisive and aggressive action by revolutionaries can effect the necessary push for the maturing of the revolutionary situation. "The subjective factor can help to form some objective prerequisites of the socialist revolution"*.⁽¹⁵⁾

It is clear that, for communists and revolutionaries, there is no such thing as waiting for objective conditions to mature to the "ideal" point. That is menshevism. A correct grasp of this aspect of the question is of truly *vital* importance for the revolutionary movement of Turkey. Especially in view of the fact that the subjective factor is lagging behind objective conditions.

Accomplishment of the tasks imposed by the revolutionary situation will help the rapid maturing of the revolutionary situation, will disperse the threatening clouds hanging over our people and bring the country to an advanced democratic revolution. It will, at the same time, ensure that the struggle bears the stamp of the TKP and the working class, therefore ensuring that the working class is able to protect its *class independence*. The following long, but extremely important, quotation from Lenin explains very well what we want to say and the paths before us:

"To remove all misinterpretations and misunderstandings let us first of all note that the

danger to which we are referring lies not in the subjective, but in the objective aspect of the matter, not in the formal stand which social-democracy (communist—R.Y.) will take in the struggle, but in the material outcome of the entire present revolutionary struggle. The question is not whether this or that social-democratic (communist—R.Y.) group will want to dissolve in bourgeois democracy, or whether they realise that they are doing so. Nobody suggests that. We do not suspect any social-democrat (communist—R.Y.) of harbouring such a desire, and this is not at all a matter of desire. Nor is it a question of whether this or that social-democratic (communist—R.Y.) group will formally retain its separate identity, individuality, and independence of bourgeois democracy throughout the course of the revolution. They may not merely proclaim such “independence”, but may even retain it formally, and yet *it may turn out* that their hands will nevertheless be tied in the struggle against the inconsistency of the bourgeoisie. The ultimate political outcome of the revolution may prove to be that, despite the formal “independence” of social-democracy (communists — R.Y.) despite its complete organisational individuality as a separate party, it will in fact not be independent; it will not be able to place the imprint of its proletarian independence on the course of the events, it will prove so weak that,...., its “dissolution” in bourgeois democracy will nevertheless be a historical fact” (16)

In order to stamp the mark of the proletariat on the development of events, we must give new impetus to the ideological struggle, and take up the questions brought forward by this situation, developing their revolutionary content. We must first and foremost strengthen the organisations of our working class and people, the TKP, the general staff of our working class, first of all. We must establish new organisations which will be able to fulfill the tasks of the revolutionary situation, and generally innovate and reorganize all our organisations. We must exert all

our strength to help the masses pass over to action.

To summarize, the revolutionary situation demands *innovation* in all the activities of communists and revolutionaries. In every sphere, in the ideological struggle, in education, in organisation in political tactics in forms of action: *innovation!*

Such is the situation in our country today. There is a profound crisis. This situation, as Comrade I.Bilen, the General Secretary of the TKP, most correctly asserted, makes our country a weak link of the imperialist chain. It gives the revolutionary forces the historical responsibility of carrying out the revolution.

The development of events has accelerated. As the crisis becomes deeper, the dichotomy of either fascism or an advanced democratic people's revolution will show itself more clearly. Let us say one last thing that may perhaps help those who "cannot understand" this dichotomy:

"Anyone who has read Marx and failed to understand that in capitalist society, at every acute moment, in every serious class conflict, the alternative is either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat, has understood nothing of either the economic or the political doctrines of Marx".⁽¹⁷⁾

Today, Turkey has reached such a point of development that no government can be progressive without the participation of the working class. No government can be revolutionary if it is not established under the hegemony of the working class. Nothing other than an anti-fascist, anti-monopoly and anti-imperialist advanced democratic people's revolution can overcome the fascist danger, unemployment, poverty, rising prices, hunger and ignorance. And then, no revolutionary democratic transformation that does not turn into a socialist revolution through the Leninist process of uninterrupted revolution, that does not smash the bourgeois dictatorship with the dictatorship of the proletariat, can provide lasting solutions to any problem or protect any gain.

It is in this manner that both the problems and their solutions

have come onto the agenda of history. Three-four years from now, Turkey will be much different than it is today. Defeat is death! We have to win! We shall win! We shall carry out an advanced democratic people's revolution that will grow into socialism!

December 1978

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Appendix I: Surplus-Value

I. On the Method of Finding the Rate of Surplus-Value:

Labour-power is the aggregate of mental and physical capabilities which the human being exercises in production. The value of labour-power is equal to the value of the means of subsistence which are essential if that human being is to live at a level which will preserve these capabilities and allow him to reproduce. Theoretically, its equivalent in money is wages. (However, in Chapter III, we saw that wages in Turkey are much below the value of labour-power.)

Labour-power is such a "commodity", that there is a difference between its own value and the value that is created by the worker in expending it. The capitalist pays the worker the value of his labour-power (he does not even pay this in full). However, in expending his labour-power while engaged in production, the worker creates a value much greater than the value of his own labour-power. It is this difference between the value of labour-power and the value created by the worker in expending that labour-power, which constitutes surplus-value. The source of the capitalists' profits lies in this exploitation.

In what does the value of a commodity consist? *First*, production input and the depreciation of machinery and buildings. All of these, we

call constant capital — “C”. *Second*, wages, i.e., variable capital, or what the capitalists have paid in purchasing labour-power. This we call “V”. *Third*, surplus-value. We call this “S”. Let us call the commodity “A” and write the following formula:

$$(The\ value\ of\ A=C+V+S)$$

If we wish to understand to what degree the worker is exploited in producing “A”, we must look at the ratio of surplus-value to wages, i.e., (S/V) . This is what we call the rate of surplus-value. We can express this same rate in units of time as well. We divide the time during which the worker works for the employer without pay (the time in which he produces S), by the time in which the worker produces the equivalent of his own wages, i.e., the time in which he produces (V).

Now, let us assume that the total annual product of the manufacturing industry in Turkey is A. Once again, the value of A is equal to $(C+V+S)$ and we are going to find (S/V) . But, when we turn to the census of manufacturing industry there is no mention of “C”, “V” or “S”. What shall we do? This is where the discussion on method begins.

In the statistics, we find “wages”. But these are not exactly as they should be. For some years, they include high salaries received by non-workers. For this reason, “wages” appear much higher than they really are. The effect is to underestimate (S/V) .

Then we have “input”. This is the sum of what used to be called “materials used, raw materials, fuel and energy”. As we can see, this is not all of “C”. It does not include that portion of the value of machinery and buildings which is transferred to the product in the course of production, i.e., it does not include depreciation. This means that either we accept “input” as the equivalent of “C”, or we try to find another way to find a better estimate of “C”.

In the statistics, we find “output”. This is the value of the total annual product, i.e., what we have called “A” in our formula.

The statistics also include “value added”. “Value added” is obtained by subtracting “input” from the value of the annual product, i.e., “output”. Since input is only a part of “C”, value added includes wages (V), surplus-value (S) and the remaining part of (C), i.e., depreciation of machinery and buildings. Thus, we must find depreciation in order to find surplus-value.

Let us express what we have said above in the form of equations:

$$(A=C+V+S)$$

We want to find (S/V) . However, in the statistics:

[A(output)-part of C(input)]	=	Value Added
That is, [(C+V+S)-part of C(input)]	=	Value Added
That is, [The remaining part of C (depreciation of machinery and buildings)+V+S]	=	Value Added

We know the figures for value added and wages. In order to find "S", we must find what we have called the remaining part of "C", i.e., depreciation.

After this brief introduction, let us come to the differences in method we mentioned under "The Rate of Exploitation" in Chapter 3. As we know, these differences in method led to different rates of surplus-value in *Table: 1*.

Y.N. Rosaliev considers the total value added as newly created value and equates it (value added) to the sum of wages and surplus-value. That is, he accepts (value added=S+V). On the other hand, wage figures include the wages of all those employed in the manufacturing industry. Indeed, wages and salaries were not separated in the Turkish statistics for those years.

Thus, Rosaliev's method tends to overestimate both numerator and denominator in (S/V). "S" includes depreciation, while "V" includes salaries as well as wages. Although the two overestimations cancel each other out to a certain extent, this method, *technically*, tends to somewhat overestimate the rate of surplus-value.

Özlem Özgür considers value added as the sum of surplus-value, wages and depreciation, that is, [(S+V)+the other part of C, excepting "input"]. As depreciation what we have called the other part of "C", is not found in the statistics, he equates this to the gross additions made to fixed capital during the year. On the other hand, while in 1950 and 1959, wage figures include the wages of all those employed in the manufacturing industry, in 1963 and 1968 they include only the wages of those engaged in production.

This method of equating depreciation with gross annual additions to the fixed capital assumes that every machine or building acquired during the year will replace the old, worn ones. Thus, it overestimates the share of depreciation in value added and underestimates surplus-value. That is, the numerator in (S/V) is much reduced. For this reason, the rate of surplus-value appears lower than it is.

In our opinion, the most correct method, *technically*, is one which takes depreciation into account, but does not equate it to the total

investment in fixed capital made during the year. For this reason, like Özlem Özgür, we also considered value added as $[(S+V)+\text{one part of } C(\text{depreciation})]$. However, we tried to reduce depreciation.

For the years 1969-1972, we found the percentage ratio of general figures given for "consumption of fixed capital" to the figures for "gross fixed capital formation". The average percentage was 34%. We applied this percentage to the manufacturing industry and thus for 1970 and 1973, we assumed depreciation to 34%.

In addition to these, for the year 1970, statistics made no distinction between wages paid to those "employed in production" and wages paid to others. For 1973 however, these wage figures are given separately. In order to eliminate this discrepancy, we found the ratio between these two wage groups in 1972 and 1973. This was 100:35. This is how we arrived at the wages of those employed in production in 1970.

All the figures relating to what we have said above are presented in the table below:

Appendix Table: 1

Annual Gross Fixed Capital Formation and
Fixed Capital Consumption

YEAR	(1) Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Million TL)	(2) Fixed Capital Consumption (Million TL)	(3) (2) as a Percentage of (1)
1969	21,706.7	7,812.5	36.0
1970	27,004.9	9,065.5	33.6
1971	31,735.5	11,031.9	34.8
1972	40,360.4	13,614.1	33.7

Taken from *Türkiye İstatistik Cep Yılığı (Turkey Pocket Statistical Year Book) 1974*. DİE, Ankara 1975, pp.191-192.

The rates of surplus-value we obtained for 1970 and 1973 using the method explained and the figures presented above, have been given in *Table: 1* in Chapter 3.

The method we have used also has aspects which are weak

technically. One is that wage figures, i.e., (V), are reduced by restricting them only to the wages of those employed in production. There are workers who take part in the production of surplus-value without being directly engaged in production. Unfortunately, we cannot separate the wages of these workers from the high salaries of a few managers which distort all the figures. From this point of view, when finding (S/V), (V) appears smaller than it actually is. The depreciation figures we have assumed, on the other hand, are greater than they are in actual fact. This also leads to surplus-value (S) appearing smaller than it is in fact. Nevertheless, because the tendencies to underestimate (S) and (V) cancel each other out, we believe that the rate of surplus-value obtained by this method is the most correct *technically*.

Appendix Table: 2

Manufacturing Industry Data

YEAR	(1) Value added	(2) Annual Additions to Fixed Capital	(3) Estimated Depreciation as 34% of (2)	(4) Wages
1970	20,316,555,000	3,480,817,000	1,183,477,780	4,717,032,593
1973	55,003,931,442	9,244,320,286	3,143,068,897	11,032,060,824

Compiled from *Türkiye İstatistik Cep Yıllığı 1974*. DIE, Ankara 1975, pp.16-129 and Results of the 1973 Census of Manufacturing Industry.

While discussing methods, we have always underlined the word "technically". Because, as we explained in Chapter 3, if the whole working class, rather than just that part employed in the large manufacturing industry, were taken into account, the rate of surplus-value found would be higher than even the highest rate found by using one or the other of these methods.

The question may rise as to why we have given so much attention to these methods. Some overestimate, some underestimate, but all figures indicate a high rate of exploitation. It was necessary to show this. But, it may be asked, what need was there for the third method? The aim was

to see whether even the most *technically* correct method would yield the same high results.

II. On the Mass of Surplus-Value

The mass of surplus-value is the total surplus-value that passes into the hands of the capitalist. After passing through a series of transformations, this becomes profit.

The size of the mass of surplus-value depends, first and foremost, on the rate of exploitation. But that is not all. Even if the rate of surplus-value remains the same, the mass of surplus-value grows as much as do the number of workers employed by the capitalist and the length of the period during which he makes them work. Over-time and shift-work are of great significance in this respect.

We made a rough calculation of the mass of surplus-value created in the manufacturing industry of Turkey in various years between 1950-1973. Using the method which "underestimates" this, we equated the

Appendix Table: 3

Mass of Surplus-Value in the Manufacturing Industry

YEAR	Mass of Surplus Value (1000 TL)	Index	Increase
1950	419,062	100	—
1959	3,365,847	803	+703 %
1963	4,001,993	955	+ 19 %
1968	14,219,800	3393	+225 %
1970	12,118,705	2892	- 15 %
1973	34,727,550	8287	+187 %

additional annual investment in fixed capital to depreciation. Despite this, the extreme growth in the mass of surplus-value can be seen in the table above.

Most important, is the fact that the total wages paid by these employers in the same years grew at a much slower rate. For example, while the mass of surplus-value grew by 225% in the years 1963-1968, total wages grew by only 140%. While the mass of surplus-value jumped by 187% between 1970-1973, total wages increased by 134%. This also shows that the gap between the bourgeoisie and the working class of Turkey is growing.

Appendix II: Wages

I. The Value of Unskilled Labour-Power or the Required Minimum Wage:

In *Table 4* under the heading of wages in Chapter 3, we gave various figures for the "value of unskilled labour-power" or the "required minimum wage". The sources of these figures are as follows:

In July 1972, the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DISK) published a report on the "minimum wage". This report compared the minimum wage necessary to meet the requirements of a worker with the minimum wage still in effect that year. It showed that official minimum wages remained much below the value of unskilled labour-power. (*Table: 4*)

We arrived at the figure of 72TL given for 1972 by taking an average of the "required minimum wage" column in the above table.

The figures of 180TL and 200TL given for the years 1975 and 1976 are the results arrived at by the Association of Economists of Turkey (TIB). "...The daily wage required for a worker's family of three children to meet its needs is 151TL in 1975 prices. When we take into account the fact that price increases in the first five months of 1976 approached 10%, this figure becomes 165TL. A minimum daily wage of 200TL is necessary for this 165TL to pass to the worker's family as a

Appendix Table: 4

Relation Between the Value of Unskilled Labour-Power and
the Minimum Wage in 1972

CITY	Required Minimum Wage	Official Minimum Wage	Difference	Gap %
İSTANBUL	70.93	19.50	51.43	72.51
ANKARA	71.43	18.00	53.43	74.80
İZMİR	73.07	18.00	55.07	75.37

Aydın Engin, "Fiyatlar, Ücretler ve Asgari Ücret" ("Prices, Wages and the Minimum Wage") *İlke*, no:5, p.25 (from the DİSK Report).

net wage, after deductions". ("The Economy of Turkey in 1976" TİB Yayınları, Ankara 1977, No: 17, p.62) We assumed that 151TL would require a gross daily wage of 180TL.

We arrived at the figures of 300TL and 650TL we gave for the years 1977 and 1978, by adding a rough estimation of the tax burden to the net wage figures for May and subsequent months of 1977 given by Osman Nuri Koçtürk. Osman Nuri Koçtürk wrote as follows: "According to official data of the Ankara State Statistical Institute, the net minimum wage should be 252.88TL in May 1977, 336.32TL in August 1977 according to unofficial retail prices. These calculations were made before the recent price increases". (*İşçinin Sesi, The Worker's Voice*, no: 81, 9.12.1977). From this we assumed that a net 252.88TL roughly required a gross daily wage of 300TL; a net 500TL a gross daily wage of 650TL.

We arrived at the figure of 800TL gross that we gave for the end of 1978 using the above data of Osman Nuri Koçtürk. According to the OECD, in the summer of 1978 the cost of living index jumped 70% over the previous year. Towards the end of 1978, prices are rising 5% a month. (*Financial Times*, Supplement on Turkey, 13 November 1978) According to this information, and taking the 336TL given for August 1977 as a base, we first increased this by 70%, then added on 5% for each of July, August and September; added to the resultant rough estimate of net 620TL a tax burden of 30%, and arrived at the figure of 800TL. But even this figure is too low, because taxes alone would be more than 30%.

II. Wages in Comparison with the Minimum Wage and the Required Level of Wages


Appendix Table: 5

The Difference Between Average Wages and the
Official Minimum Wage, 1963-1977

YEAR	(1) Official Minimum Wage (Gross, TL/day)	GENERAL			PRIVATE SECTOR		
		(2) Average Wage (Gross, TL/day)	(3) Difference Between (1) and (2) as Percent- age of (1)	(4) Average of (3), 1963-77	(5) Average Wage in the Private Sector (Gross, TL/day)	(6) Difference Between (1) and (5) as Percent- age of (1)	(7) Average of (6) 1963-77
1963	10.10	17.92	74.4		18.30	81	
1964	11.00	19.55	93.6		—	—	
1965		21.62	96.5		21.20	93	
1966	12.90	23.53	113.9		—	—	
1967		25.83	100.2		24.40	89	
1968	17.10	28.22	118.8		—	—	
1969		32.13	87.9	105%	30.80	80	86.7%
1970	23.50	35.32	106.5		—	—	
1971		39.32	129.9		36.30	112	
1972	40.00	43.88	86.7		41.40	76	
1973		54.41	131.5		51.00	117	
1974	60.00	68.26	70.6		63.50	59	
1975		85.55	113.9		78.70	97	
1976	60.00	115.30	92.2		98.00	63	
1977		153.00	155.0		—	—	

Table, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*. ILO, 1974
1977 İcra Programı. DPT
1978 Programı, *Resmî Gazete*. no:16261
Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Plan (Third Five-Year Plan) compiled
from p.674.

Graph I



As can be seen in the table, the minimum wage for unskilled labour-power approaches wages when we add such factors as skill, seniority and overtime.

Moreover, the average wages mentioned in Chapter 3 are not even at the level of the required minimum wage. That is, the minimum wage required to meet the value of unskilled labour-power is much higher than both the official minimum wage and average wages — and the difference is growing. The gap between the official minimum wage and average wages on the one hand, and the required minimum wage on the other hand, is shown by this graph. (*Graph 1*)

III. Average Wages in Various Sections:

Appendix Table: 6

Gross Wages in Non-Agricultural Sectors

YEAR	Non-Agricultural Sections	Manuf. Industry	Mining	Construction	Transport, Storage, Communications	Fisheries
1964	19.55	17.73	15.64	19.62	21.88	14.61
1965	21.62	20.66	17.00	23.52	23.79	16.41
1966	23.53	22.66	21.39	22.82	28.49	21.55
1967	25.83	24.75	22.33	27.09	31.56	29.47
1968	28.22	27.06	27.09	29.03	33.72	28.34
1969	32.13	31.80	27.01	32.15	38.42	36.26
1970	35.32	35.72	31.39	33.72	40.41	35.45
1971	39.32	40.72	33.09	38.25	46.30	44.11
1972	43.88	45.21	35.64	41.71	52.13	38.74
1973	54.41	57.28	48.31	48.10	62.28	50.31
	(549)	(558)	(643)	(649)	(654)	(670)

Year Book of Labour Statistics. International Labour Office, 1974
(The figures in parentheses are the page numbers.)

Appendix Table 7
Average Wages in Branches of the Manufacturing Industry*

YEAR	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Food	17.60	18.91	20.50	21.73	24.16	26.78	30.36	33.88	37.26	45.86
Drink	21.87	25.03	28.07	29.17	33.73	35.99	50.45	45.76	47.28	58.96
Tobacco	15.96	17.54	20.53	21.92	26.35	27.67	54.68	37.33	35.82	64.34
Textiles	16.87	18.18	19.48	21.39	22.50	27.26	28.26	34.81	40.76	66.02
Clothing	17.75	18.87	19.05	19.57	21.38	25.71	28.39	29.27	30.84	38.40
Timber	14.81	16.07	16.56	18.16	19.22	36.76	24.54	29.17	30.14	35.16
Furniture	17.38	17.14	17.44	18.61	19.97	12.81	25.64	27.29	29.08	35.35
Paper and paper products	22.18	25.18	28.13	31.58	34.25	37.89	39.75	40.07	53.51	76.92
Rubber products	19.48	22.54	23.64	27.74	28.06	30.62	32.97	41.30	48.56	56.88
Chemicals	24.15	26.13	27.34	29.61	31.77	32.26	42.75	47.68	59.40	63.59
Petrol products and coal	36.96	40.99	44.09	53.82	56.54	56.63	54.50	67.97	76.80	96.58
Non-metallic mineral pro.	17.70	18.35	21.42	23.44	25.14	29.39	31.14	38.19	40.88	54.44
Basic metals industries	25.58	28.64	33.32	36.55	40.36	44.82	50.61	56.70	67.94	68.14
Metal products	20.73	22.67	23.38	25.31	27.12	37.43	34.20	40.15	44.91	52.06
Mach. ind. (non-electr. mac)	23.53	23.94	24.69	27.20	29.66	33.29	37.89	45.33	48.87	55.48
Electrical machinery	20.92	23.35	24.96	26.99	29.16	33.78	41.17	48.43	54.85	60.22
Transport vehicles	22.24	23.98	27.76	31.88	34.04	38.19	39.07	61.52	65.05	70.65
Printing-publishing	25.53	28.90	30.23	31.87	33.60	36.83	44.79	43.76	50.28	55.91
Leather and leather products	19.98	20.89	21.72	22.38	23.70	26.21	33.02	33.49	34.04	41.88
Various man. industries	17.20	19.34	20.36	23.57	23.96	36.88	30.92	31.49	36.68	40.84

Year Book of Labour Statistics, International Labour Office, 1974, p 626

* Average daily gross wages in liras (including salaries)

IV. Average Wages in Comparison with Price Increases: Real Wages

Appendix Table: 8


Index of Real Wages (Gross) 1963-1977


YEAR	Index of Average Wages	Yearly Increase %	(1) Istanbul Cost of Living Index	Yearly Increase %	(2) Ankara Cost of Living Index	Yearly Increase %	Index of Real Wages Accord. to (1)	Yearly Increase %	Index of Real Wages Accord. to (2)	Yearly Increase %	Real Wages Accord. to (1) (TL, gross)	Real Wages Accord. to (2) (TL, gross)
1963	100	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	100	-	17.92	17.92
1964	113.7	13.7	100.2	0.2	100.8	0.8	108.6	8.6	112.8	12.8	19.46	20.21
1965	120.6	6.1	104.8	4.6	107.6	6.7	115.2	6.1	112.1	-0.6	20.64	20.09
1966	131.3	8.9	113.6	8.4	113.5	5.5	115.7	0.4	115.7	3.2	20.73	20.73
1967	144.1	9.7	129.6	14.1	120.6	6.8	111.3	-3.8	119.5	3.3	19.95	21.41
1968	157.5	9.3	137.6	6.2	125.6	4.1	114.5	2.9	125.4	4.9	20.52	22.47
1969	179.3	13.8	144.2	4.8	132.7	5.7	124.3	8.6	135.1	7.7	22.28	24.21
1970	197.1	9.9	155.6	7.9	148.3	11.8	126.7	1.9	132.9	-1.6	22.71	23.82
1971	219.4	11.3	185.2	19.0	180.7	21.9	118.5	-6.5	121.4	-8.7	21.24	21.76
1972	244.9	11.6	213.7	15.4	208.3	16.8	114.6	-3.3	117.6	3.1	20.54	21.07
1973	303.6	24.0	243.6	14.0	241.2	15.8	115.9	1.1	125.9	7.1	20.77	22.56
1974	380.9	25.5	301.8	23.9	278.4	15.4	125.7	8.5	136.8	8.7	22.53	24.52
1975	477.4	25.3	365.8	21.2	331.3	18.0	130.5	3.8	144.1	5.3	23.39	25.82
1976	643.4	34.8	429.5	17.4	385.6	16.4	149.8	14.8	166.9	15.8	26.84	29.91
1977	853.8	32.7	541.2	26.0	472.4	22.5	157.8	5.3	180.7	8.3	28.28	32.38

Appendix Table: 9

Index of Real Wages (Net) 1971-1977
(1971=100)

YEAR	Index of net average wages	Yearly Increase (%)	(1) Istanbul Cost of Living Index	Yearly Increase (%)	(2) Ankara Cost of Living Index	Yearly Increase (%)	Index of Real Wages Accord. to (1)	Yearly Increase (%)	Index of Real Wages Accord. to (2)	Yearly Increase (%)	Real Wages Accord. to (1) (TL)	Real Wages Accord. to (2) (TL)
1971	100	—	100	—	100	—	100	—	100	—	31.70	31.70
1972	109.3	9.3	115.4	15.4	115.3	15.3	94.7	-5.3	94.8	-5.2	30.02	30.05
1973	130.2	19.1	131.5	14.0	133.5	15.8	99.0	4.5	97.5	2.9	31.38	30.90
1974	158.6	21.8	163.0	24.0	154.1	15.4	97.3	-1.7	102.9	5.5	30.84	32.62
1975	187.6	18.3	197.5	21.2	183.3	19.0	95.0	-2.4	102.4	-0.5	30.12	32.46
1976	240.1	30.0	231.9	17.4	213.4	16.4	103.5	9.0	112.5	9.9	32.81	35.66
1977	289.6	20.6	292.2	26.0	261.4	22.5	99.1	-4.2	110.8	-1.5	31.42	35.12





V. Real Wages (Manufacturing Industry) in Comparison with Productivity of Labour

Appendix Table: 10

Changes in the Condition of Workers in the Manufacturing Industry of Turkey, 1964-1973
(1964=100)

YEAR	1 Gross Average Wages (TL/day)	2 Wages Index	3 Istanbul Wages Exceeds Cost of Living Index	4 Index of Real Wages	5 Production per Worker TL/year	6 Index	7 Wholesale Price Index of Industrial Products	8 Real Index of Industrial Products	9 Labour's Share in Production	10. Index of exploita- tion
1964	17.73	100	100	100	78,700	100	100	100	100	100
1965	20.66	116.5	106.1	109.8	85,900	109.1	104.0	104.9	104.7	95.5
1966	22.66	127.8	110.7	115.4	97,800	124.3	108.1	115.0	100.3	99.7
1967	24.75	139.6	117.4	118.9	112,000	142.3	113.8	125.0	95.1	105.1
1968	27.06	152.6	122.3	124.8	118,800	151.0	115.3	131.0	95.3	106.0
1969	31.80	179.4	128.4	139.7	—	—	128.7	—	—	—
1970	35.72	201.5	140.2	143.7	112,800	143.3	129.2	110.9	139.6	77.2
1971	40.72	229.7	164.2	139.9	—	—	151.0	—	—	—
1972	46.21	255.0	185.9	137.2	181,700	230.9	167.6	137.9	99.5	100.5
1973	57.28	323.1	212.5	152.0	221,500	281.4	181.6	165.0	98.0	102.0

1 *International Labour Office, Yearbook 1974, Geneva, p. 538*

2 We adjusted the 1963=100 index to 1964=100.

3 Series 2 and 3.

4 Production per worker should have been in TL/day. However, there are no figures for "average weekly hours" changing from year to year. Therefore, in order to express this column in TL/day we would divide all by the same figure and thus the index would not change at all. That is why we base production per worker as TL/year.

5 *Enflasyon ve Bankacılık, Inflation and Banking, Turkey's Bank and Finance Journal, August 1975, p. 298* (adjusted from the 1963=100 index)


6 Series 6 and 7.

7 Series 4 and 8. The real ratio of the share of the product received by the worker to the total product. When this figure becomes smaller, it means that exploitation is increasing.

8 Series 8 and 4. It shows the tendency of exploitation. When the worker's share is larger, it means that exploitation is increasing.

Series 2, 4, 8 and 9 in Appendix Table: 10 are shown in Graph IV

Graph IV



Appendix Table: II
Real Wages in Various Sectors of Manufacturing Industry

(a)
Chemical Industry

YEAR	Average Wages TL/day Gross	Average Wages Index	Istanbul Wage- Earner's Cost of Living Index	Real Wages	Output per Worker TL/year	Worker Index	Wholesale Price Index	Real Labour Product- ivity	Labour's Share in Produc- tion
1964	24.15	100	100	100	103,500	100	100	100	100
1965	26.13	108.2	106.1	102.0	126,900	122.6	102.7	119.4	85.4
1966	27.34	113.2	110.7	102.3	132,200	127.7	104.5	122.2	83.7
1967	29.61	122.6	117.4	104.4	147,500	142.5	105.8	134.7	77.5
1968	31.77	131.6	122.3	107.6	167,500	161.8	107.7	150.2	71.5
1969	32.26	133.6	128.4	104.1	-	-	104.9	-	-
1970	42.75	177.0	140.2	126.2	137,000	132.4	116.6	113.6	111.1
1971	47.68	197.4	164.2	120.2	-	-	138.0	-	-
1972	59.40	246.0	185.9	132.3	220,000	212.6	145.1	146.5	90.3
1973	63.59	263.3	212.5	123.9	253,800	245.2	161.4	151.9	81.6

(b)
Food Industry

1964	17.60	100	100	100	118.800	100	100	100	100
1965	18.91	107.4	106.1	101.2	126.400	106.4	104.4	101.9	99.3
1966	20.50	116.5	110.7	105.2	146.700	123.5	110.4	111.9	94.0
1967	21.73	123.5	117.4	105.2	175.500	147.7	120.9	122.2	86.1
1968	24.16	137.3	122.3	112.3	183.300	158.5	124.5	127.3	88.2
1969	26.78	152.2	128.4	118.5	—	—	126.8	—	—
1970	30.36	172.5	140.2	123.0	173.700	146.2	138.9	105.3	116.8
1971	33.88	192.5	164.2	117.2	—	—	162.3	—	—
1972	37.26	211.7	185.9	113.9	250.000	210.4	187.9	112.0	101.7
1973	45.86	260.6	212.5	122.6	285.500	240.3	206.5	116.1	105.6

(c)
Machine Industry

1964	23.53	100	100	100	177,800	100	100	100	100
1965	23.94	101.7	106.1	95.9	99,500	84.5	121.0	70.3	136.4
1966	24.69	105.0	110.7	94.9	103,600	87.9	121.0	73.1	129.8
1967	27.20	115.0	117.4	98.5	117,900	100.1	123.2	81.3	121.2
1968	29.66	126.1	122.3	103.1	128,200	108.8	120.7	90.1	144.4
1969	33.39	141.9	128.4	110.5	—	—	120.8	—	—
1970	37.89	161.0	140.2	114.8	92,000	78.1	127.8	61.1	187.9
1971	45.33	192.6	164.2	117.3	—	—	172.0	—	—
1972	48.87	207.7	185.9	111.7	174,700	148.3	184.7	80.3	139.1
1973	55.78	235.8	212.5	110.0	132,400	112.4	206.2	54.5	205.5

(d)
Electrical Machinery Industry

1964	20.92	100	100	100	90,700	100	100	100	100	100
1965	23.35	111.6	106.1	105.2	86,500	95.4	103.0	92.6	113.6	113.6
1966	24.96	114.5	110.7	103.4	93,800	103.4	110.9	93.2	111.1	111.1
1967	26.99	129.0	117.4	109.9	108,800	120.0	116.3	103.2	106.5	106.5
1968	29.16	139.4	122.3	114.0	117,500	129.5	118.8	109.0	104.6	104.6
1969	33.78	161.5	128.4	125.8	—	—	127.2	—	—	—
1970	41.17	196.8	140.2	140.4	104,800	115.5	130.4	88.6	158.5	158.5
1971	48.43	231.5	164.2	141.0	—	—	147.4	—	—	—
1972	54.85	262.5	185.9	141.0	161,900	178.5	158.2	112.8	125.0	125.0
1973	60.22	287.9	212.5	135.5	128,300	141.5	167.5	84.5	160.4	160.4

(e)
Transport Vehicles Industry

1964	22.24	100	100	100	34,200	100	100	100	100	100
1965	23.98	107.9	106.1	101.7	36,500	106.7	121.0	88.2	115.3	115.3
1966	27.76	124.8	110.7	112.7	62,400	182.5	121.0	150.8	74.1	74.1
1967	31.88	143.8	117.4	122.1	70,100	205.0	123.2	166.4	73.4	73.4
1968	34.04	153.1	122.3	125.2	78,700	230.1	120.7	190.6	65.7	65.7
1969	38.19	171.7	128.4	133.7	—	—	120.8	—	—	—
1970	39.07	175.7	140.2	125.3	72,900	213.2	127.8	166.8	75.1	75.1
1971	61.52	276.6	164.2	168.5	—	—	172.0	—	—	—
1972	65.05	292.5	185.9	157.3	162,200	474.3	184.7	256.8	61.3	61.3
1973	70.65	317.7	212.5	149.5	126,800	370.8	206.2	179.8	83.1	83.1

(f)
Textile Industry

1964	16.87	100	100	100	48,000	100	100	100	100
1965	18.18	107.8	106.1	101.6	50,600	105.4	102.7	102.6	99.0
1966	19.48	115.5	110.7	104.3	56,000	114.6	108.5	105.6	98.8
1967	21.39	126.8	117.4	108.0	59,800	124.6	111.8	111.4	96.9
1968	22.50	133.4	122.3	109.1	65,700	136.9	109.7	124.8	87.4
1969	27.26	161.6	128.4	125.9	--	--	110.0	--	--
1970	28.26	167.5	140.2	119.5	77,400	161.3	115.4	139.8	85.5
1971	34.81	206.3	164.2	125.6	--	--	142.0	--	--
1972	40.76	241.6	185.9	130.0	136,400	284.2	160.5	177.1	73.4
1973	66.02	391.3	212.5	184.1	153,700	320.2	176.6	181.3	101.5

Sources: Average wages: *ILO Yearbook 1974*.- Wholesale price indexes: Türkiye İş Bankası İktisadi Araştırmalar Müd. Yayını. *Enflasyon ve Bankacılık (Inflation and Banking)*, p.298.

For the clothing, textile, chemical and electrical machinery industries, we used the wholesale price indexes for these goods. For the machine and transport vehicles industries, we used the wholesale price index, "Machine (agricultural) industry products".

- Output per worker (Productivity of labour): 1964, 1968, 50 *Yıl DİE*, 1970, 72, 73; 1974 *Türkiye Cep Yılığ* (1974 Turkey Pocket Yearbook)

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**Report of the
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the General
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CC of TKP, at the
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